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BRYTHONIC CHRISTIANITY*

By Louis Herbert Gray

Professor of Comparative Linguistics, Columbia University

While we possess a very considerable wealth of material regarding the history, liturgy, and organization of Goidelic Christianity, our sources for knowledge of the Brythonic Churches are lamentably scanty.[1] Apart from a few scattered notices, these sources are

* Read in abstract at the Celtic Session of the Centenary of Fordham University, 15 September, 1941.

1. *Acta Sanctorum quotquot toto orbe coluntur* (Paris, 1863 sqq.) *(ASB)*; *Acta Bollandiana* (Brussels, 1882 sqq.) *(AB)*; S. Baring-Gould and J. Fisher, *The Lives of the British Saints*, 4 vols. (London, 1907-13) *(LBS)*; *Bibliotheca hagiographica Latina*, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1898-1911); *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Landévennec*, ed. A. de La Borderie (Rennes, 1888); *Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum Latinorum antiquiorum saeculo xvi. qui asservantur in bibliotheca nationali Parisiensi*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1889-93) *(CCHLBNP)*; G. H. Doble, *Cornish Saints Series (CSS)*; F. Duine, *Catalogue des sources hagiographiques pour l'histoire de Bretagne jusqu'à la fin du XII^e siècle* (Paris, 1922); *Inventaire liturgique de l'hagiographie bretonne* (Paris, 1922) (= *Bulletin et mémoires de la société archéologique du département d'Ille-et-Vilaine* XLIX, i-ix, 1-292); *Memento des sources hagiographiques de l'histoire de Bretagne . . . du V^e au X^e siècle* (Rennes, 1918) (= *ibid.*, XLVI, 243-457); *Bréviaires et missels des églises et abbayes bretonnes de France antérieurs au XVII^e siècle* (Rennes, 1906) (= *ibid.*, XXXV, 1-219); A. J. G. Evans, *The Text of the Book of Llan Dâv* (Oxford, 1893) (the edition by W. J. Rees [Llandovery, 1840] may be disregarded); L. Gougaud, *Christianity in Celtic Lands* (London, 1932); A. H. Haddan and W. Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1869-1878) *(CED)*; H. O'N. Hencken, *The Archaeology of Cornwall and Scilly* (London [1932]); R. Largillière, *Les Saints et l'organisation chrétienne primitive dans l'Armorique bretonne* (Rennes, 1925); A. Le Grand, *Les Vies des saints de la Bretagne armorique*, first ed. 1636 or 1637; best ed. by A. M. Thomas, J. M. Abgrall, and P. Peyron (Quimper, 1901); G. A. Lobineau, *Les Vies des saints de Bretagne* (Rennes, 1724); F. Lot, *Mélanges d'histoire bretonne* (Paris, 1907); J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne en Armorique* (Paris, 1883); *Les Noms des saints celtiques* (Paris, 1910) (= *Revue celtique* XXIX [1908], 222-48, 271-311; XXX [1909], 121-55, 283-320, 395-403); H. Morice, *Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne*, I, (Paris, 1742); E. J. Newell, *A History of the Welsh Church to the Dissolution of the Monasteries* (London, 1895); *Nova Legenda Anglie*, ed. C. Horstmann, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1901) *(NLA)*; J. Pryce, *The Ancient British Church* (London, 1878); R. Rees, *An Essay on the Welsh Saints* (London, 1836); W. J. Rees, *Lives of the Cambro British Saints* (Llandovery, 1853) *(CBS*; to be superseded by the *Vitae Sanctorum Britanniae* of A. W. Wade-Evans, in press); W. Smith and H. Wace, *A Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literatures, Sects, and Doctrines*, 4 vols. (London, 1877-87) *(DCB)*; T. Taylor, *The Celtic Christianity of Cornwall* (London, 1916); A. W. Wade-Evans, *Welsh Christian Origins* (Oxford [1934]); F. E. Warren, *The Liturgy and Ritual of the Celtic Church* (Oxford, 1891); H. Williams, *Christianity in Early Britain* (Oxford, 1912); L. H. Gray, "A Survey of Studies in Cornish Hagiography and Church History," in *Review of Religion*, IV (1940), 431-34.

two: the *Vitae* of the Brythonic saints; and the evidence to be gleaned from place-names. In the case of Brittany, indeed, these two constitute our only material not only for the ecclesiastical, but also for the civil, history of the land in the early period.

The lives of the Brythonic saints, unfortunately, must be used with extreme caution. In no case are they *acta sincera*. Except for a very few, they are late in date; many of them were evidently written long after all real knowledge of the saints whom they commemorate had been lost, and are, in reality, only homilies whose chief end is edification; there is a suspicious absence of definite names of persons and places; their chronology is frequently impossible historically; ignorance is too often thinly veiled by glittering generalities on the great virtues of their heroes and by long discourses whose piety is far superior to the specific information which they give concerning the saints extolled; and attention is devoted chiefly to an accumulation of miracles ascribed to those whom they eulogize. It must, of course, be remembered that when these *Vitae* were composed, the modern concept of history had not been developed; and sometimes there is reason to suspect that, to glorify a local cult or a local monastery, one saint is intentionally magnified at the expense of another.[2]

In the *Vitae* of the Brythonic saints, additional difficulties confront the investigator. Of many of these holy men, biographies of considerable extent must once have existed only to vanish. Brittany is best off in the number of *Lives* that have survived; for Wales we have relatively few; for Cornwall almost none. Brittany was at least spared the robbery and destruction inflicted by Henry VIII and the "Reformers"; and Wales was better protected topographically than Cornwall. But apart from all this, many *Vitae* were abridged for use in Legendaries, and then were further shortened for the various diocesan Breviaries, while their originals were allowed to disappear.[3]

Here Brittany furnishes an outstanding example of each of the two extremes. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dominican Al-

2. See, in general, *The Legends of the Saints: An Introduction to Hagiography* by the distinguished Bollandist H. Delehaye (English translation, London, 1907). For the Celtic Lives in general, see Gougaud, pp. 52-56; and for the Irish, C. Plummer, *Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae* (*VSH*), I (Oxford, 1910), lxxxix-cxxix. Two Brythonic saints, David and Machutus (Maclovius), are still commemorated by "black-letter days" in the Anglican Book of Common Prayer.

3. For Brittany see especially the four works by F. Duine cited in Note 1.

bert Le Grand industriously compiled, from all the Legendaries, Breviaries, and other documents which he could find, voluminous *Vitae,* in which he heaped marvel on marvel with an entire disregard of historical fact and with the sole aim of pious edification. At the other extreme, the Benedictine Gui-Alexis Lobineau (1666-1727), almost a century later, wrote his somewhat jejune collection in a highly critical spirit, though drawing, of necessity, on much the same sources as Le Grand; and he was aided by a group of Benedictines, who made for him a collection of Latin *Vitae* contained in pages 601-889 of Bibliothèque Nationale MS. fr. 22,321, formerly part of the library of the monastery of the Blancs-Manteaux at Paris.[4]

For Wales, one has a collection of lives contained in a manuscript in the British Museum (Vesp. A. XIV), and probably written at Brecon in the twelfth century; but the only edition thus far, by W. J. Rees, is almost incredibly faulty[5] (a new corpus, *Vitae Sanctorum Britanniae,* under the able editorship of A. W. Wade-Evans, is now in press). A Welsh counterpart to the Breton Le Grand was Nicholas Roscarrock (?1549-1634?), who made a collection of *Lives* in English, preserved in a manuscript of 401 folios, now in the Library of Cambridge University (Add. MS. 3041), running from Aa to Si.[6] Some information is also given (though no formal *Vitae*) by William of Worcester (1415-1482?) and by John Leland (*ca.* 1506-1552).

In 1937, Mr. Francis Wormald, of the British Museum, found that the fourteenth-century manuscript I, 81 (formerly M.n. 57) in the Ducal

4. From this manuscript, *Vitae* have been printed of SS. Maudetus, Golven, Hervé, and Efflam by A. de La Borderie *(Mémoires de la société d'émulation des Côtes-du-Nord* XXVIII [1890], 202-9; XXIX [1891], 216-28, 256-74; *Annales de Bretagne* VII [1892], 282-96, of St. Goneri by Y. M. Lucas *(Revue historique de l'ouest,* 1888, pp. 10-15; cf. La Borderie, *ibid.,* pp. 255-56), and of SS. Meriadoc and Sulian by G. H. Doble (*CSS,* XXXIV, 44-51; XXXVII, 35-36).

5. To be corrected by the collation with the original manuscript by W. Stokes (published by K. Meyer) in *Y Cymmrodor* XIII (1900), 76-96, without taking into consideration the very numerous minor misprints. The Lives of SS. David and Carantoc *(CBS,* pp. 117-44, 97-101) have been properly re-edited by A. W. Wade-Evans in *Y Cymmrodor* XXIV (1913), 1-71, and in J. T. Evans, *The Church Plate of Cardiganshire* (Stow-on-the-Wold, 1914), pp. 133-36; of SS. Iltut and Kebi (pp. 158-82, 183-87) in *ASB,* III Nov., 225-34, 825-27; of St. Winfreda (pp. 198-209) *ibid.,* I Nov., 702-8; and of the Irish St. Aiduus (pp. 232-50) by C. Plummer, *VSH,* I, 295-311.

6. His life of the English St. Christina is printed in *NLA,* II, 532-37; and excerpts are given in *CCS,* notably XXV, 25-32, and in Stephens's *Material for a History of the Church and Parish of St. Carantoc* (inaccessible to the writer).

Library at Gotha contains forty-five lives of English and Cornish saints, including, among the latter, those of SS. Nectan, Rumon (*Vitae* of these two previously unknown), Petroc, Cadoc, Neot, and Sativola. This manuscript Canon Doble characterizes as "beyond doubt the most valuable English Mediaeval collection of Lives of saints in existence. Those in *Nova Legenda Anglie* are merely pale copies, only of value where their originals are lost."[7] The new material in this manuscript will, it is hoped, appear in the Bollandist *Subsidia Hagiographica* under the editorship of Canon Doble, Mr. Wormald, and Fr. P. Grosjean, S.J.

The *Nova Legenda Anglie,* to which Canon Doble refers, contains the *Vitae* of twenty-nine British saints;[8] but if one compares this collection, made by John of Tynemouth (*ca.* 1290-1349), with the *Lives* from which he drew, one very quickly sees how relatively meager they are, the frequent omission of names and places being especially vexatious.[9] The Legendaries and Breviaries are, of necessity, shorter still; and of purely British Propers only a few have survived.[10]

7. Letter to the present writer, 28 August 1939. Canon Doble has since translated the Lives of SS. Rumon and Nectan in *CSS,* XLII, 9-14; XLV, 5-26; and the account of the theft and restitution of the relics of St. Petroc in *Antiquity* (1939), pp. 403-15.

8. Bernacus (I, 114-17), Cadocus (I, 167-73), Caradocus (I, 174-76), Carantocus (I, 177-79), Cungarus (I, 248-54), David (I, 254-62), Decumanus (I, 263-65), Dubricius (I, 267-71), Gildas (I, 468-69), Gudwalus (I, 501-4), Gundleus (I, 504-6), Iltutus (II, 52-56), Yvi (II, 91-92), Iustinanus (II, 93-95), Kebius (II, 100-2), Kynedus (II, 105-9), Maclovius (II, 149-56), Maglorius (II, 156-57), Melorus (II, 183-85), Neotus (II, 213-18), Osmanna (II, 237-39), Oudoceus (II, 273), Paternus (II, 274-78), Petrocus (II, 317-20), Piranus (II, 320-27), Samson (II, 350-55), Tatheus (II, 361-63), Teliavus (II, 364-67), and Winwaloeus (II, 460-65, 558-73).

9. Cf. Bernacus, *CBS,* pp. 5-12: *NLA,* I, 114-17; Cadocus, *CBS,* pp. 22-96: *NLA,* I, 167-73 = *ASB,* III Jan., 218-20; Carantocus, *CBS,* pp. 97-101 = *ASB,* III Mai., 583-85: *NLA,* I, 177-79; Gudwalus, *ASB,* I Jun., 718-36: *NLA,* I, 501-4; Gundleius, *CBS,* pp. 145-57: *NLA,* I, 504-6; Iltutus, *CBS,* pp. 158-82 = *ASB,* III Nov. 225-34: *NLA,* II, 52-56 = *ASB,* III Nov., 234-36; Yvi, *AB,* II, 324-30: *NLA,* II, 91-92 = *ASB,* III Oct., 400; Kebius, *CBS,* pp. 183-87 = *ASB,* III Nov., 825-27; *NLA,* II, 100-2; Melorius *AB,* V, 166-76: *NLA,* II, 183-85 = *ASB,* I Jan., 136-37; Neotus, *ASB,* VII Jul., 330-40: *NLA,* II, 213-18; Osmanna, *ASB,* III Sept., 422-25; *NLA,* II, 237-39; Tatheus, *CBS,* pp. 255-64: *NLA,* II, 361-63.

10. For the Breton material see the works of Duine cited in Note 1. For SS. Deiniol, Meriadoc, and Ronan see *LBS,* IV, 387-90; *CSS,* XXXIV, 44-55; *ASB,* I Jun., 81-82. For British saints, fragments survive of a Proper of SS. David (*CED,* I, 621; *CBS,* p. 144; *Y Cymmrodor* XXIV [1913], 28) and Teliau (*CED,* I, 621-22); and complete Propers for SS. David (*CED,* I, 696-97; Warren, pp. 159-61), Cadoc (*CSS,* XL, 43-45), and Nectan (*CSS,* XLV, 27). John of Tynemouth has preserved collects for SS. Yvi, Iustinan, Melor, Neot, Teliau, and Wenefreda (*NLA,* II, 92-93, 95, 188, 218, 368, 422). Lives existing as

Omitting the extremely condensed *Vitae* in Legendaries and Breviaries, as well as modern monographs on individual Lives, as falling outside the scope of this study, and citing only the best editions, the Brythonic saints of whom printed Latin *Vitae* exist are as follows:[11]

Bernacus or Brynach (Welsh, sixth century; 7 April): *CBS*, pp. 5-12 (*ca.* 1200), abridged in *NLA*, I, 114-17 (Duine, *Memento*, no. 101; *LBS*, I, 321-27; *DCB*, I, 316).

Briocus or Briomaglus, Brieuc, Briek (Welsh, but labored chiefly in Brittany; *ca.* 440-530; 1 May): I, F. Plaine, *AB*, II (1883), 162-90 (probably of the eleventh century); II, *ASB*, I Mai, 95-97 (from a Proper) (Lobineau, pp. 11-19; Le Grand, pp. 151-62; Duine, *Memento*, no. 62; *CSS*, XVII; *LBS*, I, 288-301; *DCB*, I, 338).

Cadocus or Catuuodus, Cattwg (Welsh; *ca.* 497-557; 24 January): *CBS*, pp. 22-96 (by Lifris, probably at Brecon, between 1067 [or, more likely, 1073] and 1086); abridged in *NLA*, I, 167-73 = *ASB*, III Jan., 218-20 (Lobineau, pp. 30-31; Le Grand, pp. 547-52; Duine, *Memento*, no. 102; *CSS*, XI; *LBS*, II, 14-42; *DCB*, I, 364).

Caradocus (Welsh; † 1124; 13 April): A. de La Borderie, *Mélanges historiques, littéraires, bibliographiques publiés par la société des bibliophiles bretons*, II (Nantes, 1883), 210-15; *NLA*, I, 174-76 (*LBS*, II, 75-78).

Carantocus or Caronnog (Welsh; fifth century; 16 May): *CBS*, pp. 97-101 = *ASB*, III Mai, 583-85 = A. W. Wade-Evans, in J. T. Evans, *The Church Plate of Cardiganshire* (Stow-on-the-Wold, 1914), pp. 133-35 (vita prima), 135-36 (vita secunda) (beginning of the twelfth century), abridged in *NLA*, I, 177-79 (Duine, *Memento*, no. 103; *CSS*, XIV[2]; *LBS*, II, 78-90; *DCB*, I, 383).

Clitaucus or Clydog (Welsh; *ca.* 482; 19 August): *Book of Llan Dâv*, pp. 193-95; *NLA*, I, 190-91 (*LBS*, II, 153-54; *DCB*, I, 578-79).

Congarus or Cyngar (labored chiefly in Somerset and Wales; eighth century; 7 November): *NLA*, I, 248-54 (Duine, *Memento*, no. 106; *LSB*, II, 248-53; *DCB*, I, 723).

Conwoïonus (Breton; † 868; 5 January): Morice, I, 229-33 (second half of the

yet only in manuscript or known solely from the French compilations by Le Grand and Lobineau or from *LBS* are omitted as being either inaccessible or of no importance for the present study (the work of de Garaby, *Vies des bienheureux et des saints de Bretagne pour tous les jours de l'année*, St.-Brieuc, 1839, is quite devoid of scientific value). For bibliographical material of worth in this connexion see Duine (especially his *Memento*); Loth, *Émigration*, pp. 242-56, and *Noms*, *passim*; *CED*, I, 27-36, 156-61, 700; II, 86-90; Williams, pp. 297-303.

11. This list is a mere compilation (though every *Vita* in it has been read anew) to give a convenient bibliographical summary, brought up to date, with indications as to where additional material may be found. It must also be borne in mind that the dates assigned to the saints often differ, as do even their feasts. For the dates of the *Lives* of SS. Cadoc, Carantoc, II Gildas, and Iltut see J. S. P. Tatlock, in *Speculum*, XIV (1939), 346-49, 353-54.

ninth century) (Duine, *Memento,* no. 5; Lobineau, pp. 181-92; Le Grand, pp. 1-7).

Corentinus or Korantin (Breton; † *ca.* 540; 12 December): I, F. Plaine, in *Bulletin de la société archéologique de Finistère,* XIII (1886), 118-53 (ascribed by him to the ninth century); II, A. Oheix and E. Fawtier-Jones, *Mémoires de la société d'histoire et d'archéologie de Bretagne,* VI (1925), 38-56 (both *Vitae* ascribed by them to the thirteenth century) (Duine, *Memento,* no. 55; Lobineau, pp. 50-53; Le Grand, pp. 683-99; *CSS,* V; *LBS,* II, 181-84; *DCB,* I, 688).

Cunivalus (Breton; sixth century; ?): A. Oheix, *Revue celtique,* XXXII (1901), 157-69 (perhaps end of the tenth century) (Duine, *Memento,* no. 61).

David or Dewi (Welsh; sixth century; 1 March): I, *CBS,* pp. 117-44 (by Rhygyfarch or Ricemarch, *ca.* 1090), better by A. W. Wade-Evans, *Y Cymmrodor,* XXIV (1913), 1-28 (text; translation and notes, pp. 29-73; translation, London, 1923); II, *ASB,* 1 Mar., 41-45; III, Giraldus Cambrensis (*ca.* 1146-1220), *Opera,* III, 377-404, ed. J. S. Brewer (London, 1863 = H. Wharton, *Anglia Sacra,* II (London, 1691), 628-40; IV, *NLA,* I, 254-62 (Duine, *Memento,* no. 107; *LBS,* II, 285-322; *DCB,* I, 791-93).

Decumanus (Welsh; † 706 ?; 27 August): *NLA,* I, 263-65 = *ASB,* VI Aug. 24 (probably written in Somerset at earliest in the fifteenth century) (*CSS,* XXVIII; *LBS,* II, 323-24; *DCB,* I, 800).

Deiniolus (Welsh; † 584 ?; 23 November): *LBS,* IV, 387-90 (nine lections from a Legendary) (*LBS,* II, 325-31; *DCB,* I, 802).

Dubricius or Dyfrig (Welsh; *ca.* 450; 14 November): I, *Book of Llan Dâv,* pp. 78-86; II, Wharton, *Anglia Sacra,* II, 654-61 (by Benedictus Claudiocestrensis; both *Vitae* not long after 1120); III, *NLA,* I, 267-71 (Duine, *Memento,* no. 108; *LBS,* II, 359-82; *DCB,* I, 909-10).

Efflamus (Irish; labored in Brittany; † 512; 6 November): A. de La Borderie, *Annales de Bretagne,* VII (1892), 282-96 (from Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. fr. 22,321; original *Vita* not before the twelfth century) (Lobineau, pp. 86-88; Le Grand, pp. 582-90; Duine, *Memento,* no. 67).

Ethbinus or Egbinus (Breton; † *ca.* 625; 19 October): I, A. de La Borderie, *Cartulaire,* pp. 137-41 = *ASB,* VIII Oct., 487-88 (perhaps eleventh century); II, *NLA,* I, 368-70 (Lobineau, pp. 128-29; Le Grand, pp. 510-14; Duine, *Memento,* no. 66; *LBS,* II, 466-67; *DCB,* II, 211-12).

Fingarus or Guignerus, Eguinerus, Guinearus, Wynner (Irish; labored first in Brittany and then in Cornwall; fifth century; 14 December): *MPL,* CLIX, 325-34 (by a Cornish monk Anselm, probably in the twelfth century) (Lobineau, pp. 23-24; Le Grand, pp. 703-4; Duine, *Memento,* no. 110; *LBS,* III, 24-30; *DCB,* II, 517).

Gildas or Jildaz (Welsh; labored chiefly in Brittany; † 570 ?; 29 January): I, *ASB,* III Jan., 573-82 = Lot, *Mélanges,* pp. 433-73 = Gildas, ed. H. Williams (London, 1901), pp. 322-89 (by a monk of Ruys, *ca.* 1060); II, Gildas, ed. Williams, pp. 394-413 (by Caradoc of Llancarvan, somewhat after 1088); III, *CCHLBNP,* II, 182-91 (Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. lat. 5318); IV, *NLA,* I,

468-69 (Duine, *Memento,* no. 1; Lobineau, pp. 72-77; Le Grand, pp. 17-26; *LBS,* III, 81-130; *DCB,* II, 670-71).

Golvenus or Gulven, Vulvinnus (Breton; † *ca.* 600; 1 July): A. de La Borderie, *Mémoires de la société d'émulation des Côtes-du-Nord,* XXIX (1891), 216-28 (from Bibliothèque Nationale MS. fr. 22,321) (Lobineau, pp. 204-6; Le Grand, pp. 277-88; Duine, *Memento,* no. 51; *LBS,* II, 138-43; *DCB,* II, 695).

Gonerius (British; labored in Brittany; sixth century; 18 July): Y. M. Lucas, *Revue historique de l'ouest,* 1888, pp. 10-15 (from Bibliothèque Nationale MS. fr. 22,321; corrections by La Borderie, *ibid.,* pp. 255-56; not earlier than the twelfth century) (Lobineau, pp. 83-84; Le Grand, pp. 117-22; Duine, *Memento,* no. 69; *LBS,* III, 134-38).

Gudvallus (Welsh, labored chiefly in Brittany; seventh century ?; 6 June): *ASB,* 1 Jun., 718-36 (*ca.* 1140), abridged in *NLA,* I, 501-4 (Lobineau, pp. 135-37; Duine, *Memento,* no. 146; *CSS,* XXX; *LBS,* III, 150-54; *DCB,* II, 807).

Guenaelus (Breton; sixth century; 3 November): *ASB,* 1 Nov., 674-79 (second half of the ninth century ?) (Lobineau, pp. 80-82; Le Grand, pp. 554-58; Duine, *Memento,* no. 6; *LBS,* III, 172-81).

Gundleius or Gwynllyw (Welsh; sixth century; 29 March): *CBS,* pp. 145-57 (beginning of the twelfth century?), abridged in *NLA,* I, 504-6 (Duine, *Memento,* no. 109; *LBS,* III, 234-41; *DCB,* II, 831-32).

Guthiernus (Breton; seventh century; 29 June, transferred to 3 July): *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Sainte-Croix de Quimperlé,* ed. L. Maître and P. de Berthou (Paris, 1896), pp. 3-7 (after the twelfth century) (Lobineau, p. 49; Duine, *Memento,* no. 70).

Hermelandus (born in the Low Countries; labored in Brittany; † *ca.* 720; 25 March): *ASB,* III Mar., 573-84 = W. Levison, *MGH, SRM,* V, 682-710 (end of the eighth or beginning of the ninth century) (Lobineau, pp. 168-74; Le Grand, pp. 658-62; Duine, *Memento,* no. 8; *DCB,* II, 924).

Hervaeus or Huvernus, Hervé (Breton; sixth century; 17 June): A. de La Borderie, *Mémoires de la société d'émulation des Côtes-du-Nord* XXIX (1891), 256-74, and F. Plaine, *Revue historique de l'ouest* (1893), pp. 367-78 (from Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. fr. 22,321) (Lobineau, pp. 111-13; Le Grand, pp. 232-39, Latin translation *ASB,* III Jun., 296-300; Duine, *Memento,* no. 73; *LBS,* III, 270-81; *DCB,* III, 6-7).

Iltutus or Hiltutus, Eltutus, Illtyd, Ildut (Welsh; latter part of the fifth century; 7 July or 6 November): *CBS,* pp. 158-82 = *ASB,* III Nov., 225-34 (written at Llantwit Major between about 1086 and some time after 1107), abridged in *NLA,* II, 52-56 = *ASB,* III Nov., 234-36 (Lobineau, pp. 24-25; Duine, *Memento,* no. 111; *LBS,* III, 303-17; *DCB,* III, 226).

Jacutus (Breton; fifth century; 8 February or 3 March): *CCHLBNP,* I, 578-85 (Lobineau, p. 48; Le Grand, pp. 771-76; Duine, *Memento,* no. 75; *LBS,* III, 332-33).

Judocus or Iodocus, Judicus, Josse (Breton; † *ca.* 668; 13 December): Morice, I, 206-11 (eighth century or first half of the ninth) (Lobineau, pp. 152-57; Le Grand, pp. 699-702; Duine, *Memento,* no. 9; *DCB,* III, 467-68).

Justinianus or Stinan (Breton; labored in Wales; sixth century; 23 August or 5 December): *NLA*, II, 93-95 = *ASB*, IV Aug., 635 (Duine, *Catalogue*, no. 113; *LBS*, III, 339-42; *DCB*, III, 538).

Kebius or Cybi, Cubi (Cornish; labored chiefly in Wales, and also said to have spent much time in Ireland; sixth century; 8 November): I, *CBS*, pp. 183-87 = *ASB*, III Nov., 825-27; II, *LBS*, IV, 379-83 = *ASB*, III Nov., 828-29; III, *NLA*, II, 100-2 (*CSS*, XXII; *LBS*, II, 202-15; *DCB*, I, 733; III, 600).

Keyna or Ceneu (Welsh; sixth century; 8 October): *NLA*, II, 102-4 = *ASB*, IV Oct., 275 (*CSS*, XXV, 34-48; *LBS*, II, 52-55; *DCB*, I, 437).

Kinedus (Breton; labored in Wales; sixth century; 1 August): *NLA*, II, 105-9 (Duine, *Catalogue*, no. 114; *DCB*, III, 612).

Leonorius or Lunarius (Welsh; labored in Brittany; sixth century; 1 July): I, *ASB*, 1 Jul., 107-11; II, *CCHLBNP*, II, 153-73 (Lobineau, pp. 91-92; Duine, *Memento*, no. 81; *LBS*, III, 342-46; *DCB*, III, 687).

Machutus or Maclovius, Maclou, Malo (Welsh; labored in Brittany; sixth century; 15 November): I, by Bili, F. Plaine, *Bulletin et mémoires de la société archéologique du département d'Ille-et-Vilaine* XVI (1883), 167-293 = F. Lot, *Mélanges*, pp. 340-430; II, anonymous, A. de La Borderie, *Bulletin, ut supra*, pp. 267-93 (both in the second half of the ninth century); III, by Sigebert of Gembloux (*ca.* 1030-1112), *MPL*, CLX, 729-46; IV, *NLA*, II, 149-56 (Lobineau, pp. 126-34; Le Grand, pp. 590-99; Duine, *Memento*, no. 11; *LBS*, III, 411-34; *DCB*, III, 778-79).

Maglorius or Magloire, Magloar (Welsh; labored in Brittany; † 575 in Sark; 24 October): I, *ASB*, X Oct., 782-91 (by Balderic of Anjou, twelfth century), supplemented by La Borderie, *Mémoires de la société archéologique et historique des Côtes-du-Nord* II, IV (1890), 230-46 (*Miracula*, pp. 254-56; Office and Mass, pp. 283-93); II, *CCHLBNP*, III, 308-16 (Lobineau, pp. 114-18; Le Grand, pp. 534-39; Duine, *Memento*, no. 10; *LBS*, III, 407-10; *DCB*, III, 783).

Mandetus or Maudez, Modez, Mawes, Mandé (Irish; labored in Brittany; sixth century; 18 November): I, La Borderie, *Mémoires de la société d'émulation des Côtes-du-Nord* XXVIII (1890), 202-9 (end of the eleventh century; from Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. fr. 22,321); II, La Borderie, *ibid.*, pp. 210-17 (fourteenth century, or thirteenth at earliest; Office, pp. 218-24) (Lobineau, pp. 84-85; La Grand, pp. 606-9; Duine, *Memento*, no. 82; *CSS*, I[2]; *LBS*, III, 441-49).

Melorus or Melar, Mylor (Breton; seventh century; 2 October): F. Plaine, *AB*, V (1886), 166-76 (probably rewritten in its present form in the eleventh or twelfth century), abridged in *NLA*, II, 183-85 = *ASB*, I Jan., 136-37 (Lobineau, pp. 61-63; Le Grand, pp. 487-91; Duine, *Memento*, no. 84; *CSS*, XIII).

Melanius or Melani (Breton; † *ca.* 530; 6 January): I, *ASB*, 1 Jan., 328-34 = B. Krusch, *MGH, SRM*, III, 372-76 (probably ninth century); II, *CCHLBNP*, I, 71-77 (not earlier than the fourteenth century); III, *ibid.*, II, 531-41 (Lobineau, pp. 32-39; Le Grand, pp. 568-74; Duine, *Memento*, no. 13; *CSS*, VII; *DCB*, III, 889).

Meriadocus (Breton; seventh century ?; 7 June): *CSS*, XXXIV, 44-51 (Bibli-

othèque Nationale, MS. fr. 22,321; twelfth century ?) (Lobineau, pp. 242-44; Le Grand, pp. 219-21; Duine, *Memento,* no. 37; *DCB,* III, 904).

Mevennus or Méen, Mewan (Welsh; labored in Brittany; sixth century ?; 21 June): I, F. Plaine, *AB,* IV (1884), 142-58 (by Ingomar, probably early in the eleventh century); II, *ASB,* V Jun., 88-90 (from Le Grand) (Lobineau, pp. 138-42; Le Grand, pp. 246-50; Duine, *Memento,* no. 83; *CSS,* VIII², 3-32; *LBS,* III, 484-86; *DCB,* III, 913).

Nectanus (Welsh; fifth century; 17 June): Gotha MS. I, 81 (end of the twelfth century; translated *CSS,* XLV, 5-26; Mass, *ibid.,* p. 26) (*CSS,* XXV, 18-25; XLV; *LBS,* IV, 1-2; *DCB,* IV, 10-11).

Neotus (English; hermit in Cornwall; ninth century; 31 July): I, *ASB,* VII Jul., 330-40, abridged in *NLA,* II, 213-18; II, J. Whitaker, *Life of S. Neot* (London, 1809), pp. 339-65 (not seen) (*CSS,* XXI; *LBS,* IV, 4-10).

Ninnoca or Nennoca (Welsh; labored in Brittany; sixth century; 4 June): I, *ASB,* I Jun., 400-3 (twelfth century); II, Maître and de Berthou, *Cartulaire de....Quimperlé,* pp. 15-27 (Lobineau, p. 63; Le Grand, pp. 270-74; Duine, *Memento,* no. 85; *LBS,* IV, 16-19; *DCB,* IV, 17).

Osmanna (Irish; labored in Brittany; sixth century; 9 September): *ASB,* III Sept., 422-25, abridged in *NLA,* II, 237-39 (Lobineau, pp. 40-41; Le Grand, pp. 739-40; Duine, *Memento,* no. 86).

Oudoceus (Welsh; † early in the seventh century; 2 July): *Book of Llan Dâv,* pp. 130-39 (*ca.* 1150), abridged in *NLA,* II, 273 = *ASB,* I Jul., 284-85 (Lobineau, pp. 89-91; Duine, *Memento,* no. 113; *LBS,* IV, 28-36; *DCB,* IV, 169).

Paternus or Padarn (confusion of St. Patern of Vannes [second half of the fifth century] with St. Padern of Wales [a century later], the one Breton, and the other Welsh; 15 April): *CBS,* pp. 188-97 (written at Brecon at latest early in the twelfth century), abridged in *NLA,* II, 274-78 = *ASB,* II Apr., 376-78 (Lobineau, pp. 10-11; Le Grand, pp. 142-47; Duine, *Memento,* no. 29; *CSS,* XLIII; *LBS,* IV, 39-51; *DCB,* IV, 171-72).

Paulus Aurelianus or Pol de Léon (Cornish; labored in Brittany; sixth century; 12 March): I, F. Plaine, *AB,* I (1882), 209-58, and C. Chuissard, *Revue celtique,* V (1883), 417-58 (by Wrmonoc, 884); II, *ASB,* II Mar., 111-19 (Lobineau, pp. 64-71; Le Grand, pp. 98-105; Duine, *Memento,* no. 14; *LBS,* IV, 75-86; *DCB,* IV, 262).

Petrocus (Cornish; † 564; 4 June): *NLA,* II, 317-20 = *ASB,* I Jun., 392-93 (Lobineau, pp. 29-30; Duine, *Memento,* no. 115; *CSS,* XI³ [translation of *Vita* in Bibliothèque Nationale MS. lat. 9989], pp. 8-22; *LBS,* IV, 94-103; *DCB,* IV, 326-27).

Piranus or Perran (Cornish; ?; 5 March; confused with the Irish St. Ciaranus): I, *ASB,* I Mar., 392-95; II, *ibid.,* pp. 395-97; Plummer, *VSH,* I, 216-33 (Duine, *Memento,* no. 179; *CSS,* XXIX; *LBS,* II, 119-38; IV, 105-6; *DCB,* I, 544; III, 608; IV, 404-5).

Ronanus (Irish; labored in Brittany; sixth century; 1 June): *CCHLBNP,* I,

438-58 (tenth century ?) (Lobineau, pp. 41-43; Le Grand, pp. 205-7; Duine, *Memento,* no. 87; *CSS,* XLII; *LBS,* IV, 120-25; *DCB,* IV, 554).

Samson (Welsh; labored in Brittany; *ca.* 485- *ca.* 565; 28 July): I, by an anonymous monk of Dol (*ca.* 610-615), *ASB,* VI Jul., 573-91; better R. Fawtier, *La Vie de saint Samson* (Paris, 1912), pp. 93-172; tr. T. Taylor, *The Life of Saint Samson of Dol* (London, 1925); II, by Balderic of Dol (second half of the ninth century), F. Plaine, *AB,* VI (1887), 79-150; III, *Book of Llan Dâv,* pp. 6-24 (Lobineau, pp. 95-109; Le Grand, pp. 314-29; Duine, *Memento,* no. 2; *CSS,* XXXVI; *LBS,* IV, 130-70; *DCB,* IV, 582-83).

Sulianus or Suliacus (Welsh; labored in Brittany; sixth century ?; 29 July): *CSS,* XXXVII, 35-36 (Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. fr. 22,321) (Lobineau, pp. 110-11; Le Grand, pp. 481-85; Duine, *Memento,* no. 195; *LBS,* IV, 203-6).

Tatheus or Tathan (Irish ?; labored in Wales; sixth century; 26 December): *CBS,* pp. 255-64, abridged in *NLA,* II, 361-63 (*LBS,* IV, 211-14; *DCB,* IV, 783).

Teliavus or Teilo, Eliud (Welsh; labored in Brittany and Cornwall; sixth century; 9 February): I, J. Loth, *Annales de Bretagne* IX (1894), 277-86, 436-38 = *Book of Llan Dâv,* pp. 97-117 (twelfth century; by the monk Stephanus); II, Wharton, *Anglia Sacra* II, 662-66 by Galfridus Landavensis, not long after 1120); III, *NLA,* II, 364-67 = *ASB,* II Feb., 308-10 (Lobineau, pp. 28-29; Duine, *Memento,* no. 117; *LBS,* IV, 226-42; *DCB,* IV, 815-16).

Turiavus (Breton; seventh or eighth century; 13 July): I, Duine, *Bulletin et mémoires de la société archéologique du départment d'Ille-et-Vilaine,* XLI (1912), 29-47 (second half of the ninth century); II, *ASB,* III Jul., 588-90 (tenth century); III, *ibid.,* pp. 590-596 (rhetorical amplification of II; eleventh or twelfth century) (Lobineau, pp. 177-79; Le Grand, pp. 302-6; Duine, *Memento,* no. 16).

Tutwalus or Tudual, Tugdual (Breton; sixth century ?; 30 November): I, A. de La Borderie, *Mémoires de la société d'émulation des Côtes-du-Nord,* II, ii (1886), 84-86 (after the ninth century); II, *ibid.,* pp. 86-93; III, *ibid.,* pp. 93-117 (these two of the eleventh and twelfth centuries) (Lobineau, pp. 56-60; Le Grand, pp. 669-76; Duine, *Memento,* no. 15; *LBS,* IV, 271-74).

Vitalis or Vial, Viaud (British; eighth century; labored in Brittany; 16 October): I, A. Oheix, *Bulletin de la société archéologique de Nantes et du département de la Loire-Inférieure,* LIV (1913), 80-89 (not earlier than the twelfth century); II, *ASB,* VII, ii Oct., 1096-101 (Lobineau, pp. 175-77; Le Grand, pp. 507-10; Duine, *Memento,* no. 94).

Vougay or Vio (Irish ?; labored in Brittany; sixth century; 15 June): *ASB,* III Jun., 536-38, from Le Grand, pp. 222-24 (Lobineau, pp. 39-40; Duine, *Memento,* no. 95).

Winfreda or Wenefreda, Winefred, Gwenefrewi (Welsh; † *ca.* 660; 3 November): *CBS,* pp. 198-209 = *ASB,* I Nov., 702-08, abridged in *NLA,* II, 415-21 (*LBS,* III, 185-96; *DCB,* IV, 1189-90).

Winnocus (Breton; † *ca.* 717; 6 November): I, *ASB,* III Nov., 263-67 = W. Levison, *MGH, SRM,* V, 769-75 (before 846); II, *ASB,* III Nov., 267-74 (prob-

ably between 962 and the middle of the eleventh century); III, *ibid.*, pp. 285-89 (fourteenth or fifteenth century); IV, *Miracula, ibid.*, pp. 275-284 = Levison, pp. 780-86 (by Drago of Bergues after 1050) (Lobineau, pp. 165-68; Le Grand, pp. 576-79; Duine, *Memento,* no. 17; *CSS,* XLIV; *DCB,* IV, 1191).

Winwaloeus or Winwaloe, Guenole (British; labored in Brittany; first half of the fifth century or second half of the sixth ?; 3 March): I, *ASB,* I Mar., 254-59 (incomplete); C. de Smedt, *AB,* VII (1888), 172-249; La Borderie, *Cartulaire,* pp. 1-135; R. Latouche, *Mélanges d'histoire de Cornonaille* (Paris, 1911), pp. 97-112 (by Wrdisten, *ca.* 880); II, *ASB,* I Mar., 248-52; III, *ibid.,* pp. 252-54; IV, R. Fawtier, *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire,* XXXII (1912), 34-44; V, *NLA,* II, 460-65, 558-73; VI, *Vita metrica, AB,* VII, 250-61 (Lobineau, pp. 43-48; Le Grand, pp. 59-66; Duine, *Memento,* no. 7; *CSS,* IV²; *LBS,* IV, 353-62; *DCB,* IV, 1191).

Ywi or Ivy (British; labored in Brittany; early eighth century; 6 October): I, *AB,* II (1883), 324-30; II, *NLA,* II, 91-92 = *ASB,* III Oct., 400 (Duine, *Memento,* no. 74).

Considering the quantity of material in the *Lives* of the Brythonic saints, the specific details which they give concerning the organization and the life of their Churches are very meager. There seems to be no reason to suppose that data of interest to the historian have been deliberately suppressed in the interest of Canterbury in Great Britain, or of Tours in Brittany; it would appear, rather, that the very matters which to us would be the most valuable were of scant concern to the writers of *Vitae*—they took them for granted and as known to all. Nevertheless, one finds, here and there, sentences which give welcome knowledge of traits which marked off the Brythonic Churches not only from Rome, but even from Ireland.

One of the problems which here arises is that of abbot-bishops.[12] In Wales, St. David was both a bishop and the abbot of Menevia, as St. Teilo was a bishop and the abbot of Llandaff, St. Cybi, bishop and founder of Caergybi (Holyhead), and St. Paternus, bishop and founder of Llanbadarn; while in Cornwall, Kenstec (833-870) speaks of himself as "chosen, though humble and unworthy, to the episcopal see in the Cornish nation in the monastery which in the British tongue is called Dinnurin."[13] Taking the evidence as a whole, it seems clear that

12. Cf. Gougaud, pp. 217-20; J. Ryan, *Irish Monasticism* (London, 1931), pp. 170-74; *CED,* I, 142-43; Williams, pp. 456-57; Newell, pp. 56-62; Taylor, pp. 61-64; Hencken, pp. 235-37, 252; Largillière, pp. 205-23.

13. Gougaud, p. 218; *CED,* I, 674: "Ego Kenstec, humilis licet et indignus, [ad] episcopalem sedem in gente Cornubia in monasterio quod lingua Brettonum appellatur Dinnurin [lege: Dingerein?] electus."

Wales and Cornwall had abbot-bishops, and it would likewise appear that such was the case in Brittany as well. This was inevitable by force of circumstances. Unlike Gaul, where episcopal sees arose from the Roman *civitates,* and where, as in the rest of the Empire, Roman civil organization was carried over, *mutatis mutandis,* into the ecclesiastical (as had been true of Britain also before the collapse of Roman rule), the Brythonic and Goidelic lands were essentially evangelized by missionaries. In the nature of the case, there could at first be no distinct dioceses, nor even parishes. The centers of Christianization were small groups of monks about little monasteries, whose abbots, to keep unimpared the hierarchic orders, were of necessity invested with episcopal rank or, at least, had bishops attached to them. On the other hand, while in the Goidelic areas this degenerated into a state of affairs where the bishop was little more than an agent for the conveyance of Holy Orders, and was completely dominated by the abbot, and which ultimately led to the scandalous throngs of *episcopi vagantes,* the Brythonic Churches would appear satisfactorily to have combined in one office the abbot and the bishop. These small monasteries had, in their turn, arisen from foundations of individual monks who wandered hither and thither as circumstances permitted, and who were, in many cases, favored with protection and with grants of land by the petty chiefs into whose territory they came.

That paganism still prevailed in the areas Christianized by the Brythonic monks is clear. For Cornwall (specific statements for Wales seem to be lacking), we have the well-known passage in the Life of St. Samson:

> Now it came to pass, on a certain day, as he was on a journey through a certain district which they call Tricurius [the Hundred of Trigg], he heard, on his left hand to be exact, men worshipping a certain idol after the custom of the Bacchantes, by means of a play in honour of an image . . . and observing those who worshipped the idol, [he] saw in front of them, resting on the summit of a certain hill, an abominable image,

which, after a convincing miracle, was destroyed by its deluded worshippers.[14] For Brittany, besides the statement, which there is little reason to

14. *I Vita Samsonis,* XLVIII (tr. Taylor, p. 49; cf. also *II Vita Samsonis,* I, 16): "Quadam autem die, cum per quendam pagum quem Tricurium uocant deambularet, audiuit, ut uerum esset, in sinistra parte de eo, homines baccantum ritu quoddam phanum per imaginarium ludum adorantes . . . intendensque in his qui idolum colebant, uidit ante eos in cuiusdam uertice montis simulacrum abominabile adsistere."

doubt, that in the time of St. Melanius "erant . . . Uenetenses paene omnes gentiles,"[15] we find general mentions of destruction of idols and temples.[16]

Wrmonoc, in his Life of St. Pol de Léon,[17] says that the island of Penn Ohen, "Ox-Head," was so named, in his opinion, "because in ancient times the head of an ox was adored by its inhabitants as the god of the country"; but the most cogent evidence of paganism, as late as the seventh century, is given by the twentieth canon of the Council of Nantes, in 658:

> Bishops and their ministers must strive with the utmost zeal that trees consecrated to demons, which the vulgar worship and hold in such veneration that they dare not cut from them a branch or a twig, be torn up by the roots and burned. Also, let the stones which they venerate in ruinous and wooded places, deceived by illusions of demons, [and] where, likewise, they vow and offer vows, be dug up from their very foundations, and be thrown in places where they never can be found by their worshippers.[18]

While for building churches the material nearest to hand would naturally be used, they were usually first made of wood. Thus, in Wales, St. Cadoc constructed an "insigne monasteriolum" of wood, with a refectory and dorter nearby; and, as followers flocked to him, he surrounded this, together with a cemetery, with "a vast heap of earth" *(uastum aceruum de terra)*. Cadoc later rebuilt his monastery of wood, and also an oratory; but on the Île-St-Cado he constructed a "stone basilica," as well as a stone monastery in Scotland.[19] In Wales, St. Iltut

15. *Vita Melanii*, XXIII.

16. *I Vita Gildae*, IX (in northern Brittany).

17. "Insula Penn Ohen . . . latina [lingua] autem caput dicitur boum . . . quae ideo ut nobis hoc nomen uidetur meruit adipisci, quia ab incolis illius . . . antiquitus caput bouis pro deo adorabatur patriae." For Celtic bull-cults see J. A. MacCulloch, *Religion of the Ancient Celts* (Edinburgh, 1911), pp. 38, 140, 208-09, and *Celtic Mythology* (Boston, 1918), pp. 124, 127, 157-58, and Plates II, 4, 5, 9; III, 2, 5; IX B; XIX, 1, 6; XX B; XXI.

18. "Summo decertare debent studio episcopi et eorum ministri ut arbores daemonibus consecratae, quas uulgus colit et in tanta ueneratione habet ut nec ramum nec surculum inde audeat amputare, radicitus excindantur atque comburantur. Lapides quoque quos in ruinosis locis et siluestribus daemonum ludificationibus decepti uenerantur, ubi et uota uouent et deferunt, funditus effodiantur atque in tali loco proiiciantur ubi nunquam a cultoribus suis inueniri possint" (Morice, I, 220). Technically speaking, Nantes is in Loire-Inférieure, not in Brittany; but its distance seems too small to be worth considering in the present connexion.

19. *Vita Cadoci*, V, VI, IX, XVII, XXXII, XXXIII.

similarly constructed his church of the Holy Trinity, under the direction of St. Dubricius, except that in this case the rampart was a quadrangle of stone with a moat around it.[20] St. Kined built his cell of wattle with a roof of reeds:[21] after constructing "a little house" (*habitaculum*); St. Gundleius blessed (*signauit*) a cemetery and established in its midst a temple with slabs and branches (*tabulis et uirgis fundauit templum*):[22] St. Congar rebuilt such a church in stone;[23] and St. Caradoc seems to have constructed his of stone from the very first.[24] In Cornwall, there are remains of a very primitive church at Perranzabulo, probably erected between the seventh and tenth centuries, of the roughest kind of dry batter, but apparently once having had a wooden roof;[25] and the foundations of another primitive stone church have recently been discovered under the church of St. Agnes, formerly a chapel of Perranzabulo, roughly 18 x 12 feet, and with walls from 18 to 20 inches thick.[26]

In Brittany, the only traces of structures of the period here under consideration seem to be ruins of monastic cells on the Île Modez and the Île

20. *Vita Illuti*, VII: a dedication to the Holy Trinity at this early date is impossible. The wall surrounding the buildings finds parallels on Skellig Michael off the coast of Kerry, on Eilean Naomh not far from Iona, and on Inishmurray off Sligo, though in the latter case the *vallum* of an old fort was adapted to form the monastic cashel (R. A. S. Macalister, *The Archaeology of Ireland*, London [1928], p. 244; A. C. Champneys, *Irish Ecclesiastical Architecture*, London, 1910, pp. 16-17, 19, 20).

21. "Construxit enim cellam de uiminibus, quam et arundine operuit" (*Vita Kynedi, NLA*, II, 107).

22. *Vita Gundleii*, V: for the use of slabs of wood, cf. the unique nave at Greenstead-juxta-Ongar (Essex), probably built in 1013, and constructed of upright oak-trunks, set palisade-fashion, and smoothed with the adze on their flat faces. For the term *templum* applied to a Celtic church, cf. the Irish use of *teampull* in *Teampull Beanáin* and *Teampull Mhic Duach* (Aran), *Teampull Chaimhghin* (Glendaloch), *Teampull Molaise* (Inishmurray), etc.; also in the Scottish islands, e.g., *Teampull Frangaig* (Scalpa), *Teampull Tomas*, *Teampull Pheadair*, *Teampull Ronan*, *Teampull Moluach*, *Teampull na Cro Naomh* (Lewis), *Teampull na-Trianaide* (North Uist), *Teampull Rona* (Rona) (T. S. Muir, *Ecclesiological Notes on Some of the Islands of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1885, pp. 38, 42-43, 48, 92-95 [notes taken between 1855 and 1866]).

23. *NLA*, I, 231. The *Teampull na Trinoite* at Glendaloch has corner brackets whose explanation "becomes simple and obvious when we look back from the stone church to the wooden prototype: they are simply the decorative projecting ends of the wall-plates" (Macalister, p. 249; cf. also pp. 247-48).

24. "Cementarios et operarios cuiusdam sue ecclesie, quadam sexta feria, de paucis pisculis refecit" (*Vita Caradoci, NLA*, I, 175).

25. Hencken, pp. 259-61: much more detailed account, written not long after its first excavation in 1835, by W. Haslam, *Perran-Zabuloe* (London, 1844), pp. 66-79.

26. *CSS*, XXIX, 68.

Lavret off Paimpol,[27] which recall the "little houses" *(casulae)* and oratory built by St. Winwaloe on the island of Topopigia (or Topepigia, Theopia, now Tibidy);[28] and the saint himself was buried in a wooden church *(in ecclesia lignea)*, which was later replaced by one in stone.[29] St. Iudoc likewise built both his oratories of wood;[30] and the same material was employed by SS. Ronan and Brioc.[31] The old wooden church of St. Magloire at Léhon was replaced by one of stone taken from a Gallo-Roman structure, evidently the Fanus Martis, of which remains still exist at Haut-Bécherel near Dinan.[32]

One statement of particular interest has been preserved concerning the dimensions of the old monastery at Llandaff in 1120, which was 28 feet long, 15 wide, and 20 high, "with two transepts on either side of very poor area and height, and with a porch of round structure, twelve feet in length and breadth."[33] These measurements compare very closely with those at Perranzabulo, which was 29 feet long, 16½ wide, and 19 high; while those of the Saxon church at Bradford-on-Avon (Wilts), built by St. Aldhelm before 705, are as follows:[34]

Nave	25 ft., 2 in. long,	13 ft., 2 in. wide,	25 ft., 5 in. high to wall-plate.
Chancel	13 ", 2 " "	, 10 ", 0 " "	, 18 ", 4 " " " " "
Porch	9 ", 11 " "	, 10 ", 5 " "	, 15 ", 6 " " " " "

Turning now to Brythonic ritual and liturgy, there is a curious statement in the Life of St. Samson that, "according to custom handed down from ancient times," in all elevations to the episcopate, three must be

27. *CSS*, I², 9-10, with a photograph (taken in June, 1938) of the much-restored Forn Modez ("Modez's Oven").

28. *I Vita Winwaloei*, II, 1.

29. *II Vita Winwaloei*, XVI.

30. "Famulus Christi Iudocus in loco oratoria duo manibus suis nitabatur construere . . . et utrumque ex lignis" (*Vita Iudoci*, Morice, I, 209).

31. *Vita Ronani*, XII; *Vita Brioci*, XXX.

32. *Miracula Maglorii*, XXIII-XXVIII; cf. La Borderie, *Mémoires de la société archéologique et historique des Côtes-du-Nord* II, iv (1890), 318.

33. *Book of Llan Dâv*, p. 86: "Posite sunt reliquie sancti Dubricii in tumbam ad hoc aptam et in antiquo monasterio [Landauensi] ante sancte Marie altare uersus aquilonalem plagam, et predictus antistes uir bone memorie [Urbanus] uidens loci paruitatem in longitudine xxviii pedum, in latitudine xv, altitudine xx, et cum duabus alis utraque parte admodum parue quantitatis et altitudinis et cum porticu xii pedum longitudinis et latitudinis rotunde molis."

34. Haslam, p. 67; W. H. Jones, *An Account of the Saxon Church of Saint Laurence, Bradford-on-Avon* (Bradford-on-Avon, 1911), pp. 22, 25.

presented to be consecrated together by three bishops in unison;[35] and in the utterly unhistorical story of the consecration of SS. David, Patern, and Teliau to the episcopate in Jerusalem, the rite is said to have been performed "per impositionem manus primi archiepiscopi."[36]

With regard to frequency and times of celebration of Mass, the Brythonic *Vitae* offer some data of interest. In his Jeremiad, Gildas declares that the Britons are "contrary to the whole world (and) enemies to Roman usage, not only in the Mass, but also in the tonsure"; and, likewise, that the priests seldom offered the Sacrifice.[37] As to the Celtic tonsure, we need here note only that Aldhelm condemned it, apparently with success, in his letter of 705 to Geruntius, King of Damnonia (Devonshire and Cornwall); that it was adopted by Saxons on the Breton border by the latter part of the sixth century; and that it was finally abolished in Brittany by the Letters Patent of Louis le Débonnaire for the Abbey of Landévennec in 817, and in Bretoña in Gallicia by the forty-first canon of the Council of Toledo in 633.[38]

The differences between the Celtic and the Roman Mass are nowhere stated; but they can scarcely have been of importance, for when St. Augustine asked of St. Gregory, as his second question, what to do since "one rite *(consuetudo)* of the Mass is observed in the Holy Roman Church and another (in that) of the Gauls," the Pope's[39] reply was that the best elements should be chosen from both rites. According to the eighth-century (?) *Catalogus Sanctorum Hiberniae,* the "second order" "of Catholic presbyters" (543-549) "received a Mass from David the

35. *I Vita Samsonis,* XLIII; *II Vita* I, 14: "Et cum uenissent episcopi qui ad ordinationem ueniebant, duos ad ordinandum deferentes secum, tertium secundum morem antiquitus traditum ordinare uolentes; sed quis adhuc esset ignorantes—ut mos ibi est a tribus episcopis tres ordinari."

36. *CBS,* pp. 192-93; cf. Gougaud, pp. 208-10; Warren, pp. 68-69. Cf. also *I Vita Kebii* (*CBS,* p. 183): "postea accepit gradum episcopalem ab Hilario episcopo [Pictauensi]."

37. Frag. X: "Britones toti mundo contrarii, moribus Romanis inimici, non solum in missa, sed in tonsura etiam"; *De excidio* lxvi: "[Sacerdotes] raro sacrificantes."

38. *CED,* III, 270; II, 78, 79, 99-100; cf. Gougaud, pp. 201-6.

39. Bede, *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum,* I, 27. The earliest distinctly Celtic Mass known is that of the Irish Stow Missal (ninth or tenth century); cf. Warren, pp. 198-268 (text of the Ordinary and Canon, pp. 226-44; "Misa apostolorum et martirum et sanctorum et sanctarum uirginum," pp. 244-46; "Misa pro penitentibus uiuis," pp. 246-47; "Misa pro mortuis pluribus," pp. 247-48).

Bishop and Gilla (i.e., Gildas) and Docus;"[40] while, on the other hand, St. Winwaloe is said to have received the rule *(norma)* of St. Patrick.[41]

Gildas's complaint that Mass was rarely celebrated seems true only from the Roman point of view; i.e., it was not celebrated daily. On the other hand, as Warren justly observed,[42] "there does not appear to have been a daily Eucharist in the Celtic Church, but only on Sundays, saints' days, and days specially appointed by the head of the monastery." This statement holds true, in general, not only for the Goidelic, but also for the Brythonic, Church. St. Samson celebrated regularly only on Sundays;[43] but at this period there were also Masses for the ordination of priests and for the consecration of bishops, at the beginning of Lent and on Easter Even and Easter, for the departed, for exorcism of demons and before the killing of dragons, at the special request of the King, and to settle a quarrel between mother and son.[44] On the other hand, daily Masses are directed by the Venedotian Code of Howel the Good;[45] St. Ywi celebrated daily, being especially devout, as did the monk Condeluc, St. Winwaloe, St. David, and (apparently) St. Corentin.[46]

Sometimes, at least, Mass was celebrated at the ninth hour (i.e., three o'clock in the afternoon), as by St. Gudwal;[47] and if we may believe the

40. *CED*, II, 293: "A Dauide episcopo et Gilla et a Doco Britonibus missam acceperunt."

41. *I Vita Winwaloei*, 1, 19.

42. *Liturgy*, p. 140; cf., in general, pp. 140-42.

43. "Oratorium inibi componentes, ubi sanctus Samson per cunctos dominicarum dies ad missam cantandam et ad Christi communionem ueniebat" (*I Vita Samsonis*, xli; cf. xviii, xliii; similarly *II Vita*, i, 13).

44. *I Vita Samsonis*, xiii; *I Vita Tuduali*, iv. *I Vita Samsonis*, xliv. *I Vita Machuti*, xv; *II Vita Melanii*, xv; *II Vita Melanii*, xiii. *I Vita Machuti*, xvi, xiii. *II Vita Samsonis*, ix. *Vita Leonorii*, xx; *III Vita Tuduali*, vii. *Vita Leonorii*, xv. *Vita Yvii*, viii. Cf. also Ryan, pp. 345-46.

45. *CED*, I, 227.

46. "Tantae uero deuotionis erat quod omni die, illis exceptis diebus quibus legitime fuisset impeditus, cum summa affectione et deuotione missam celebrauit," *Vita Yvii*, iv; *Acta Sanctorum Redononensium*, II, 3 = Morice, I, 245; *Vita Ethbini*, vii (cf. *NLA*, II, 464, 572). *I Vita Davidis*, xxxi; *Vita Corentini*, v, ed. Plaine = ix, ed. Oheix: "Mane autem facto, illuscente aurora, homo Dei Chorentinus missam, sicut consueuerat, uoluit celebrare." The mention of daily Mass in the *Life* of St. Winfreda (*CBS*, p. 199) is too late to be of any value in this connection.

47. *Vita Gudwalli*, xxxi: "Hora nona peractis sacramentorum Christi solemniis, refectionis causa fratres in unum conuenire." Durandus, *Rationale divinorum officiorum*, IV, i, 20, says: "Celebratur autem Missa hora tertia, sexta, et nona . . . et in nona quia illa hora in cruce pendens emisit spiritum," especially in Lent and on fast days.

late *Vita Leonorii*,[48] this was the regular custom at his monastery. A reference to celebration after noon is recorded in the *Acta Sanctorum Redonensium:*

> On a certain day . . . some of the brethren went out together with the venerable priest [Riwennus] . . . and were there till about midday. And when the sun had mounted high and heat consumed them quite excessively, the aforesaid priest said to his colleagues: "If it please you, brethren, give me leave to return to the monastery, for I have not offered the Sacrifice to God to-day; and after I have completed it, I shall come to you again."[49]

Mention is made of a glass chalice;[50] and, as in the Irish Church, there is evidence of Communion under both Species.[51] In a letter of Melanius, bishop of Rennes, and of the bishops of Tours and Angers, written between 515 and 520, certain priests are severely reproved who persisted in going from house to house with portable altars, having with them women called "fellow-visitors," who, when the priests celebrated Mass, held the Chalice and presumed to administer the Blood of Christ to the people.[52] Mention is likewise made of an *altare anceps*.[53]

In the Brythonic *Vitae*, references to Divine Office are much more frequent than to Mass; and in one instance, in the Life of St. Brioc, these

48. ix: "Ad horam uero nonam appropinquantes, recedebant ab opere et ad suum pergebant oratorium . . . dein uero celebrabant eorum missas, et postea exibant ad refectionem."

49. ii, 2: "Quadam uero die . . . exierunt quidam de fratribus una cum uenerabili presbytero [Riwenno], fueruntque ibi usque ad mediam fere diem. Cumque sol in altum conscenderet et feruor nimius eos decoqueret, dixit praefatus presbyter ad collegas suos: Fratres, si uobis placet, date mihi licentiam ut reuertar ad monasterium, quia hodie non obtuli sacrificium Deo, et postquam compleuero, iterum ueniam ad uos."

50. *Miracula Winnoci*, ii; cf. Warren, p. 143.

51. *I Vita Pauli Aureliani*, viii: "De cuius [Pauli] manu rex et universus populus post celebranda missarum solempnia communionem corporis et sanguinis Domini solempniter degustaret"; *III Vita Maclovii*, viii: "Muniuit [gigantem] uiatico Dominici corporis et sanguinis"; cf. Warren, pp. 134-136; Ryan, p. 351.

52. Printed by L. Duchesne, *Revue de Bretagne et de Vendée*, LVII (1888), 8-9 (cf. also p. 14), and by La Borderie, *Histoire de Bretagne*, II (Rennes, 1898), p. 527: "Uiri uenerabilis Sparati presbyteri relatione cognouimus quod gestantes quasdam tabulas per diuersorum ciuium uestrorum capanas circumferre non desinatis et missas ibidem, adhibitis mulieribus in sacrificio diuino, quas conhospitas nominastis, facere praesumatis, sic ut, erogantibus uobis eucharistiam, illae uobis positis calicem teneant et sanguinem Christi populo administrare praesumant."

53. *I Vita S. Davidis*, xiii. What this "two-headed altar" was is unclear.

are listed as five: vespers, compline, midnight service (matins), lauds, and "the second hour" (prime).[54]

The ideal life in a Brythonic monastery—though, as the *Vitae* show, reality and ideal did not invariably coincide—is detailed at some length in Ricemarch's Life of St. David:[55]

> And when everything was completed, the saintly father decreed with fervour such rigour of cenobitical purpose that every monk should toil at daily labour, and spend his life in common, working with his hands, "for he who labours not," says the apostle, "let him not eat." For knowing that untroubled rest was the formenter and mother of vices, he subjected the shoulders of the monks to divine fatigues. For those, who bend thought and time to leisurely repose, generate an unstable spirit of apathy and restless incitements to lust.
>
> Therefore with increasing zeal they labour with hand and foot; they place the yoke on their shoulders; with unwearied arm they dig into the ground mattocks and spades; they carry in their saintly hands hoes and saws for cutting; they provide with their own labours all the necessities of the community. Possessions they regard with disdain; they reject the gifts of the unjust; they detest riches. No care of oxen is introduced for ploughing. Each to himself and the brethren is riches, each too an ox. When work was done, no complaint was heard, no conversation was held beyond what was necessary. But each did the task enjoined either with prayer or well-directed meditation.
>
> When outside labour was finished, they returned to the cells of the monastery, and spent the whole day till evening in reading or writing or praying. On the approach of evening, when the stroke of the bell was heard, each one left his study, for if the stroke should sound in the ears of anyone, the top of a letter having been written or even half the form of that letter, they rose up the more quickly and left their tasks, and thus in silence proceeded to church without any idle talk. When the chanting of the psalms is done, the voice being in accord with the intention of the heart, they worship on bended knees until the stars are seen in heaven bringing the day to a close. The father alone, after all had gone out, poured forth a prayer in secret to God for the state of the Church.
>
> At length they assemble at table. They relieve, each one, their wearied limbs, refreshed by partaking of supper, not however to excess, for too much, though it be of bread only, produces wantonness, but on that occasion they all take supper in accordance with the varying condition of their bodies and ages. Not dishes of various tastes lie before them or too dainty provisions, but having fed on bread and herbs seasoned with salt, they assuage ardent thirst with a temperate sort of drink. On that occasion they provide for the sick and those advanced in age, and even those wearied with a long journey, some refreshments of a more appetising sort, for one must not weigh out to all in equal measure.

54. *Vita Brioci*, xlix: uespertina synaxis; completorium; circa noctis medium; gallicinii tempore . . . matutinae laudes; hora secunda; cf. also Gougaud, p. 330.

55. xxi-xxxi; tr. Wade-Evans, pp. 12-15.

After giving of thanks, they go to the church at the canonical ringing, and there they are insistent in watchings, prayers, and genuflexions for about three hours. As long as they prayed in church, none dared unrestrainedly to yawn, none to sneeze, none to spit.

These things being so done, they compose their limbs for sleep. Waking at cockcrow, they devote themselves to prayer on bended knee, and then spend the whole day without sleep from morning till night. And in like manner they serve through other nights.

From the eve of the sabbath until after dawn light shall have begun in the first hour of the Lord's Day they apply themselves to watchings, prayers, and genuflexions, one hour then excepted after the matins of the sabbath.

They open out their thoughts to the father, and obtain the father's permission even for the requirements of nature. All things are common. Nothing is "mine" or "thine," for anyone who should say either "my book" or what not, would straightway be subjected to hard penance. They were wont to wear mean garments, especially skins. Obedience was not lacking to the father's order. There was exceeding perseverance in doing what was to be done. There was uprightness in all.

For he who, desiring this manner of saintly living, should ask to enter the community of the brethren, would first remain for ten days at the door of the monastery as one rejected, being subjected also to reproachful words. But if he stood his ground, duly exercising patience till the tenth day, he was first received under the elder who by authority presided over the entrance and served him. And when he had toiled there for a long time, many antipathies of his soul being broken, he was at length deemed worthy of entering the society of the brethren.

No superfluity was allowed; voluntary poverty was loved. For whosoever desired their mode of life, the saintly father would receive none of his substance, which he had parted with in renouncing the world, not even one penny, so to speak, for the use of the monastery. But being received naked, as one escaping shipwreck, he might in no way extol or raise himself among the brethren, or relying on his wealth fail to enter upon equal toil with the brethren. Nor, vacillating as to the way of religion, might he extort by force what he left to the monastery, and move to wrath the patience of the brethren.

The father himself pouring forth fountains of tears daily, irradiating with censed holocausts of prayers, and blazing with a double flame of charity, consecrated with pure hands the due oblation of the Lord's Body, and thus after matins proceeded alone to angelic discourse. After this he immediately used to seek cold water, in which by lingering a long time wet he subdued every heat of the flesh. Afterwards he was wont to spend the whole day, unshaken and unwearied, in teaching, praying, and genuflecting, in care for the brethren, and also in feeding a multitude of the bereft, orphans, widows, the needy, the weak, the infirm, and pilgrims. So he began, continued, and ended. As for the rest of his severe living, although necessary for imitation, the intended shortness

of this little work forbids us to set it forth. But imitating the Egyptian monks he led a life similar to theirs.

Besides the data to be gleaned from the *Vitae* of the Brythonic saints, there is another source of information which is even more important for historical knowledge concerning them—the evidence of toponomy. The statement of Joseph Loth in this regard has become classic to all investigators of Celtic hagiology, and is justly taken by Largillière as one of the three mottoes—all from Loth—for his *Les Saints et l'organisation chrétienne primitive dans l'Armorique bretonne:*

> L'hagio-onomastique constitue en Bretagne, ainsi qu'en Cornwall et en Galles, une branche importante, je serais tenté de dire la plus importante, de l'hagiographie. Dans ces trois pays . . . ce ne sont pas les vies des saints qui nous renseignent le mieux sur l'existence de saints, l'organisation nationale du culte, ce sont les *noms de lieux*.[56]

Thanks to the labors of Loth and Largillière for Brittany and of Doble, in his *Cornish Saints Series,* for Cornwall, we can here be very brief. For Scotland, the ground is quite adequately covered by W. J. Watson;[57] for Wales and Ireland the task still remains for the most part to be done.[58]

In old church-names in the Brythonic area, the following principle may be laid down: there are no dedications in the present sense of the term; the church received its name because of actual and personal association with the saint whose name it bears. The earliest reference to a church dedicated to another than its founder is an *eglwys lann Vihagel* ("Church of Michael the Archangel") in 717.[59] After St. Michael come, in chronological order, dedications to the Blessed Virgin, and then to individual saints.

The nomenclature preceding the saint's name is also of importance in determining the chronology of dedications to Brythonic saints. The

56. Loth, *Noms,* p. 1 = *Revue celtique,* XXIX (1908), 222.

57. *The History of the Celtic Place-Names of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1926), pp. 270-338.

58. Newell, pp. 145-47, and P. W. Joyce, *The Origin and History of Irish Names of Places,* I[5] (Dublin, 1883), pp. 142-59, have brief remarks on the subject. A thorough study of the material in E. I. Hogan's *Onomasticon Goedelicum* (Dublin, 1910), would probably yield results of value. For Brythonic terminology, see especially Williams, pp. 265-75.

59. *CED* i, 203.

only common Celtic term of any frequency is Middle Irish *lann* "(enclosed) land, land belonging to a church, church, house" (in Modern Irish also, "floor, chamber"; in Scots-Gaelic "enclosure, land"), Old Welsh *llan,* "enclosure, land" (Modern Welsh *llan-nau,* "enclosure, yard, church," and sometimes "village"), Cornish *lan,* "church, enclosure," Old Breton *lann,* "court, country, region" (Middle Breton *lann,* Modern Breton *lan*[*n*], "territory").[60]

Three other components of parish-names are frequent in Brittany—*Plou-, Tré-,* and *Loc-*. The first of these, borrowed from Latin *plebe-,* "people," is found, indeed, in Old Welsh *plwyw,* "people," Modern Welsh *plwyf,* "people, congregation" (these two meanings obsolete), "community, parish," Cornish *pleû, plû, plew, plui,* "parish," Middle Breton *ploue,* "country, people, village," Modern Breton *plou(e), pleu,* "country"; but as a parish-name in Cornwall with certainty only in *Pelynt (Plunent* in Domesday Book, *Plenent* in 1275, *Plenynt* in 1283), "Parish of Nonna."[61]

Tré-, though extremely common in Brittany, and found as a common noun in Old Irish *treb,* "abode, tribe, family, clan," Modern Irish *treabh,* "house, home, tribe, family or race, class, gens," Old Welsh *tref,* "dwelling-place, home," Modern Welsh *tref,* "home (stead), hamlet, town," Cornish *tre(v),* "town, village, dwelling, home (stead)," Old Breton *trebou,* "turmae," *treb,* "village," Middle Breton *treff,* Modern Breton *tref, trev,* "église succursale avec ses dépendances," seems not to occur in combination with a saint's name in Wales, Cornwall, or the Goidelic areas.

Loc-, borrowed from Latin *locus,* "place," and found in Middle Irish *loc(c),* "place, tomb, hollow," Modern Irish *log,* "place," Middle Breton *loc,* "(monastic) cell, monastery, consecrated place," Modern Breton *lok, loc'h,* "place," occurs in Breton hagiotoponymy only in regions which are now Breton-speaking, not in areas which spoke Breton up to the ninth and tenth centuries. The term must, therefore, be late in this usage, its first examples dating from the eleventh century and used only in late dedications.[62] No names of this type are recorded for Wales, and

60. Cf. Joyce, I, 321-24; Hogan, pp. 475-76; Williams, pp. 266-68; T. F. G. Dexter, *Cornish Names* (London, 1926), pp. 33-35. In Scotland the word is very rare, though found in *Lanbryde, Lamnabride, Lamanbride* (1215), *Lambride* (*ca.* 1391) in Morayshire (Watson, p. 274).

61. Dexter, p. 51 (no. 167g); C. Henderson, in *CSS,* XVI, 15.

62. Largillière, pp. 17-27.

for Cornwall the single instance known is *Luxulyan (Luxulian* 1281, *Luxulien* 1333, *Luxulyan* 1304, *Lussulian* 1319, *Lossulyan* 1412) "Locus Suliani."[63]

In Cornwall, a Lan-name is never that of the patron saint of the parish church.[64] In Brittany, "*Plou-* désigne le territoire d'une paroisse; *Lan-* désigne parfois un monastère, et souvent une simple chapelle, un oratoire; *Tré-* désigne un hameau; ce hameau peut être d'origine religieuse, quand il s'est constitué autour d'une *Lan-;* en ce cas il a un saint pour éponyme."[65] In this area, moreover, whether Breton- or French-speaking, eponymous saints with *Lok-* are never those with *Lan-, Plou-,* or *Tré-,* and vice versa; but the three latter may have the same eponyms; and of the three, *Tré-* seems to be the oldest in Brittany.[66]

If we consider the matter from the Brythonic point of view as a whole, it would appear that *Lan-, Plou-,* and *Lok-* existed in the period of Brythonic church-unity; that, in Britain, *Plou-* and *Lok-* fell out of use; and that, in Brittany, *Tré-* was an independent development, probably with the idea of "gens" as distinguished from "plebs." The *Lan-*group would seem originally to have designated the "land" given to or occupied by the saint; the *Lok-*group the "place" where he personally settled for a longer or shorter space of time; and the *Plou-*group the area occupied by his followers, the *Tré-*group evolving as a subdivision thereof.

There are, besides, in Cornwall a couple of sporadic designations: the isolated *Altarnun,* "Nonna's Altar" (Altrenune *ca.* 1100; Alternon *ca.* 1224);[67] and *Eglosbroc (ca.* 1130; St. Breaca 1264), now Breage, comparable with the anglicised *Dewchurch* (Herefordshire) "David's Church" (Deuweschurche *ca.* 1225), as well as with the Irish *Ecclas Choluim* (Fifeshire), *Eglesgreig,* "Church of Cyric," now St. Cyrus (Forfarshire), and *Eglismonichto* (1482; Forfarshire), "Church of (Mo-)Nechtán" (or Mo-Nechtóc).[68]

Names with "Saint X" are probably later than those with *Lan-, Plou-,*

63. Henderson, *Truro Diocesan Gazette* (May, 1929), reprinted in *CCS,* XXXVII, 30-31; E. Ekwall, *Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Place-Names*[2] (Oxford, 1940), p. 293.

64. *CCS,* II[2], 8.

65. Largillière, pp. 27-28.

66. *Ibid.,* pp. 25-26, 28, 30; cf. also W. B. S. Smith, *De la toponymie bretonne: dictionnaire étymologique* (Philadelphia, 1940), pp. 76, 71, 103, 127.

67. Dexter, no. 167a; Ekwall, p. 7.

68. Dexter, no. 167a; Ekwall, pp. 59, 137; Hogan, p. 392; Watson, pp. 290, 324, 331.

Tré- or *Lok-*,[69] as are those with merely "X,"[70] though, in Cornwall, all the present names of this type show older forms with "Saint": *Constantine* (Sanctus Constantinus, Domesday Book), *Gerrans* ([ecclesia] Sancti Gerendi, 1261), *Germoe* ([parochia] Sancti Germocii, 1377), *Gorran* ([ecclesia de] Sancto Gorrono, 1270), *Gulval* ([ecclesia] Sancte Welvele, 1328), *Gunwalloe* ([ecclesia] Sancti Wynwoluy, 1291), *Gwinear* ([rector] Sancti Wyneri, 1258), *Madron* ([ecclesia] Sancti Maderi, 1205; Sancti Maderni, 1276), *Mylor* ([ecclesia] Sancti Melori, 1258), *Paul* (Sanctus Paulinus, 1266), *Probus* (Sanctus Probus, Domesday Book), *Sancreed* ([ecclesia] Sancti Sancredi, 1291), *Sennen* ([parochia] Sancte Semane, 1377), *Sithney* (St. Sythyn, 1230), *Wendron* ([ecclesia] Sancte Wendrone, 1291), and *Zennor* ([ecclesia] Sancte Senare, 1291).[71]

A survey of the *Vitae,* combined with that of the toponymy, shows that there were a multitude of saints whose existence is known only from place-names, and that the Christianization of Brittany proceeded from Wales and, more immediately, from Cornwall. In this connexion it is very significant that Breton names like *Aleth* (the old name of St. Malo), *Bangor, Berrien* (and *Tréverien), Cornubia* (Cornouailles), *Domnonia,* and *Tricurius* (Tréguier) find counterparts in British *Lanalet* (St. Germans), *Bangor, St. Buryan, Cornwall, Devon,* and *Trigg.*[72]

One further matter we can mention only briefly: the question of the Bible-text in the Brythonic Churches. On this subject, the late Abbé Duine observed:[73] "Il y aurait aussi une étude à faire sur la version de la Bible usitée dans l'ancienne église de Bretagne . . . pour les passages de la Bible employés si fréquemment dans notre vieille hagiographie celtique. Cependant on devra tenir compte de ce fait: que l'écrivain citait ordinairement de mémoire ou parfois paraphrasait légèrement." Some material here relevant has already been published;[74] the Welsh

69. Largillière, p. 43.

70. Largillière, pp. 33-37.

71. Ekwall, pp. 115, 186, 192, 198, 296, 319, 342, 357, 384, 393, 403, 482, 520.

72. Smith, pp. 9, 14, 16, 31, 44, 72-73. The principal pan-Brythonic saints (i.e., those who have cults both in Britain and in Brittany) are conveniently noted in this work under their proper rubrics; for further data see the relevant brochures of the *CSS.*

73. *Missels,* p. 189.

74. *CED,* 1, 170-80 (for the Brythonic authors Fastidius, Gildas, Nennius, and Asser, pp. 180-85, 187), and general discussion *ibid.,* pp. 188-92; "Extracts from the Old Testament in an Old Latin Version, British or connected with Britain, from MS. Bodl. Auct. F. 4, 32[m]," pp. 192-97. The citations by Gildas have been most thoroughly studied thus far by Williams in his edition (London, 1899-1901), pp. 88-98, and in his footnotes to the various passages cited.

Evangelary of Teilo-Chad (from Lichfield [formerly at Llandaff] and Hereford) has been well edited;[75] and the Breton Book of Landévennec, now in the New York Public Library, has been discussed in much detail,[76] both showing a mixed text of Old Latin and Vulgate versions. The present writer has made what he considers a fairly complete collection of Biblical citations differing from the Vulgate in the *Vitae* of the Brythonic saints, but can as yet give only the most tentative inferences from this material.

Conflations are frequent; and blunders are not unknown. As two examples of conflation, excluding that of whom one must leave to be a true disciple of our Lord and to inherit eternal life (Matt. 19: 29~Mark 10: 29-30~Luke 18: 29-30), of which there are at least thirteen various combinations,[77] one may cite: "In ueteri testamento Moysi a Deo praecipitur: Si quis humanum sanguinem fuderit, ab altari meo euelles eum ne offeret panes Domino"[78] = Gen. 9: 6 + Exod. 21: 14 + Lev. 21: 17: (Vulgate) "quicumque effuderit humanum sanguinem + ab altari meo euelles eum + non offeret panes Deo suo"; "omni petenti te tribue, et ne auertas faciem tuam ab ullo paupere; si multum tibi fuerit, habunde tribue; si exiguum fuerit, illud etiam exiguum impertire stude" = Luke 6: 30 + Tob. 4: 7, 9 : (Vulgate) "omni autem petenti te tribue + et noli auertere faciem tuam ab ullo paupere . . . si multum tibi fuerit, abundanter tribue; si exiguum tibi fuerit, etiam exiguum libenter impertire stude."[79] Whether this type is due merely to quoting from memory, or whether, since all parts of Holy Scripture are divine, such a combination was regarded as inspired, is a question for others than the writer to decide.

As a palpable blunder, mention may be made of the ascription of Ps. 118: 73, to Job, since in this alphabetic Psalm that verse is the beginning of the section Iod.[80] Prov. 21: 30, is ascribed to "apostolus"; 1 Pet. 3: 9, to St. Paul; and Ezek. 33: 11 (with many variations), once to our Lord.[81]

75. L. J. Hopkins-James, *The Celtic Gospels: Their Story and Their Text* (Oxford, 1934).

76. *The Gospel Book of Landévennec (the Harkness Gospels)*, in *Art Studies* VIII, ii (1931), 225-86, (for the text, cf. C. H. Kraeling, pp. 16-35 of the *tirage-à-part*).

77. Similarly, Matt. 17: 19, appears in four different forms.

78. *Acta Sanctorum Redonensium*, II, 10 (Morice, I, 252).

79. *II Vita Corentini*, XV.

80. *Vita Convoïonis* (Morice, I, 321). In this same *Vita* (p. 231), Vergil, *Georgics*, I, 145-46: "labor omnia uicit improbus" appears as "labor improbus omnia uincit."

81. *Acta Sanctorum Redonensium*, I, 6; *Vita Cadoci*, IV; *Vita Efflami*, XV.

Of one citation from "scriptura divina" the source is unknown to me: "morbos aspides sibilant, et mulier fundit concupiscentiae pestilentiam."[82]

Occasionally identical deviations from the Vulgate appear in *Vitae* which seem entirely unconnected. Here we may cite Ps. 80: 11: "aperi os tuum, et ego adimplebo illud": Vulgate "dilata os tuum, et implebo illud"; and two conflations: Acts 7: 59~Luke 23: 34: "Domine, ne statuas illis hoc peccatum, quia nesciunt quid faciunt": Vulgate: "Domine, ne statuas illis hoc peccatum + non enim sciunt quid faciunt"; and 1 John 3: 2~Col. 3: 4: "Cum apparuerit Christus, similes ei erimus": Vulgate "cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus + cum Christus apparuerit."[83]

Three citations seem to merit special attention: *(a)* Matt. 11: 28: "et ego requiescere uos faciam" (found also in Codex Brixianus, St. Cyprian, Tichonius, and the *Vita Germani*; St. Jerome and the *Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum*, "et ego uobis dabo requiem"): Vulgate: "et ego reficiam uos";[84] *(b)* Matt. 25: 40: "quod uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis" (cf. Codex Corbeiensis 1: "quandiu fecistis uni ex minimis istis"; Corbeiensis 2: "quandiu fecistis uni horum minimorum"; similarly SS. Hilary, Ambrose, and Augustine, as well as Ambrosiaster, Gaudentius of Brescia, and Chromatus of Aquileia) : Vulgate: "quamdiu fecistis uni ex his fratribus meis minimis, mihi fecistis";[85] *(c)* Luke 10: 42: "paucis uero opus est, aut enim uno": Vulgate: "porro unum est

82. Letter of Marbodus, bishop of Rennes, to Robert d'Arbrissel (Morice, I, 501).

83. *Acta Sanctorum Redonensium*, III, 0 = *Vita Davidis*, viii; *Vita Leonorii*, xvii (ascribed to our Lord on the Cross) = *Vita Cadoci*, xxxvi ("cum ignorauit quod egit"); *Vita Leonorii*, xxix = *II Vita Samsonis*, ii, 26. Cf. also Luke 6: 37: "si dimiseritis dimittetur uobis" (*Vita Leonorii*, xxv) = "dimittite et dimittetur uobis" (*Vita Cadoci*, xviii): Vulgate "dimittite et dimittemini."

84. *II Vita Samsonis*, ii, 16; see *CED*, I, 183 (MSS. Germ. 2 and S. Cyprian); see also the Douay Version and the first "Comfortable Word" in the Anglican Communion Office (Authorized Version, "and I will give you rest"). It is perhaps worth noting that there is here an old *flottement:* the Greek, Pechiṭṭâ, and Armenian versions (the Gothic is lacking here) have the equivalent of "requiescere" (ἀναπαύσω, *anikh hanguçiç*), as has the Rushworth text (*gereorde*), whereas the Lindisfarne version has the equivalent of "consolor" (*gefroefre*), and the West Saxon and Northumbrian of "laetifico" (*geblissige*). For the variants here cited see P. Sabatier, *Bibliorum Sacrorum Latinae Versiones antiquae seu Vetus Italica*, III, (Rheims, 1749), *ad locc.*

85. *Vita Yvii*, ix; *Vita Mevenni*, v; *I Vita Winwaloei*, i, 9 ("quamdiu fecistis," etc., *NLA*, II, 561.1); cf. also *I Vita Machuti*, i, 33 ("quandiu feceritis uni ex his minimis, mihi dabitis").

necessarium."[86] Except for the Irish *Book of Mulling*, this reading seems to occur nowhere else in the Old Latin versions (it is likewise absent from the Peshiṭtâ, Armenian, and Anglo-Saxon texts—the Gothic has a lacuna here); but it is found in Greek (ὀλίγων δέ ἐστιν χρεία ἢ ἑνός), and is used by SS. Basil and Jerome.[87] Before this problem can be at all satisfactorily solved, the biblical citations in Irish and English authors which differ from the Vulgate should be collected and thoroughly investigated, with comparison not only with all accessible Old Latin versions, but also with Irish and Welsh Bible-texts and with the still unedited Breton version represented by the Landévennec Gospels, the Bodleian MS. Auct. D. 2, 16 (2719), and MS. 85 of the Public Library at Berne.

86. *I Vita Pauli Aureliani*, xvii.

87. S. Berger, *Histoire de la Vulgate pendant les premiers siècles du moyen âge* (Paris, 1893), p. 34; Williams, p. 183; M. Hetzenauer's edition of the Vulgate (Ratisbon, 1929), p. 1263.

ON BEING IN ONE'S RIGHT MIND

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I

REPENTANCE

"Swer wil werden daz er solte sīn, der muoz lāzen, daz er iezunt ist."
(Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer p. 606).

Μετάνοια,[1] usually rendered by "repentance," is literally "change of mind," or intellectual metamorphosis. Plato does not use the word (for the verb, see *Euthydemus* 279 C), but certainly knows the thing: for example, in *Republic* 514 f., the values of those who have seen the light are completely transformed, and, in *Laws* 803 C–804 A, we are told that those who have realised their true relation to and actual de-pendence on God will be "thinking (διανοέομαι) otherwise than they do now," and that "it behooves our fosterlings to be of that same (new) way of thinking"; cf. St. Augustine's *reformamini in novitate mentis* (*Conf.* XIII. 13). Further, Plato distinguishes "understanding" (συνιέναι) from "learning" (μανθάνειν) as knowledge from relative ignorance (*Euthydemus*, 278 A); and the *Shepherd of Hermas* is certainly not misinterpreting the real meaning of μετάνοια when he says that "Repentance is a great understanding" (τὸ μετανοήσαι . . . σύνεσίς εστιν μεγαλή), and, in fact, a transformation from the state of the fool (ἄφρων) to that of one possessed of intellect (νοῦς, *Mand.* IV. 2. 1, 2). In the same way Hermes (*Lib.* I. 18) opposes μετάνοια to ἄγνοια, this "ignorance" being, in *Lib.* XIII. 7 b, the first of the "irrational torments of matter," just as in the Buddhist *nidāna* series it is the primary source of all evils.[2]

It is, indeed, unfortunate that our word "repentance" translates μεταμέλεια rather than μετάνοια; for the latter word imports far more than the merely moral meaning of regret for past error. The man who has really been "converted," i.e., turned round (τρέπω, στρέφω), will have no time to spend in punishing himself, and if he does impose

1. Cf. Hans Pohlmann, *Die Metanoia als Zentralbegriff der christlichen Frommigkeit* (Leipzig, 1938); also, Fr. Tucker, *Syneidesis—Conscientia* (Jena, 1928).

2. See references in PTS. Pali Dictionary, s.v. *paṭicca-samuppāda;* and Gerda Hartmann in *JAOS.* 60 (1940), 356 f.

hardships on himself it will not be by way of penance, but (1) as a discipline like that of an athlete in training and (2) in imitation of the divine poverty. On this level of reference there can be no room for remembrance of or sorrow for past errors, to which the words, "Let the dead bury their dead," are properly applicable, the "dead" being the "old man" who is now no more for those who can say with St. Paul, *vivo autem, jam non ego.* "Such an one, verily, the thought does not torment, Why have I not done the right? Why have I done wrong?" (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II. 9). So there comes a point in Dante's ascent at which he says "Non mi ricorda" (*Purgatorio,* XXXIII. 91). How, indeed, should one who has ceased to be anyone either recall or regret what "he" had done when he *was* someone? It is only when and if he returns from the unitive state to "himself" that he can again remember or regret.

Τὸ μετανοήσαι = τὸ συνιέναι is, then, to come to an understanding *with.*" We stress the word "with," because in order to grasp the problems involved it is essential to remember, what can easily be overlooked, that all words containing the prepositions co- or con-, *cum,* σύν, *sam-,* and all such terms as "self-control," "self-government," and "self-possession" (= com-posure), imply a relation between *two* things (cf. Plato, *Republic,* 431 A, B, 436 B), which two are, in the last analysis, respectively human and divine. For example, "When thou art rid of self, then art thou Self-controlled (*dīnes selbes gewaltic* = ἐγκρατὴς ἑαυτοῦ = *svarājan*), and Self-controlled art Self-possessed (*dīnes selbes eigen*), and Self-possessed, possessed of God (*ist got dīn eigen*) and all that he has ever made" (Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer, p. 598).[3] All this will apply to σύνεσις, σύνουσια, and σύννοια, to the verbs σύνειμι and σύνιημι, to "be together with" and "come together with," to Sanskrit *sam-ādhi,* "syn-thesis" or "com-posure" and the verbs *sambhū, sampad, saṁgam, sami,* etc., all implying con-gress and unification, a "becoming one" (*eko bhū*) in the erotic no less than in other senses, cf. τελέω, to be perfected, to marry, or to die.

In other words, the "great understanding" is a kind of synthesis and

3. To bring out the meaning we distinguish "self" from "Self," as is commonly done in translation from Sanskrit to distinguish the mortal from its immortal Self; these two "selves" corresponding to Plato's mortal and immortal "soul," and to St. Paul's "soul" and "spirit," the former being that "soul" that we must "hate" if we would be Christ's disciples.

agreement (Skr. *saṁdhi, samādhi, saṁjñāna*), by which our internal conflict is resolved, or as the Sanskrit texts also express it, in which "all the knots of the heart are loosed." If we ask, an agreement of what with what? the answer will be evident: unanimity (ὁμόνοια)[4] of the worse and better, human and divine parts of us, as to which should rule (Plato, *Republic,* 432 C); "assimilation of the knower with the to-be-known (τὸ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοίωσις), in accordance with the archetypal nature, and coming to be in this likeness" (Plato, *Timaeus* 90 D, cf. *Bhagavad Gītā* XIII. 12-18, *jñeyam . . . anādimatparam brahma . . .*), "which likeness begins now again to be formed in us" (St. Augustine, *De spir. et lit.* 37); *con-scientia* with our "divine part," when the two parts of the mortal soul have been calmed and the third part of the soul is so moved that we are "of one mind with our real Self" (σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀφικόμενος), thus obtaining true knowledge in the stead of our opinion (*Republic* 571, 572). In Indian terms this is also the marital agreement, or unanimity of the elemental self (*bhūtātman, śarīra ātman*) with the prescient solar Spirit (*prajñātman, aśarīra ātman*) in a union transcending the consciousness of a within or a without (BU. IV. 3. 21); in other words, the fusion of the Outer King with the Inner Sage, the *Regnum* with the *Sacerdotium.*

Μετάνοια is, then, a transformation of one's whole being; from human thinking to divine understanding. A transformation of our being, for as Parmenides said, "To be and to know are one and the same" (Diels, *Fr.* 18 5), and "We come to be of just such stuff as that on which the mind is set" (*Maitri Upaniṣad,* VI. 34. 3). To repent is to become another and a new man. That this was St. Paul's understanding is clear from Ephesians 4:23, "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind" (ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοὸς ὑμῶν).

II

ON THE "TWO MINDS"

God is "not a man, that he should repent" (1 Sam. 15:29, cf. Ps. 110:4, and Ezek. 24:4). Metanoia is a "change of mind" differing only in its larger implication from the change of mind that has taken place when we repent of any intention. When we do this, it is because we feel

4. Ἃ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς διδάσκει, αὕτω γίγνεται ὁμονοεῖν, Xenophon, *Oec.* XVII. 3. For we then participate in his πρόνοια = Skr. *prajñāna,* Providence or Prescience.

ourselves to be now "better advised" and so able to act "advisedly," or as Plato would express it, κατὰ λόγον. Whose advice are we taking? Who gives counsel when we "take counsel with ourselves"? On this point Socrates had no doubt, for, as he says, "When I was about to cross the stream, the daimonian sign that usually comes to me was given —it always holds me back from what I want to do—and I thought I heard a voice from it which forbade . . ." (*Phaedrus,* 242 B).[5] Or, as Plato also says, "there is a something in the soul that bids men drink and a something that forbids, something other than that which bids," what draws us on being the passions and diseases, and that which holds us back the voice of Reason (*Republic* 439). Everyone has had experience of this.

We hardly need to say that Plato speaks of the Leader (ἡγεμών) within us by many names, such as vocal Reason (λόγος), Mind (νοῦς), Genius (δαίμων), and most divine (θειότατος) and best or ruling (κράτιστος) and eternal (ἀειγενής) part of us, nor to be reminded that this Immortal Soul "is our real Self" (*Laws,* 959 A) and that it is for "us" to be Its servant (ὑπερετής, *Laws* 645 A, *Timaeus* 70 D, etc.); how otherwise, indeed, should "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven"? This immanent divinity is likewise Philo's "Soul of the soul" (ψυχὴ ψυχῆς), Hermes' "Good Genius" (ὁ ἀγαθὸς δαίμων), and the "Shepherd" of Hermas. It is the Scholastic "Synteresis," Meister Eckhart's "Funkelein," and however attenuated, our own "Conscience"; but not by any means *our* "reason," or Bergson's "intuition." It is the Spirit that Scripture, as St. Paul points out, so sharply distinguishes from the soul, and his *jam non ego, sed Christus in me* (Heb. 4:12 and Gal. 2:20). It is "the Self of the self, called the 'Immortal Leader' " (*ātmano'tmā netāmṛtākhyaḥ, Maitri Up.* VI. 7), the "Inner Controller" (*antaryāmin, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* III. 7. 1, etc.), "Self (or Spirit) and King of all beings," or "of all that is in motion or at rest" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* 1. 4. 16, 11. 1. 2, *Ṛgveda* 1. 115. 1, etc.), the immanent Genius (*yakṣa*) of *Atharva Veda* X. 8. 43 and *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Br.* IV. 24, and the impassible "immortal, incorporeal Self" of *Chāndogya Up.* VIII.

5. It is rather strange that in one context Socrates supposes that "the daimonian sign has come to few or none before me" (*Rep.* 496 C) but this is contradicted elsewhere, notably in *Timaeus* 90 D and *Phaedo* 107 D and cf. *Odyssey* III. 26.

12. 1, the "That" of the famous dictum "That art thou."[6] And, just as for Plato, so in the Vedic books this deathless, impassible Inner Man and very Self "dwells together with" the human, mortal, passible self in the "house" or "city" of the body for so long as "we" are alive. It is this (Holy) "Ghost" that we "give up" when we die: and the poignant question arises, "In whom, when I go forth, shall I be going forth?" (*Praśna Up.* VI. 3), the answer, according to which we shall be "saved" or "lost" depending upon whether before the end we have known "Who we are" (*Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Br.* IV. 19. 4, 5, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* IV. 4. 14, *Bhagavad Gītā* IV. 40, etc.).

We still make use of such expressions as to be "double minded," "strong or weak minded," "in two minds" (about a purpose), and "not to know one's own mind"; we also "make up our minds,"[6a] and only when this has been done do we really know what we are really "minded to do." We use these expressions (like so many other inherited phrases) without a full consciousness of their meaning, just as we speak of "self-government" or "self-control" without realising that "the same thing will never do or suffer opposite things in the same context and in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if we ever find these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was not the same thing functioning" (*Republic,* 436 B, cf. 431 A, B, and *Parmenides* 138 B).[7] Actually, all these expressions derive their meaning from the age-old doctrine of the duality of human nature,[8]

6. That "We (I) have the mind of Christ" (1 Cor. 2:16) is but another way of saying the same thing, and it will be seen that the new mind and the new man are one, or in other words that to know one's real mind is the same as to know or love one's real Self (φιλήσας δὲ σεαυτόν, νοῦν ἔξεις, Hermes, *Lib.* IV. 6b), the Self of all beings. To have that Mind is to be "blest with a good genius" (εὐδαίμων), but sole dependence on our own unstable mind is to be "cursed with a bad genius (κακοδαίμων, Philo, I. 37, 38. Our "free will" does not consist in doing what we like (i.e., what we must, by a "natural" compulsion) but in a choice of guides, a choice between the good and evil Genii, "the good Daimon" and the Evil, whose name is Legion.

6a. This implies a con-sent of the two wills involved.

7. Philo I. 94 seems to contradict, but is at fault; for it is not the same man who "rubs himself" and is also rubbed; it is, say, a finger that rubs and a leg that is rubbed, and these are not the same man but two parts of the same man. Subjectively, it may be the better part that wills to rub, and the worse that needs rubbing; or the worse part that wants to be titillated and the better part that yields.

8. Plato, *Republic,* 604 B, etc.; II Cor. 4:16; St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.,* II-II. 26. 4; Upaniṣads, *passim.*

stated in terms of a duality or bivalence of mind (νοῦς, Skr. *manas*). It is this doctrine which Professor Goodenough seems to find so strange in Philo:[9] and yet, without it, the notion of repentance would be unintelligible. To know one's own mind is the same as to "know oneself" or "love oneself" in the superior sense of Aristotle (*Nich. Eth.* IX. 8), Hermes (*Lib.* IV. 6 B), St. Thomas Aquinas (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II. 26. 4), and the Upaniṣads (BU. II. 4, etc.). Philo says that "There are two minds, that of all (beings),[10] and the individual mind: he that flees from his own mind flees for refuge to the mind of all in common." The one is ungenerated and immortal, the other generated and mortal (I. 93). The soul being "dead" when it is entombed in the passions and vices (I. 65, and as for St. Paul) he points out that "That which dies is not the ruling part of us, but the subject laity, and for so long as the latter will not repent (μέχρις ἂν μεταυοίᾳ χρησάμενον) and acknowledge its perversion (τροπή), so long will it be held by death" (I. 80). The individual mind is the same thing as our "sensibility" (αἰσθήσις);[11] and "it is always right that the superior should rule, and the inferior be ruled; and Mind is superior to sensibility" (I. 131); "the easy-going man sinks down into his own incoherent mind" (I. 94, cf. *Bhagavad Gītā* II. 67 and VI. 34),[12] i.e., "estimative knowledge" in terms of "hunger and thirst."

It amounts to the same thing to deny the name of "mind" to the estimative faculties of the sensitive soul, governed by its wants. Thus in Hermes, *Lib.* I. 22, it is asked, "Have not all men mind?" and answered, "Mind comes only to those that are devout and good and pure"

9. E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light*, pp. 382-86.

10. The plural ὅλων cannot mean "the universe," and ought not to be rendered thus, as it is by Colson and Whitaker in the Loeb Library edition. The "mind of all in common" (συμπάντων) is that of the "Self of all beings" in Plato, *Phaedo* 83 B: "Philosophy exhorts the soul to trow in nothing but her Self, that she may know her Self itself, the very Self of all beings" (αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων = Skr. *sarva-bhūtānām ātmā*). Xenophon remarks that "When the God is our teacher, we all come to think alike" (ὁμονοεῖν, *Oec.* XVII. 3). It is when we "think for ourselves," knowing only too well what we like to think, that we disagree.

11. "The carnal mind is enmity against God" (Rom. 8:7).

12. We ought then to "pour out as a libation the blood of the soul and sacrifice our whole mind to God" (Philo, I. 76). Eckhart says "the mind must be demented of itself"; that implies by no means the modern anti-intellectualism (in favor of instinctive behavior) but Plato's "divine madness," for "The men whom He dements He uses as his servants . . . it is God himself who speaks through them" (*Ion* 534 D).

(καθαρός = *śuddha*). In Platonic terms, the soul is mindless (ἄνους) at birth and may be still unconscious (ἀνόητος) at death (*Timaeus,* 44 B, C); the unchanging Mind that is contrasted with opinion subject to persuasion is to be found only in the Gods and in a small number of men (*Phaedo* 51 E). If, however, we intend by "mind" merely the human instrument of discursive thought, then to participate in the divine manner of knowing will be, humanly speaking, to be "out of one's mind"; so of the Prophet through whom God speaks Plato says that "his mind is not in him (*Ion,* 534), a state of "mania" that must not be confused with insanity (*Phaedrus,* 244, 265): "the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God" (I Cor. 3:19).

We have now seen that the notion of a "change of mind" presupposes that there are two in us: two natures, the one humanly opinionated and the other divinely scientific; to be distinguished either as individual from universal mind, or as sensibility from mind, and as nonmind from mind or as mind from "madness"; the former terms corresponding to the empirical Ego, and the latter to our real Self, the object of the injunction "Know thyself." We shall conclude by briefly noticing the equivalents of these formulations in the Indian sources.

The formulation in terms of two minds is explicit in Manu I. 14: "From himself the Self-existent drew forth the mind, of which the nature is real and the unreal" (*sadasad-ātmakam*);[13] the mind, that is, with which one thinks "both good and evil" (*puṇyam ca . . . pāpam ca, Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Br.* I. 60. 1) and which is, therefore, a means "either of bondage or liberation" (*Maitri Up.* VI. 34. 11). "The mind is said to be twofold, pure and impure (*śuddhāśuddham*): impure, by connection with desire, pure by separation from desire.[14] . . . Indescribable his bliss who abides in the Self, his mind's defilement washed

13. *Sat* and *asat* are primarily being, reality, truth and their contraries. In the Supreme Identity (*tad ekam*), without otherness (*advaitam*), these are no longer contraries; but considered apart, where *ens et bonum convertuntur, asat* as "nonbeing" is "evil" by the same token that English "naught-y" is "bad."

14. As in Hermes, X. 16, νοῦς καθαρὸς . . . τῶν ἐνδυμάτων. The "purification" enjoined (*cittam . . . śodhayet, Maitri Up.* VI. 34. 3) is precisely the Platonic Katharsis, "a separation of the 'soul' from the 'body,' as far as that is possible," the kind of "death" that is practised by philosophers (*Phaedo* 67 C-E, cf. *Sophist* 227 D); for Plato, purification and liberation are coincident (*Phaedo* 82) just as in the *Maitri Up.* VI. 34. 11 the mind detached from sensible objects (*nirviṣayam*) is liberation (*mokṣa*).

away by Self-composure"[15] (*samādhi-nirdhauta-malasya niveśitasya ātmani, Maitri Up.* VI. 34. 6, 9).

The distinction of Mind from sensibility (νοῦς from αἰσθήσις) is analogous to that of Manas, Mind, from Vāc, the power or faculty of expression. Mind becomes a name or hypostasis of God,[16] than whom there is no other that intelligizes (*nānyad ato'timantṛ, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* III. 8. 11). Manas is the sacerdotal principle that knows and wills, Vāc the power of action without whom nothing would be effected. It is her function to "imitate" (*anukṛ*) him[17] and to act as his follower and messenger, "for she is by far the lesser and he by far the superior" (*Taittirīya Samhitā* II. 5. 11. 5; *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* I. 4. 4. 7 and 5. 11). But though the Victory depends upon her co-operation, she may be reluctant to fulfil her office (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* I. 4. 4. 12; *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* II. 5. 11. 5, etc.); she is easily seduced from her allegiance to Mind and Truth to the service of what she likes to think, and then merely babbles (*ŚB.* III. 2. 4. 11, etc., cf. Philo, I. 94).

In the Indian texts we also meet with the notion of a meliorative dementation as noted above. For when "mind" is thought of only as a part of the psychic organism, then to be "mindless" and "unconscious" is the superior, and conscious mental operation the inferior condition. Thus, "When the mind has been immolated in its own source for the love of Truth, then the false controls of actions done when it was deluded by sensibilia likewise pass away" (*Maitri Up.*, VI. 34. 1, 2); "None whose mind has not been immolated can attain to Him" (*Kaṭha Up.* II. 24); viz., the Person, who being devoid of all limiting attributes is necessarily "mindless," though the source of mind (*Muṇḍaka Up.* II. 1. 2, 3). God does not think and does not know in our imperfect way of knowing in terms of subject and object; we may say that he thinks, but there is no second thing, other than himself, of which he might think (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* IV. 3. 28, etc.).[18] In this sense, then, it is said

15. *Samādhi* (literally synthesis, composure) is the consummation of *yoga,* and what is meant by Plato when he exhorts the soul to "collect and concentrate itself in its Self" (αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὑτήν, *Phaedo,* 83 A).

16. *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* II. 5. 11. 5, VI. 6. 10. 1; *Śatapatha Br.* X. 5. 3. 1; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* V. 5. 6, etc.

17. Cf. Hermes, *Lib.* XII. 1. 13 A. ὁ οὖν λόγος ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ νοῦ, καὶ ὁ νοῦς τοῦ θεοῦ.

18. Cf. Witelo, *Intelligentia semper intelligit . . . (sed) si se ipsam cognoscendo non cognoscit alia* (*De Intelligentiis* XXIV, XXVII, the Commentary adding (*id est*) *perceptionem non intelligit, sicut anima.*

that "when one attains to the state of dementation (*amanibhāva*), that is the last step" (*Maitri Up.* VI. 34. 7), and we recognize the like doctrine in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Cum vero intellectus jam ad formam veritatis pertingit, non cogitat, sed perfecte veritatem contemplatur (Sum. Theol.,* I. 34. 1, ad 2). We must only be careful not to confuse this superior mindlessness of the suprarational and superconscious with the mindlessness of the Titans who are still irrational and subconscious; just as we distinguish the non-being of the divine superessentiality from the non-being of what has not yet come into being or could not be.

To resume: in the first part of this article our intention was to show that what "repentance" really means is a "change of mind," and the birth of a "new man" who, so far from being overwhelmed by the weight of past errors is no longer the man who committed them; and, in the second part, to outline the doctrine of the duality of mind on which the possibility of a "change of mind" depends, and to demonstrate its universality; to point out, in other words, that the notion and necessity of a μετάνοια are inseparably bound up with the formulations of the *Philosophia Perennis* wherever we find them.

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE COLLEGE*

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It was in October, 1923, just about a month after my departure from Switzerland when, on the Old Oregon campus, the profoundly human, wise, and wiry elderly scholar, George Rebec, who had invited and was befriending me, took me to a ritual I had never heard of, the academic assembly. A goodly number of students and a portion of the faculty had gathered to hear a message delivered in person by a gentleman who, I was told, held the office of President of the University, a position also unknown to me. Before the President spoke he amazed me by ceding the platform to a man of the cloth, for the invocation which, I believe to remember, was offered in a very perfunctory manner. It was not this manner, however, which shocked me. I was upset by the performance as such. I had just come from academic surroundings in which the belief prevailed that, of the two institutions, the church and the university, the latter was the loftier. Consequently, I believed, it would be quite possible though not usual to have a scholar give higher consecration to an ecclesiastic function, but to have a clergyman in his clerical capacity elevate an academic function seemed a contradiction in terms.

I had no anticlerical rancors. My persuasion was antiecclesiastic. For me, the university—the *universitas literarum,* or rather the *universitas idearum*—was the only conceivable church, the ἐκκλησία καθολική. I took the word ἐκκλησία in its root sense of an "open assembly," and, taking seriously the wholeness asserted by the terse adjective καθολική, I found none of the churches spiritually all-embracing or catholic. The university, however, seemed to be the properly organized public assembly of men bent upon the truth, as the church visible, embracing not only the holy orders on the campus but holding in its fold every inhabitant of the land, and as the church spiritual, being the repository of every truth without exception. In contrast, it appeared to be the very nature of the denominational churches to make exceptions, putting doctrine before inquiry. That some seem to prefer popularity to both, doctrine and inquiry, I had not then discovered. Nor had I become

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sufficiently aware of the inherent shortcomings of all organizations, especially of academic organizations. My antiecclesiasticism simply expressed an inordinate confidence in the efficacy of organization.

My intransigeance of twenty years ago put me in line with the all-American principle of separating public schools and churches. I had read about this separation before I came to this country. I was astonished to find that the principle was not rigidly adhered to in public schools, particularly in state institutions of higher learning.

I was not quite so unworldly as not to understand that there is a problem. A substantial part of the people feel that serious undertakings like education demand a recognition of their religious bearings. Most of them are satisfied with a ritual recognition, hence the custom of invocations and benedictions before and after school celebrations. As for considering the feelings of unbelievers, the presumption seems to be that the shorter the ritual the less offensive it should prove in the eyes of such outsiders. The minority can be expected to submit gracefully to the habits of the majority. Ours is a civilization of tolerant and kindly compromise.

The problem has a religious side, however, a side not amenable to compromise. I will state it briefly. Either all education is religious education, as Croce said in 1923, and as I believe, or it is not.

If it is not, then invocations and benedictions are mere appendages to school functions explicable only as concessions to the apparent demands of public opinion. In plain English, people are welcome to bring to commencements and similar celebrations not only their infants but also their divines, at least in token samples. To my way of feeling, such a concession shows anything else but true respect for religion. A strict separation of scholastic and religious rites would be much more respectful, if education has nothing to do with religion.

If, however, religion is at the very core of education, then this innermost essence must be given voice, implicitly at least, every hour of school, and it must be explicitly voiced at those occasions when faculty and student body are assembled, or when, following the admirable American tradition, the academic citizenry and their outside relatives and friends have come together to celebrate the school as an educational enterprise.

To express the religious ties of education seems to be an uncomplicated matter in a denominational school which, without unfairness,

may rest its actions on the assumption of a common faith. But in our day of very mixed constituencies of public schools, there is hardly a more embarrassing task than that of voicing the religiosity of education, in the classroom or in open assembly. To put it in old words, who can live up to the summons of Paul: "Let your speech, while always attractive, be seasoned with salt, that you may know how you ought to answer each one"? (Col. 4: 6). For, the listeners do have questions.

The cultural history of this country has been of a kind to lead many, possibly the majority, to identify religion with ecclesiasticism. As a consequence, the dissenters, or a large number of them, conceive of themselves as non-religious. In their eyes, the official appearance of a clergyman on a school platform appears as a concession to their church-minded contemporaries. And in their ears, the phraseology of ecclesiastical tradition does not seem to be seasoned with the salt of thought, nor does it seem to have the flavor of all-embracing wisdom. How are their unspoken questions to be answered? And how is the answer that is fit for them to be fit simultaneously for the ears of the conformists? Simultaneously, I say, for a speaker who would first address the left and then turn to the right with a different speech would give the impression that he was desirous of carrying water on both shoulders, and therefore under suspicion of political aims; he would be suspect of lacking the candor required for voicing whatever is deeply religious.

There are moments when one cannot help but feel that it is not considered quite proper for a philosopher to make so much as a reference to religious depths. Such moments are symptomatic of an aged condition in our culture; they are indicative of the fact that the language of traditional religion has lost the vitality with which it would assail everyone. Our religious situation is in need of revival.

However, revivalism will do no longer. Our mood is too serious for a mere turning over of the leaf and beginning anew, simply repeating all the old words. Nor can we afford any longer to put down on the new page the naturalistic formulae which, earlier in our century, imbued many a modernist and, sad to remember, too many teachers with the feeling that religion was overcome for good, or that it was reduced to its scientific ingredients. Such scientism now proves to be of a kind with revivalism, being the mere reverse of it.

If I say, with such assurance, that we have become older, I have in mind numbers of the young people who, in my classroom and in my

office, have expressed their unwillingness and inability to go back, their bewilderment with the scientistic panaceas, and their desire to know. We are in need of philosophical knowledge, and there is no use in deploring our age. "When philosophy paints its gray upon gray," said Hegel, "a form of life has become old, and with gray upon gray life cannot be rejuvenated, it can only be known; the owl of Minerva begins its flight only at dusk."

The religious people may not know Hegel, but they sense the impossibility of spiritual rejuvenation by philosophy alone. Not knowing philosophy, they may jump to the conclusion that they can do without it, nay, that philosophy is detrimental to the religious quest. They never heard of, or they have forgotten about all the times in history when philosophy did become efficacious, not indeed as a substitute for religion, but as a tutor.

It is my belief that ours is such a time, a time of checking and deepening, a period of potential rejuvenation. Actual rejuvenation is not to be had at will. It is a gift of Providence. But the gift is not bestowed upon the unprepared. Rejuvenation does not come upon an unwilling man. We must set our will on the things that are meet to do. We must align ourselves with all those who offer the best help, though they be long dead. We must profit from the merits of those whom the heaven of history harbors.

We can profit only if we live up to the foremost duty of our age, the duty of translating and retranslating. For we are no longer unilingual, neither in speech nor in thought. No longer can we abide by a single set of terms, or be satisfied with but one language. Nor are there any true findings, no matter how refined and recondite, which do not become the concern of ordinary public opinion, implicitly or explicitly. Our time, however, demands of us to be explicit. Those who still endeavor to muddle through are no longer of any use; they are through, except for their nuisance value. Our time demands clear-cut commitments.

We must be explicit. That means we must recognize the shortcomings of all verbal formulations. We must distinguish between wordings and meanings. The ever fermenting wine of truth cannot be kept in old skins. We must translate the old wordings in order to regain the old meanings. If by translation and retranslation we regain them, these old

meanings prove to be new; what the dead once thought turns out to be our own most intimate thought.

And here is the apparent paradox. Any attempt on our part to be original merely makes us obsolete, and fatuously ineffective. Our efficacy springs from our faithfulness in rethinking the old thoughts. Almost everyone is willing to concede the truth of this in the field of the sciences, where mere originality is identical with arbitrary fancy, and where genuine originality springs from faithful attention to the facts. The truth is not so easily conceded in philosophical matters. For most of us have been brought up to believe that philosophical ideas are nothing but arbitrary theories, and to disbelieve any assertion that there is a substantial continuity of philosophical problems and solutions.

This disbelief has its reasons. It rests on the remnants of old beliefs, religious beliefs which once were experienced as the very foundation of life. These beliefs were not the product of explicit thinking; in fact, their efficacy was only enhanced by the implicitness of their meaning. In comparison with such fundamental beliefs, the explicitness of philosophy appeared ephemeral. The verdicts of philosophy rule only the day, and their power over the future depends on the adequate rewording they must receive from future thinkers. Philosophy therefore looked as if it were sheer verbalization, empty ratiocination, void of a substance commensurable with the substance of belief whose very words last throughout their epoch.

Moreover, in so far as belief has to be articulate in order to be conscious belief, its articulateness is that of simple enunciations, sententious sayings, apparently obvious tenets, utterances in the form of an honest witness report. It was the natural assumption, therefore, that the reports of other witnesses would be commensurate. In fact, the witnesses would corroborate each other's beliefs. Compared with this unanimity among the believers, the concert of the philosophers appeared as nothing but discord. For the enunciations, the sentences, the utterances of the philosophers seem to express diametrically opposed views. In philosophy, the very problems demand, ever so often, to be rethought so fundamentally that the consecutive formulations seem to be at odds. The trained student will see the *perennis philosophia*. To the outsider, however, the history of philosophy seems nothing but an orderless sequence of odd opinions, not only lacking continuity of presentation, but lacking it because of a lack of substantial foundations.

Psychologically speaking, philosophy seemed to lack roots in the subconscious. It appeared as a matter of mere consciousness, and therefore of mere ideology. Belief, on the contrary, had made man whole, reaching down into the unfathomable depths of his soul, and rising up into articulate creeds and confessions. Philosophy seemed to be a matter of the mind only, of a mind detached from reality. Belief appeared more realistic. It appears realistic even to those who have lost it.

It is realistic because it reaches below the surface of the merely conscious. It reveals our depths. Belief is no mere conscious construction. One does not invent the terms of it. They come upon us. In this very sense of being discovered, not made up, belief is mythological. No myth can be invented. None of the great myths of humanity were mere poetry, though the poet in man was needed to give them clear voice.

It is not within the power of peoples or of individuals—says Schelling—"to abstain from mythological notions, to accept them or to reject them. For they do not *come* from without, they are *in* men, and men are not aware how. For these notions come from the interior of consciousness, and they present themselves in consciousness with a necessity which leaves no room for any doubt about their truth."[1]

1. *F. W. J. Schellings sämmtliche Werke.* Zweite Abtheilung. Erster Band. *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie.* (Stuttgart und Augsburg, 1856) p. 194. I also translate the following passages, by way of expounding the one translated above, in the text. "Mythology is not explicable as a merely ideal relationship between consciousness and some object" (p. 77). "To be sure, mythology has no reality *outside* of consciousness. But although it occurs only in determinations of consciousness, that is in images *(Vorstellungen)*, yet this *occurrence*, this *very succession of images*, as a succession, can not in turn be merely *imagined*, it must *really* have taken place, it must have come to pass actually, in consciousness. This real succession is not made by mythology, mythology is made by it" (pp. 124 f). "Former explanations used to assume that somehow mythology was an *invention*. In order to be done with such explanations, and in order to express very definitely that which is independent of all invention, nay that which is *the contrary of all invention* . . . we must say: mythology comes to pass by *a necessary process* (necessary in consciousness), a process whose origin is lost and hides in the super-historical, a process whose particular traits consciousness may resist, but whose entirety it can neither stop nor much less reverse" (p. 193). "No individual trait of mythology, only the process as a whole is truth" (p. 211). "With this result in mind, one may even ask whether mythological images could ever have been *meant*, that is, whether they could ever have been the object meant when we say 'I mean this,' the object taken for true by a free act. . . . Mythological images are neither invented nor freely accepted. Being products of a process which is independent of thought and will, they were of unequivocal and unavoidable reality. Peoples as well as individuals are only tools of this process which they can not survey, and which they serve without understanding it" (Here follows the sentence quoted in my text).

Men live by myths. We moderns are loath to admit this, for we have not quite gotten behind us the rationalism of the Enlightenment which, from its intellectualistic detachment, looked upon everything mythological as merely primitive. Even Giambattista Vico, the early eighteenth century thinker who was profoundly suspicious of a certain vacuity he sensed in rationalism, and who on that account bent his mind on the investigation of mythology, looking for the realistic meaning of myth—even Vico speaks as if man could definitely outgrow the mythologizing childhood of his mind. "The first men, being the babes of mankind, and being unable to form intelligible concepts of things, were in natural need of fashioning poetic notions, which are imaginative genders or universals."[2]

For all I know, our suspicions about the imaginative forms of thinking may have roots not only in rationalism but in the iconoclasm of the Reformation. Notwithstanding its reactionary appearances—and even its essence is reactionary in one respect—one aspect of the Reformation is modern: the demand for explicit consciousness, the demand that the implicit meaning of religious imagery ought not turn into the dead ritualism of idolatry. Iconoclasm expresses this demand most crudely. Calvinism articulates it in terms of legalism and even of casuistry. The reactionary concepts of the reformers were unfit to bring about a redeeming explicitness. Nay, they repressed the subconscious which demanded redemption in explicit terms. But the demand was there—"every man his own priest," said Luther—and it marks modernity.

We need to become articulate about our own situation. Ours is not an angelic existence. Angels, being by definition pure spirits, could be in need only of determining their own lucid place in the spiritual realm, which is wholly transparent. Our lot is to rise from obscurity. We too need orientation, we need to know our place. But first of all we need articulateness. We are unable to resign ourselves to a vegetative existence. Nor can we remain in a brooding condition of mind, forever befogged by the numb stirrings in our soul. We need some kind of language, some terms in which to say who we are. We must come forward from noncommittal obscurity, and commit ourselves. But such committal dare not be arbitrary guesswork; it must be somehow revelatory of our actual condition. To commit ourselves arbitrarily would mean to cast ourselves in characters not our own. Such personifications would

2. *La Scienza Nuova* (ed. Nicolini, Bari, 1928) Vol. 1, p. 91, Article xlix, no. 209.

retain the impersonality of an actor's role, which is not to be mistaken for his own personality. Our committal must be personal. It must truthfully articulate the condition we are in, the condition of creatures, of beings who reach for the light *de profundis*. The depth of our souls must enter into our commitments. The genuine articulations of ourselves, therefore, retain something of the ineffable darkness from which we rise. None of our true commitments are translatable into rationalistic formulae.

Now, the rationalist is not wrong when the ineffability of the expressions stemming from our subconscious disturbs him, and when he makes bold to postulate a liberation from this bondage to darkness. He is wrong only in so far as he expects a total transfiguration of our being. We are not gods who have never known darkness. It is precisely our task to *know* our own darkness. We must transfigure our subconscious origin, but we cannot transcend it.

This transfiguration which is the very task of man, is not a mere sublimation. To sublimate our nature is to desert it, or to falsify it, no matter in what subtle manner. What we need is not sublimation but wholeness. And we cannot be made whole if we lack the humility of acknowledging our nature, while transfiguring it.

Our nature is not apart from our historical condition. We are our very selves not as abstract spirits, but as these concrete selves who have a calling, who are to do what we alone are fit to do in our historical circumstances.—Fichte once answered the question about the real nature of things by saying that things *are* what we ought to make of them.[3] In this sense we too are like Fichte's things: we *are* the ones into whom we ought to make ourselves. We make ourselves responsible for what we are to be. We do not acquiesce in our natural conditions; we are historical beings. We posit history by acknowledging our factual condition as our task. Our potential tasks are our very substance. And it is this substance which must be acknowledged in the terms which articulate our very selves.

Our first self-articulations are imaginative, not conceptual. Vico said that, "by necessity of human nature, poetic speech was born before prosaic." Thus "the imaginative universals were born before the reasoned universals of philosophy." And it was not "the remote wisdom of

3. *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre*. 1794 (*Sämmtliche Werke*. Vol. I, p. 286).

great and rare philosophers," not the reasoned but the imaginative universal which constituted "the common wisdom of the legislators who founded mankind."[4] We may condense Vico's statements, saying that it is the imaginative act, the act of poetry which raises man to the level of humanity. Ποιεῖν means to posit, and man does posit himself as human, that is, as an historical being, as soon as he attains as much as an imaginative position in the scheme of things—as soon as he finds his myth. I say, an imaginative, not a merely imagined position.

Whereas, in the derogatory sense of the word mythology, mythological figures are fictitious characters, merely imagined entities, man's first self-articulation is myth in a quite different sense. The myths in terms of which we come to recognize ourselves as in a mirror, are not fictitious but realistic, they are no mere poetic inventions. They have been called revelations. They are not fanciful fashionings out of nothing. They reveal something. They reveal unto us who we are.[5]

And since we are not apart from our historical condition, it is possible that we can recognize ourselves in the imagery of the same myth in which our fathers and our contemporaries recognized and recognize themselves. It is possible that a whole age find its own basic truth in a genuine myth. This is possible *if* the myth be genuine, that is, if it be found, not made up—revealed, not invented. This finding of a true myth, this coming of a revelation is not a matter of arbitrary will. It is not a matter of will at all, except in so far as will means the perseverance of waiting, and the resistance to what is arbitrary and therefore "not of God." The bringers of humanity's great myths have always emphasized that they were sent, that they spake not of themselves, that, far from advancing imperious schemes of priestcraft, they themselves were subject to the power of their message. The great religions came to pass through profound piety, not by political nor even by statesmanly will. Only when a myth had come into existence could the political minded as well as the great statesmen make use of it.

It is a sign of the shallowest misunderstanding of the nature of myth when certain uprooted individuals try to create a new myth at will—like the Nazi theorist Rosenberg—or when others, driven by the dismal lack of bearings, attempt a deliberate conversion of themselves or of others. Wilful endeavors to believe are a sign of decadence, a sign

4. *La Scienza Nuova* (ed. Nicolini, 1928) Vol. 1, p. 195, no. 460: p. 151, no. 384.
5. Compare above, note 1, especially Schelling's sentence from pp. 124 f.

that an age nears its end, that an epoch is in transition. Ours is such a time.

Historical epochs are marked by the myths in which the men of each epoch find the revelation of their own being. A genuine myth creates an age. The myth of a people—said Schelling—"is not due to their history. On the contrary, their history is determined by their mythology. Or rather, the mythology does not *determine,* it *is* the destiny of a people (just as the character of a man is his destiny)."[6]—Every great myth creates an historical epoch. Ours is the Christian.

Ever since the Enlightenment, there have been voices expressing an opinion that the Christian epoch has come to its end, or is approaching it. In Nietzsche's *Zarathustra,* only the old hermit in the wilderness has not heard what all the world knows, that the old God is dead. And when the Nazis—whose nihilism Nietzsche fortold and detested—endeavor to substitute for the Christian God a god, or a whole set of gods of their own making, they merely conform, in their own crude and popular manner, to the mood of the pet victims of their diatribes, the mood of those liberals who not only find themselves outside of the Christian faith, but who have lost the sense of being descendants of Christianity, and therefore the sense of gratitude to the Christian myth. The Nazis identify this kind of liberalism with all liberalism. This is natural, for they hate their own sire and magnify him into a demon. The elder sons of the same sire, the Marxists, assume that man can live without religion. "Religion is opium for the people." The Nazis have the slight merit of being conscious of the need of myths, whereas the Communists are the more genuine myth-makers: they cater to the need without admitting it, when they bring forward their own eschatology, their own version of the final state of things, their own Millennium. All such artificialities reveal the emptiness of men who are mythless. Into the vacuum of their souls pseudo-myths keep entering, but they fill them only with passions instead of peace.

Mythological epochs do not end abruptly. Nietzsche has his Zarathustra say that gods die many deaths, and one of Zarathustra's guests holds that "Death, for gods, is but a prepossession." In another book, Nietzsche relates the legend that the shadow of Buddha could be seen, in a certain cavern, for centuries after the Master's death. A mythological epoch is not comparable to the lifetime of an individual. What is

6. *Op. cit.,* p. 65.

more, great myths have the capacity of rejuvenation, entering substantially into newer myths. Thus, at about the time of the Babylonian exile and probably on account of it, Jehovah lost the traits of a tribal deity and showed himself as a universal God of justice. Similarly, this Jewish God revealed himself, under the New Dispensation, as the Christian Trinity.

It is not necessary to assume that we stand between the times, in the sense of having Christianity behind us, and something else ahead. It is quite possible that ours is an age of purification, from which our successors will emerge with a deeper insight into and therefore a firmer faith in Christianity. But it does not seem to be a baseless assumption if we speak of a time of spiritual crisis in which we live. In this sense, we do stand between the times. And such intermediary periods are marked by certain temptations and certain corresponding duties.

A man lost in the apparent vacuum between the times looks back upon the realm of myth as upon an incubus. He is easily seduced to believe that the time of all myth is past and will never return. In his eyes, myth marks the childhood of man. Man's task is to outgrow it. Only as a trait of actual or belated childhood will myth survive in individuals. This view, it seems, is shared by large numbers of our contemporaries. It is the view of rationalism and individualism.

Opposed to it is the view of those who prefer irrationalism, and who hanker for authority. Theirs are nostalgic souls. They too have lost the old faith, but they try to convince themselves, spasmodically, that they have not. Nothing can shock them more profoundly than the encounter with an actual faith, a faith strong enough gladly to submit to the scrutiny of reason, and confident enough not to need for support the dead props of authoritarian command.

In the man of strong faith, the epoch of the old myth survives even in a time of transition, and the man of weak faith should pray that he be made strong. He will remain weak just as long as he assumes that strength rests on thoughtlessness. In the recent film *So Green Was My Valley*, the young parson says to the lame boy: "When you pray, think. Do not wallow like a hog in religious sentiment." Sentimentality springs from weakness and begets weakness. Strong faith is thoughtful, though its thoughts are symbolical and not argumentative, substantial, not formalistic.

Formalism and argumentativeness are merely the opposite of, and

therefore akin to, weak and sentimental faith. And just as there are men of weak faith and men of strong, so, among the unbelievers, the rationalists are weak, and the strong stand on more substantial ground than argumentation. However, this substance is not irrational. Irrationalism is only the reverse of formalism. And the formalist lacks what Richard Kroner, referring to Hegel, called piety of thought.[7] This piety demands that we watch and wait and prefer suspense to submissiveness. Intellectual conscience will not let a man submit to doctrines which to him have no symbolic personal significance. Therefore the pious unbeliever's prayer is mute, a quest *de profundis*.

My teacher, Medicus, used to say that there is only one legitimate prayer: the prayer for the presence of God. The word prayer is akin to the Sanskrit word *prcchati* which, according to the dictionary, means to ask for, but also simply to ask, to inquire. The German verb *fragen* comes from the same root. To pray for the presence of God, when mythological words are not available, means to raise the question about the very meaning of the phrase "presence of God." It means to inquire into the reality of that presence. For, spiritual reality *is* meaning. The peculiar piety of those who stand between the times but are not lost on that account, is the piety of thought.

If prayer and thought are separated, prayer becomes superstitious, and thought becomes argumentative.

Superstition takes literally what the myth proclaims. Owing to its task of annunciating the whole man, conscious and subconscious, myth has the power of poetic unity. Sensing this unifying power, superstition fastens upon the poetry of the myth as upon its essence. It mistakes the poetic unity for reality.[8] Thus, superstition becomes impervious to the non-literal symbolic sense of the myth. Instead of an analogy it posits an identity, and it lapses into idolatry. Likewise, argumentative thinking is tied to the verbal expression but, being without poetic sense, it misses the inner unity of the myth. Therefore this thinking either argues legalistically for, or it debates rationalistically against the myth. It becomes either apologetics or iconoclasm.

The logic of true faith is not argumentative. The true believer is aware of the symbolic character of his myth. He realizes that the myth

7. *Hegel. Zum 100. Todestage.* (Tübingen, 1932) p. 23.

8. Vico: "The human mind is naturally inclined, owing to the senses, to see itself outside, in the body, and it finds much difficulty in understanding itself by means of reflection." *Op. cit.*, p. 95, no. 236.

embodies fundamental reality and genuine truth. He feels keenly that the expressions of the myth are not mere arguments thought up to serve as intellectualistic props in order to support ulterior tenets. He feels that the mythological symbols themselves are expressions of what is most truly real.

In the myth, basic reality proves to be communicative, communicating its very essence, and this essence reveals itself as being the personal concern of the man of faith. Fundamental reality proves to be truth in the most genuine sense of the word truth. Truth is essentially accessible, not hidden, not jealous, but yielding; it is an ever new invitation.

The truth can not be told once and for all. It must be retold, even though it has been told already in a quite adequate manner. If I say that in the believer there is an awareness of the symbolic character of myth, I do not mean to impute to him the notion that the mythological expressions are inadequate to convey the truth. On the contrary, the believer will assure us that the symbols of faith are adequate. But, if his faith is genuine, he will also tell us that these symbols are inexhaustible in their meaning, or that they do not exhaust the reality they proclaim. Quite logically, he calls this reality by the name of mystery.

By the same logic, I said that the truth, the fundamental truth about our existence, demands to be retold in ever new and always genuine terms. To be sure, if I put the matter this way, the believer may feel impelled to dissent and to assert that the terms of his myth are quite sufficient and in no need of translation and retranslation. In fact, he may tell me that his terms are the only adequate ones. But this disagreement between him and me is verbal rather than material. Materially we agree that no set of terms exhausts the truth. For him, this inexhaustibility is conveyed in the efficacy which the very wording of his myth retains in repetition. For him, reiteration is not repetitious but refreshing. So it is for me. Only I am aware of the fact that the old words, when they are repeated by the really faithful, express ever new meanings. More precisely speaking, the old meanings assume ever deeper significance. And this is an instance of translation and retranslation, though the words remain the same.

As a philosopher, I cannot but state this fact explicitly, whereas for the believer the time-pervading efficacy of meanings appears as a power implicit in the specific and unique myth. For him, the myth fills all

time, making him sense the majesty of the revealed God. He lives in the fulness of time. My calling is to stand between the times.

But then, so will he say that he stands between the times, that is, between time and eternity, between the historical time in which God deigns to reveal himself, and the anticipated and really timeless bliss of finding home, the blissful return into God. And just as the believer can truthfully confess that he too always stands between the times so, with all due humility, we can experience the fulness of time in our very awareness of the awesome fact that the epoch created by a myth bears the marks of mortality.

This philosophical awareness does locate us between the times. Philosophy is no *Ersatzreligion*; philosophical insight is not the same thing as religious faith. The faithful are quite right when they feel that the explicitness of the philosophical concept does not further their cause whose innermost meaning, for them, remains implicit.

Nevertheless, the explicit concept, though no substitute for the implicit Word of the myth, is as necessary for the health of spiritual life as is faith itself. Without conceptual clarification faith would turn into stifling superstition. The terms of revelation, terms conditioned by the historical circumstances, would take the appearance of timeless impersonal formulae. Magical spells have the same character, and their impersonality makes them a fetter for the man who uses them. They are entirely conditional, hence they enslave.

The revelations of faith bring spiritual health and freedom because they are man's *unconditional concern*. I am borrowing this pregnant and concise phrase from Paul Tillich who, in 1927, defined revelation as that "which concerns me unconditionally" (was mich unbedingt angeht).[9] Most of the affairs of the world concern us only conditionally. If I want to grow grass in my shady front yard, I must get the seed into the soil a month before the trees are in foliage. If I want to be an engineer, I must learn my mathematics. If I am to deliver an address, I must have a topic. I *must* use the proper means, *if* I desire the end. But there is no unconditional obligation to have a lawn, to be an engineer, to make a speech.

No activity in the world is a duty unless it happens to become an articulation of our calling. Any activity, no matter how lowly, can be-

9. "Die Idee der Offenbarung." Dresdner Antrittsvorlesung. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*. Neue Folge. 8. Jahrgang, 1927, Heft 6.

come such an articulation, yet none can exhaust our calling. This is why the religious feel that our calling is not of this world, that not even the loftiest sacrifice amounts to an exhaustive consummation of the soul. It is a perversion of religion when the Nazi doctrine proclaims a German's soldierly sacrifice of his life as the consummation of his being, as the very meaning of his life. To be sure, the moment may come when we too may be called to quit this business of living in order to make a bit safer that which is more important than living. But we know that not even our most important tasks are identical with the reason for life, with that reason which alone is our unconditional concern.

And what is that reason? There is no answer in general and in the abstract, for the question makes sense only if it is a personal query. In the naïve language of preliminary instruction, the question is put to the catechumen: "Why did God make you?" And he is told to answer: "God made me to know Him, to love Him, and to serve Him in this world, and to be happy with Him forever in heaven." Modern man realizes that this imputed answer bristles with questions. Quite so. But these questions can not be answered at all unless we also realize that catechization concerns persons, not things. We must dare to come forward and ask, not abstractly, "What is the reason for life in general?" but concretely, "What is the reason for my life?" The former question talks about life as a strange thing, an object of argument. But the question about the reason for our own lives posits "a *task* instead of an argument," as Fichte put it concisely.[10] If we ask the question in this adequate manner, we are already in the proper mood to reject as not sufficiently realistic an answer which would permit us to acquiesce in any given goal short of realizing our place in the scheme of things, our relation to the very essence of reality.

Literally, *religio* means the re-establishment of the ligaments which tie man into his origin. But such words may easily obscure the issue rather than clear it up. True religion does not tie and confine man, it liberates him. Man's origin is such that he can realize his essence only in freedom. The myths of the so-called higher religions have proclaimed man's essential freedom. They could not amount to such a proclamation were they not of a symbolic nature. For they speak in terms of things, and things are unfree. But the mythological terms symbolize freedom.

A symbol is no mere allegory. Allegories are only hints; they are con-

10. *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. Werke,* Vol. I, p. 116.

ventional signs referring to items of an already established agreement among the individuals of the group within which the allegory has significance. This is why allegories have an air of tediousness and outright pedantry. But symbols are fresh, even when they are very old, for they are no mere conventional signs. Their meaning is not conditional upon a conscious understanding among a group of men. It is not a social matter, and its social significance is only derivative and secondary. Primarily and originally, the symbol is meaningful for the individual self who, in the symbol, recognizes the significance of his own reality. The symbol shows him where he stands in the scheme of things. But it cannot do so except by summoning him to come forward without reservations. The symbol is symbolical only in so far as it concerns the individual self unconditionally.

What concerns us unconditionally is nothing extra-mundane. An extra-mundane concern would be conditional, the condition being that we could and would detach ourselves from our worldly existence.

What concerns us unconditionally must concern us as the men we are, men of our age of transition, men of this century who, among other things, cannot ignore their scientific consciences. Fritz Medicus says: "Religious faith appeals to the *whole* man. The desire for wholeness, however, places the intellect within the spiritual currents of the age."[11]

There has been much talk about the conflict between science and so-called religion, and even more talk asserting the nonexistence of such a conflict. The fact is that there must be a clash any time the mythological letter offends the spirit of science, an offense which occurs when the terms of the myth are taken literally.

For instance, scientific conscience demands our recognition of the simple truth that, by definition, spatial limits are boundaries *in* space, and that it is a contradiction in terms to speak of any shape as a limit *of* space. Therefore, if it is legitimate to conceive of physical reality in terms of Euclidian space, it follows that physical space cannot be limited by a sphere, the sphere of the fixed stars. Scientific conscience demanded of Giordano Bruno to deny the alleged nonphysical nature of the space surrounding the sphere of the fixed stars, and consequently to do away with the Platonic and medieval conception of such a limitative sphere. However, in 1600, it looked as if the terms of Christian my-

11. In an unpublished book entitled *Das Mythologische in der Religion*, fourth chapter of the first part. Many of the things I am saying owe their origin to this book.

thology could not be cleansed of that conception. Consequently, Bruno's assertion of the infinity of physical space had to be counted against him, as one of the eight heretical sentences lined up for his trial.

Bruno's piety made him realize, during the seven years of his imprisonment in Rome, that the unconditional religious concerns of man cannot be considered in separation from his scientific conscience, and that it had been wrong for him to sever the two, at his trial in Venice, in 1592, when he hoped to save himself by appeal to the theory of a twofold truth, according to which scientific and religious truths can go separate ways.

The mythological images of religion can concern us unconditionally only if they do no violence to our scientific conscience. This principle was not only recognized explicitly by Bruno himself who preferred death at the stake to any further violation of the principle; it was also recognized implicitly by the Church which condemned him, thus repeating its previous condemnations of the theory of a twofold truth. The implicit recognition of the principle has since induced the Church to take into the fold the astronomical views it condemned in Bruno.

I chose the example of Bruno in order to underline that significant date of 1600, an historical moment which might be taken to mark the beginning of what we call the modern age. It might be said that the modern age is characterized by the explicit recognition of the truth that nothing can concern us unconditionally which violates our intellectual conscience.

Man does not doff and don historical ages as an occidental changes his clothes. Rather, like the new garment of a cold-bitten Tibetan, the new is worn on top of the old. And the old age is still very much about us. Thus, in this country, there is still a great longing for the comfortable sixteenth century makeshift of a twofold truth. I presume this longing has been enhanced by the actual schism between the churches, and by the apparent schism between science and religion.

As a rule, the theory of the twofold truth is not brought forward in sixteenth century terms. The usual fashion of propounding it today, especially in America, is to declare religion to be an essentially emotional matter which, as such, need not be in conflict with things intellectual. As a consequence of this view, theology is declared to be obsolete, nay incommensurable with the essence of religion, or at the very least inadequate to cope with that essence. Another consequence is the readi-

ness with which so many people accept the pseudo-modern notion that all genuine knowledge is strictly objective or, as the current phrase puts it, scientific.

British empiricism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had the merit of developing the precarious consequences of the notion of objectivism or scientism. The blithe scientism of Hobbes led to the scepticism and solipsism of Hume. Hume woke Kant from his metaphysical slumber—so Kant himself said—but David Hume discontinued his world of perceptions in the very year in which the thirteen colonies seceded from things British. Thus he furnished the latter day homemade scientism on our shores with a kind of a chronological alibi for its Rip van Winkle slumber and unawareness of what had already happened in 1776.

Unfortunately, the matter is too serious to let it go with a facetious remark. Scientism, owing to its very axiom that all thinking is conditional, is utterly unable to cope with the unconditional. And the declaration that the power of religion is merely emotional not only degrades this power to something conditional but it deprives religious thought of logical vitality, turning it into inconsequential superstition.

In truth, religious thought is aware of the unconditional concerns of man, concerns which cannot be apprehended in their unconditionality, by mere emotion, which is always a conditional matter. It is the unconditional character of the religious appeal which constitutes the power of religion. Take it away and you destroy religion. Arrest religious thought, and you have truly nothing but superstition, vain assertions about the essentially Unknowable. Once you have gone so far, the next step is inevitable. It becomes imperative that methodical thought abstain from traffic with the fancies of superstition. Putting it in the conciliatory terms of political compromise, it is imperative that the thoughtful pursuits of study, the pursuits of the school, be separated from the mere emotionalism of religion. The separation between science and religion, between thought and faith appears to be complete. This appearance has influenced and, in my opinion, vitiated our educational system. It has made us afraid of fundamental issues.

I am fully aware of the need of these last hundred years to separate the school from the church. Denominationalism made this separation imperative. I am also aware of the need of scientific thought to emancipate itself from the guardianship of prescientific mythological concep-

tions turned into superstitions. The minimal demand of our intellectual conscience had to be freedom of scientific research.

Scientific conscience quite rightly warns us not to mistake the mythological symbols for objective things. Science is an implicit philosophy. Philosophy would warn us explicitly not to mistake the unconditional for something conditional.[12] Such a mistake is against our intellectual conscience which, notwithstanding the confusion of much of our nineteenth and twentieth century thinking, has yet been sharpened by our scientific and historical endeavors. The greater sensitivity of our intellectual consciences is the positive reason, I believe, why people are willing to accept the erroneous thesis that religion is an emotional matter. More properly speaking, it is a matter beyond the reach of scientific thought, it is not a conditional matter.

It is not any lack of intellectual conscience, it is merely the lack of philosophical clarification of this conscience which has left us in our educational muddle. For we are muddled. We have set up our schools and our churches in a manner which would make it appear as if schools could educate human beings without touching upon their very essence, and as if churches could adequately voice that essence without entering into that public universe of discourse, the realm of philosophy, in which alone there is hope for ascertaining logically anything essential. No wonder common sense objects to ecclesiastical denominationalism. No wonder it looks upon the school as upon an institution merely academic, fondling mere abstractions, and therefore being in need of progressive reform from without, a reform which keeps forcing upon the school the cultivation of the so-called practical pursuits.

The appearances are that the school cultivates thought, but a thought that is abstract and impractical, and that the church promotes the practical attitude of prayer, but a prayer that is superstitious. However, people's sense of reality does not leave them satisfied with these appearances. Common sense counteracts the abstractionism of the schools with a sound feeling for things truly human, and it counteracts ecclesiastic formalism with social work and daily ethics. Nevertheless, owing to its very nature, common sense can fight only a defensive battle. In fact,

12. Kant says that, in so far as the concepts of reason, the ideas, "contain the unconditional, they indicate something to which all experience belongs, but which is never itself an object of experience." *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 367 (pagination of 1787).

many people of common sense have been pushed into the defensive to the extent that they have come to use the language of scientism as if it could ever adequately express their deeply human concerns. And so they are suspicious of mythology.

Common sense is unable to distinguish clearly what is positive in myth. In order to see it distinctly, we must first distinguish between the letter of the myth and its spirit. The letter is objectivistic, the spirit speculative. (I am using the word speculation in the technical sense of the great followers of Kant.) The hard labor of speculation might eventually lead to interdenominational understanding. Instead, there is an easygoing though not insincere desire to dispose of the denominational conflicts by means of compromise. But compromise never solves any difficulties we find in fundamental principles. The craving for compromise dulls the sense of our providential assignment. After all, it is not for nothing that conscientious men stand where they stand. Conscience places some inside the fold, and it puts on others the mark of unbelief.

Now, even if there were no positive ground for the unbeliever to stand on, even if unbelief were identical with evil, the believers of our century could still profitably meditate on a conviction held five hundred years ago, that the Devil himself must serve the ends of God. There used to be a picture in the Old Pinakothek, in Munich, by the Tyrolese mid-fifteenth century painter, Michael Pacher, showing a venomous green devil employed in holding a big open book from which a bishop is reading. Some interpreters say the bishop is St. Wolfgang, others name Nicolas Cusanus. If the latter identification were correct, it would suit to a nicety the purpose I have in mentioning the picture.

Cusanus was the last great thinker before the ecclesiastical schism in which we have all been living for some four hundred years. The thought of Cusanus, though suspect to some of his contemporaries, was never formally condemned as heretical, and until his natural death Nicolas retained his hierarchic dignity of a cardinal. Thus, there was a time when the church still considered as its own a profoundly revolutionary thinker. As long as the ecclesiastic organism keeps such resilience, there is no wonder that a churchman can force even God's antagonist into the service of faith.

Such force, such self-confidence seems to have disappeared from the latter-day churches. And it may be argued, of course, that already in

the fifteenth century the tolerance shown Cusanus was a sign of weakness rather than of strength, a sign of senescence. Nevertheless, I suggest that there is profit in meditating on the case of Cusanus, and the picture of Pacher. For, what churchman of today would dare to employ the devil? And what church has the courage to consider the great modern thinkers as genuine churchmen?

What is more, is there any ecclesiastical body steeped deeply enough in conceptual methodology to be able to understand *why* all great thinkers are in truth great churchmen? Perhaps there never was such a church. But there ought to be, if it is true that the church is to be defined as the communion of those who are guided by the Holy Spirit—if it is the very essence of the church to be catholic.

Of course, the invisible church, the communion of the servants of the truth, exists serenely, no matter whether or not there is any church visible resembling it. But there can be no truly all-embracing visible church in our day, unless the institutions of higher education make accessible, for the presumable leaders of tomorrow's public opinion, the conceptual tools forged by the great thinkers, the tools by means of which the basic unity of all thought can be understood. Instead of cultivating the understanding of our substantial unity, our schools still endeavor to be theologically neutral, by the convenient device of being philosophically innocuous. And instead of teaching us how to inquire, properly and hence promisingly, into the meaning of Christian myth, our churches conveniently declare themselves legal heirs to the substance of religion. Owing to such superstitious legalism, the religious substance either is turned into a dead letter, or it is declared to be an ineffable spirit—which is a contradiction in terms.

Our caution and our legalism lead to a facile discrimination between believers and unbelievers. Now, even if the unbelievers were the devil's own, they would still have their function in the economy of the divine plan, and therefore they would still have to be taken seriously. But unbelief is nothing merely negative. Even the *superficial* infidels who seem to lack a conscience are not deficient in the sense for what is expedient. And expediency is something positive, although it is not the highest virtue. The virtue of the *great* unbelievers is their dedication to the truth. From their ranks came the great religious leaders who, therefore, have always shown a subtle appreciation of the outsider's calling. They were never easygoing conformists. Nor were those whom conscience

drove into unbelief dissenters for the sake of negative dissent. They saw their duty in understanding more deeply beliefs whose previous formulation had become questionable. Thus, *sub specie aeternitatis,* the dissenters-by-conscience still belong in the fold. Nay, they may belong more genuinely than the conformists-by-indolence.

These are thorny matters, and it is ever so much easier to leave them alone. It is more comfortable to decree, by power of ignorance, that nobody has ever succeeded in thinking out anything with regard to religion. It is safer to declare one's independence from the vain squabbles of the churches. It is more decorous to make one's obeisances when the eye of the sovereign is upon us. It is more political to acknowledge a sovereignty of the vulgar in matters of religion, thus appeasing them, and inducing them to tolerate our sovereignty in matters academic.

But woe unto us when the vulgar find their champion who will rescind the license hitherto granted us. If those who have no personal relation to our cultural past are fit to judge things theological and philosophical, why not also things scientific and pedagogical? If it is proper that the democratic sovereign be left untutored in the matters which—not only allegedly but truly—are man's deepest concern, is it not proper for the same sovereign to disregard tutoring in other matters?

In Europe, the champions of the untutored masses have taken power. To be sure, in taking power they had to depose the democratic sovereign, but their logic is the logic of the untutored. And Hitler's scorn for liberalism is justified. He means the liberalism which gave license not to think, the liberalism whose tolerance was due to the lack of convictions rather than to any profound understanding of human unity. Hitler, himself a member and hence the idol of the spiritually disinherited masses, never knew the true liberalism which is identical with the courageous and assiduous pursuit of education which liberates. Thus, he has nothing to offer to the disinherited but his tedious propaganda. And in order to maintain himself he is under coercion, both personal and political, to eliminate the stewards of the heirloom of occidental culture.

In the war of arms we are waging against his revolt of the masses, the difficulty seems to be the production and transportation of material means. The spiritual war we must wage, not only to prevent a similar revolt in our country—it may be true that it cannot happen here—but in order that our people may prove a wise sovereign at the next peace

conference, this spiritual war finds the mere materials already produced and ready on the fighting line. America has built up its schools, and we are not lacking materially, but what use are we making of these weapons, and of the eager will of youth to gain their war of inner liberation?

Some seem to think that Mussolini pointed the right way. They think all we need is a concordat with the Church, or with the churches. This would be very pretty, if there existed an ecclesiastic faith that could be everybody's unconditional concern, and if our churches could furnish sufficient numbers of wise and learned spiritual advisers who could take the pedagogical tiller at the point where the charts of our secularized education give out. What our students want is not a charted course, but charts of the deeps, and a practical knowledge of how to steer by them. No mere revivalism can furnish such orientation. And if pusillanimous academic administrators schedule modicums of mild revivals they demonstrate that they do not know what our students want. They want access to the chart room. They want philosophy.

To be sure, they want more than philosophy, they want faith, or confirmation in their faith. Even those want faith for whom the very word is a stumbling block. They want faith in reality, faith in themselves. They want a calling. They ask: Who are we? For what are we here? What is it all about? A few find satisfactory answers in their church doctrine. Many churchgoing students say these doctrines do not answer their questions. And a perhaps even larger fraction of those outside the fold still more resent the callous indifference of the college which leaves them to their own devices, or which puts them off with the advice to participate in the activities of denominational student clubs. Most students do not even know that it is philosophy they want.

Philosophy is no substitute for religion. But philosophy teaches how to ask our questions properly, translating them into answerable form, instead of mistranslating them into apparent questions about nonexisting objects. Faith cannot be had for the asking, nor does philosophy guarantee faith. But philosophy teaches how to distinguish between faith and superstition, between false religion and true. Thus it prepares the way for the latter.

BOOK REVIEWS

When Egypt Ruled the East. By GEORGE STEINDORFF and KEITH C. SEELE. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. xvi + 284 pp. 109 illus. $4.00.

We have long needed a short, well-illustrated, up-to-date history of Egypt in an attractive format, written in pleasant English. As a temporary edition, *When Egypt Ruled the East* is perhaps all we could hope for, in view of the present state of Egyptology in America. Breasted's *History of Egypt* is now at least a generation behind the times and includes no archeological or historical discoveries since the second edition, which appeared in 1912. Before 1935, Breasted had begun a thorough revision of his *History*. Death halted this project at the conclusion of the chapter on the prehistoric period. In this country he was perhaps the last scholar almost equally versed in every cultural phase or period of Egyptian life. His students delegated unto themselves special historical periods, and became specialists in a general field which was already a specialized discipline in itself. From their work has come a fairly steady stream of highly specialized publications, which for the most part are scholarly and competent. They have telescoped into a generation the development of German Egyptological scholarship, that is, in one generation Egyptology, at least in Chicago, has withdrawn into itself, and has become a squirrel-cage. Its members prepare themselves to fill museum or university posts with no dynamic future, but with comfort and stability so long as museums and universities shall be able to *exist* under present conditions.

As I look about, I see *Religion* unfamiliar with the *sources* of religion. There is no adequate study of Egyptian religion in any language. Breasted had hoped for years to write one in five volumes, but never found the time to get it done. Egyptian religion is not taught in any divinity school or theological seminary. Probably the majority of ministers believe that prophecy originated with Moses as a new conception. They know rather little of the origins of the sacraments. I see *Anthropology* quite unacquainted with the civilization which, along with Mesopotamian culture, began written language. I see *Classics* confident that a handful of Athenian intellectuals invented drama, art, and philosophy almost overnight. I can see *Drama Departments* struggling to explain how the drinking song (maudlin and extemporaneous) suddenly be-

came memorized tragedy as the natural result of a brief evolution. I see *Art-history* considering disciplined aesthetics, too, as springing like Athena full-grown from the forehead of Zeus.

When St. John's College selects one hundred classics for a curriculum, I see the list begins with the Greeks. Why? Because Egyptology has not yet had time to put itself in order? For example, the Pyramid Texts are not yet in English.[1] They constitute as great a classic as large portions of the Old Testament (much of which stems from them). They should be taught in every divinity school and theological seminary in this country, and in every classics department in the world. There is good ground for adding the speakers' names to the dramatic lines of the Pyramid Texts and turning them into full-length plays! Compare the entrance of Orestes in seven Greek dramas to the entrance of Horus in many more Egyptian plays. Then read Gilbert Murray's *Classical Tradition in Poetry* (pp. 205 ff.), and find that "I am Horus," "I am Orestes," is echoed on the modern stage through Hamlet (and Horatio). Where did the name Horatio originate?

Egyptology needs men who will take it into other related fields, into religion, anthropology, classics, and drama. It appears unaware that the lay public is still more interested in Egyptian relics than in any other ancient remains. In short, Egyptology must cease to imitate the tortoise and try to emulate the bird-dog who, when he has found the long-sought quarry, points to it for all the world to see and enjoy with him. It needs more men like William Stevenson Smith and his forthcoming epoch-making publication, *A History of Egyptian Sculpture and Painting in the Old Kingdom*,[2] men like E. Baldwin Smith and his *Egyptian Architecture as Cultural Expression*,[3] men like William C. Hayes and his scientific supervision of modern paintings of ancient Egyptian life,[4] and men like Dows Dunham, John D. Cooney, and Herbert E. Winlock, with their magnificently designed exhibits at the Boston, Brooklyn, and Metropolitan Museums, respectively. There are whole university departments which need enlightenment. At present

1. The manuscript of Breasted's unpublished, thirty-year old, complete English translation of the Pyramid Texts is in my possession, and should be made available in print to all interested students of Religion and Philosophy.

2. Oxford University Press, perhaps in 1942.

3. New York, 1938.

4. Cf. H. M. Herget, "Life, Culture, and History of the Egyptians," *National Geographic Magazine*, LXXX (Oct. 1941), pp. 436-515.

this enlightenment does not come from an Egyptological group at Chicago which has little influence on related disciplines, and is so technical that everyone is afraid to take up Egyptology because it seems, outwardly, to have no future. It has little future for itself, but it has an incalculable future for the rest of learning. Egyptology is now a secret science apart from the rest of culture. A college chaplain at one of the large endowed Eastern universities was recently asked about Egyptian religion. He acknowledged having read some of the Book of the Dead, which he thought of little consequence. He had never heard of the Pyramid Texts. The president of a famous theological seminary not long ago preached on Job and spent most of the time explaining why Satan was included among the sons of God, adding: "There's both good and bad in everything." He had apparently not considered the relation of that situation to Seth's being taken into the Ennead. The fact was political and historical, not theological.

The great Egyptologists, like Steindorff, have always tried to teach Egyptology to non-Egyptologists. Today most Egyptologists not only write exclusively for each other, but they have become so specialized that an archeologist cannot (or thinks he need not) know the work of a linguist, or art-historian. What does that do to drama? The linguist calls it a "dramatic text," because he cannot study it as presented in a theater. The archeologist never looks at the text, but calls the theater a "mortuary temple," though the word mortuary would not have been permitted by the Egyptians, who used "death" only negatively in the Pyramid Texts, or as applied to a foe, and who had no word for "temple" in their language, only the word "house," which we find always applied to theaters, as in "playhouse," "a full house," etc., in all periods.

Egyptology at Chicago today is rather like Alexander's empire after the death of Alexander; the generals are so anxious to hold their individual shares of the spoils that as yet they have not pooled their specialized knowledge sufficiently to produce the much-needed definitive *History of Egypt* for which they as a body have all the first-hand raw materials. There are more Egyptologists at the Chicago Oriental Institute than at any other university in the world. This reviewer cannot but hope that those upon whom the mantle has fallen will join hands to write a book which will circulate throughout the entire English-speaking world, and perhaps, like its predecessor, even farther into other tongues. Thus far they have delegated but one of their number to this gigantic task, and he is listed as co-author with Professor Steindorff.

The format, make-up, new illustrations, and printing job of *When Egypt Ruled the East* could hardly be improved upon, and the University of Chicago Press is to be congratulated upon its skilful execution of the artistic design. But the textual matter is subject to rather severe scrutiny. The Preface and the publishers' blurb on the jacket imply that this is a new book. It is *not* a new book, though new as a first translation to many a reader, and *mutatis mutandis* remains the good original. The English is often dry and sometimes stilted[5] in comparison with Steindorff's excellent German in his *Die Blütezeit des Pharaonenreiches*. [My copy of the latter was published in 1900.] To this English translation some of the important intervening new discoveries have been added. Thus I can say: Dr. Seele is not the co-author; he is merely an emending, translating editor. Knowing Professor Steindorff's style, I cannot help but feel that he did not write the Preface of the English edition, although his name appears first under it. It definitely reads like the co-author's job. It tries to cover up evident discrepancies, and Dr. Seele takes great pains to absolve Professor Steindorff from responsibility for these. The Preface ends with this rather odd sentence: ". . . we alone, or in a few instances, only the one or the other of us, are responsible for the statements in the following pages."[6]

This reviewer took particular pleasure in the chapters dealing with religion and art. Steindorff's realistic version of the Amarna episode is very different from Breasted's somewhat nostalgic idealization of Ikhnaton in his *History of Egypt*. More recent scholarship considers the first monotheist as not entirely the lofty saint of Breasted's pen, nor the weakling drawn by Pendlebury.[7] Lay readers desirous of understanding the more obvious conventions of Egyptian art will enjoy the entire chapter treating of this subject. There is none of the pomposity and incredible verbosity of the most complex German aesthetic theories of a Schäfer,[8] nor the doctrinaire assertiveness of a Frankfort.[9]

General readers may be a little confused by the use of two systems of chronology.[10] The only serious error of fact detected by this reviewer occurs on page 13, in regard to the second Neqada culture, where it is

5. Cf. p. 197, first sentence of second paragraph.
6. P. x.
7. Cf. J. D. S. Pendlebury, *Tell El-Amarna* (London, 1935).
8. Cf. H. Schäfer, *Von Ägyptischer Kunst*, 3rd. ed. (Berlin, 1930).
9. Cf. H. Frankfort, *The Mural Painting at El-'Amarnah* (London, 1929).
10. Cf. pp. 49 and 52.

asserted: "Small figurines became common, though they had as yet nothing in common with the prevalent types in later Egyptian works of art." Actually, small figurines are common only in the first Neqada period. In the course of excavating several hundred burials of the second Neqada period only two small figurines were discovered, and one of these was an anthropomorphic natural stone. Furthermore, in function but not in style, the Neqada figurines are the prototypes of the historic servant figures.

Praise is due for a good selection of often excellent photographs. Until a definitive, up-to-date history of Egypt is written, this physically attractive volume deserves to find its way before a large American general public (not to mention the anthropologists, art-historians, classicists, theologians, and historians of the drama) and deserves to be as widely read as its German prototype was read for more than four decades.

James Henry Breasted, Jr.

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Studies on Buddhism in Japan, Vol. III. Edited by The International Buddhist Society, Tokyo, [1941]. Distributor, Perkins Oriental Books, 1620 Mission Street, S. Pasadena, Cal. 168 pp. Price $5.00.

This third volume in the general series of *Studies on Buddhism in Japan,* like its predecessors, contains a wide range of contributions by competent scholars. Five of the contributors are Japanese, one is a German and one, an Italian. The subject matter, with one possible exception, is of antiquarian interest and thus throws little light on Buddhism as a living religion in present day Japan. It should also be added that only two of the seven contributions deal directly with Japanese Buddhism.

The subjects presented are as follows:

1. "Samgha," by Professor Hakuju Ui.
2. "Characteristics of Japanese Buddhism," by Bruno Petzold.
3. "One Aspect of Saddharmapundarīka Sūtra Sāstra," by Mitsutaka Kimura.
4. "Lineé Generali Della Dottrina Shingon," by Giuliana Stramigioli.
5. "The Seating Positions of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in the Vajradhātumandala," by Professor Ryūjun Tajima.

6. "The Protocanonical Languages of Buddhists in the Old Prakrit," by Professor Hōryū Kuno.
7. "Samantamukha-Parivarta aus dem Sanskrit uebersetzt von Prof. Ernst Leumann und Watanabe-Syōkō."

While all these contributions are of considerable value to the specialist, only Professor Petzold's "Characteristics of Japanese Buddhism" would be of any real interest to the average student of religion. In fact, it is of special interest just now, not simply because it presents the chief characteristics of Japanese Buddhism in contrast with the Buddhism of India and China, but also because it reflects Japan's self-consciousness and national pride, so characteristic of modern Japan in every phase of its life.

Professor Petzold points out that it is only recently that Japanese scholars have stressed the differences between Japanese Buddhism and the older Buddhism of India and China. But, as these modern writers now look back over Japanese history, they discover that Buddhism from its very beginnings in Japan and down through its long history of over thirteen centuries in that land has been quite distinct, even though Japanese Buddhism naturally has many basic elements in common with the Buddhism of other lands. Professor Petzold bases his own studies largely upon the views of such leading Buddhist scholars as Eun Maeda, Sensho Murakami, and especially Daito Shimaji. All of these scholars seem in substantial agreement that a chief characteristic of Japanese Buddhism is and always has been its emphasis on the practical side of religion, and especially its harmony with and support of the Japanese state. This, they feel, is in rather sharp contrast with the Buddhism of India, where it held itself rather aloof from the state and where it held up the withdrawal from life as the highest ideal. And while in China Buddhism became more concerned with meeting the practical problems of man's life as a citizen of this world, it made this change only as a result of repeated persecutions from the side of the state and society. The author summarizes Shimaji's views on this point by saying that "Japanese Buddhism from its beginning understood the 'Kokutai' or 'essential nature of Japan.' Therefore it considered the Imperial House and the State as the foundation of its system. And then it penetrated more and more into the society."

Another characteristic of Japanese Buddhism is its proclamation of "the highest philosophy, religion and morality. . . . All other theories

had to submit to it, and Shinto, too, came to acknowledge the superiority of Buddhism." This claim of Shimaji is quite true historically, though present day Shintoists would hardly admit the claim. Again we read, "Japanese Buddhism endeavored to make the infinite thought of Indian Buddhism finite, and to make the theoretical and complex Chinese Buddhism practical and simple."

Professor Petzold holds that "the growing self-consciousness of Japanese Buddhism" is shown further by the flood of literature published in recent years. This consists, in large part, of revised editions of the canonical writings and, what is really significant, the inclusion in the present day canon of Japanese Buddhism of many texts which are of Japanese origin. This modern trend at first shocked some of the more conservative Buddhists who had always looked upon the Chinese canon as the authoritative source of Buddhist teachings, even though for centuries Japanese Buddhist writings had been widely circulated. But now more and more Japanese Buddhists take the position that Japan, too, has made a vital contribution to the authentic literature of Buddhism which represents a real advance for Buddhism as a world religion.

This flood of reprints of ancient texts, both Chinese and Japanese, does not of itself argue for a revival of Buddhism in present day Japan, but only for a renewed interest in Buddhist history as an integral part of Japanese history, for it is largely the work of scholars connected with government and private universities rather than that of religious leaders. In fact, one of the features of this Volume III is a list of chairs and their incumbents in leading universities dealing with "Buddhism, Indian Philosophy and the Science of Religion." This list fills ten pages.

Another ten pages of the volume are devoted to the table of contents of leading religious journals of the year 1940. Here again, the vast bulk of the material presented concerns itself with the past rather than the present. The one exception is the journal, "Studies in Religion,"—Shūkyō Kenkyū—which deals more with present day religion in Japan. It is noticeable that quite a number of the contributions to this journal are by Japanese Christian scholars.

The volume as a whole would be considerably improved if the editors had seen fit to seek the aid of some one a little more familiar with the English language. One wonders whether Volume IV, if there is to be a Volume IV, will be in English at all.

A. K. Reischauer

New York City

The Historic Mission of Jesus. By Cecil John Cadoux. London and Redhill: Lutterworth Press, 1941, pp. xxiv + 376. 21*s.*

This volume by the Vice-Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, more widely known, perhaps, as the author of *The Church and the World,* adds another to the growing list of books on the place of eschatological beliefs in the thought of Jesus. During the last dozen years probably as many notable volumes have appeared on this theme. The period is comparable to the slightly longer one before the first World War, the period initiated by Weiss's *Die Predigt Jesu von des Reiches Gottes* and closed by the outbreak of the war. This first period was chiefly concerned with those sayings in the Gospels which appeared to indicate that Jesus shared the apocalyptic views of his day. The second period, accepting in the main the conclusions of the previous one, has been primarily concerned with finding an adequate interpretation of the sayings which refer to the Kingdom of God as a present reality, with interpreting the ethical teachings in the light of these results, and with the related problem of the Messianic consciousness of Jesus.

The Historic Mission of Jesus carries the subtitle, *A Constructive Re-examination of the Eschatological Teaching of the Synoptic Gospels.* Its organizing theme is that of Jesus' purpose or mission. Cadoux's view of this is as follows: The clue to the thought of Jesus is the term, "The Kingdom of God." The primary meaning of this term in the first century was submission to God as King. This was true for Jesus as for the rabbis. The phrase was also used by Jesus in an "extensive" sense, to denote, that is, the group of individuals subject to the King. In this sense it designated a social entity. The parables of growth in the gospels show that the Kingdom was for Jesus, in certain of its aspects at least, a society of human beings, "and a growing society at that." Contemporary Jewish thought pictured a climactic fulfillment of God's rule, and it was natural that Jesus should have done so also. He expected a catastrophic and spectacular coming of the Kingdom within the lifetime of his own generation, one which he thought dependent not only on the providence of God but also on the co-operative service and prayers of men (p. 203).

Within the framework of these ideas Jesus conceived his mission. This rested, in the first place, on an "experience of unique filial intimacy with God, which dated even from his boyhood, became strikingly real to him at his baptism and again at his transfiguration" (p. 34). While

all righteous men were sons of God, he conceived of himself as in a special or unique sense "the Son," a term used in an absolute sense over against "the Father." This conception led him to apply to himself the passages in Deutero-Isaiah of the Suffering Servant of God, and to the conviction that he was the predicted Messianic king of Israel. The apocalyptic features of the Messiahship were subordinate in his mind, however, to those of a religious character. While he made no open claim to Messiahship, "by acted and spoken hint he prompted men to see it in his redemptive mission" (p. 103).

The plan which Jesus adopted was "to push ahead with his teaching about the Kingdom of God and with his works of exorcism and healing, which he regarded as indications of the presence and power of the Kingdom." At the beginning Jesus hoped that the Jewish nation as a whole would receive and follow him. The ministry in Galilee was "a joyous and triumphant episode." The prophecies of the coming Passion are all placed late in Jesus' ministry. Quite apart from that evidence, the bitter disappointment expressed by Jesus over Israel's failure to accept him "is indubitable proof that he had once hoped for a better reception." Instead, the opposition became constantly more implacable, and he foresaw the fatal issue. He made no attempt to escape it, believing that by submissively yielding himself to death he would, like the Suffering Servant of Isaiah, be the means of bringing about that widespread repentance which he had failed to secure by other means. He could not foresee, however, how early or how complete this repentance might be. He did see, nevertheless, that in repudiating him and his program, the Jews had repudiated the only policy which could save them from an engulfing wave of hatred toward Rome, an inevitable revolt, and a Roman conquest. To the last Jesus struggled passionately to prevail upon them to heed his warnings. He did not anticipate nor foretell a personal resurrection after three days. The prophecies to this effect are due to early Christian reworking of the tradition. Rather, he expected that he would go immediately into "Paradise," as the saying to the penitent thief indicates, whence he would return on the great day of consummation.

This brief sketch does not do justice to a volume which is rich in suggestiveness and insight. Critical scholarship, interest in social issues, and a concern for the realities of religion have entered into its writing. One of the best parts of the book is the final chapter in which *inter alia* the

right and duty of objective historical scholarship in the study of the records of Jesus' life is defended against the current attacks upon "historicism" in the name of Christian faith.

This reviewer must record the impression, however, that for all its values, the volume fails to deal successfully or decisively with its central issue, namely, the problem of eschatology in Jesus' thought. As stated above, Cadoux's view is that Jesus used the phrase, "The Kingdom of God" (except when used of the apocalyptic consummation) in the rabbinic sense of God's rule over man's will. This view had been maintained by previous writers, but it had not been fully elaborated or applied to the problems of Jesus' life as a whole. This needed to be done. Cadoux thus has given an interpretation which stands as an alternative to those of Schweitzer, Otto, and Dodd. Unfortunately, he seems to have been influenced, either in thought or in language, by one or more of the alternative approaches to the problem, so much so that, at times, the reader is uncertain as to his thought. Thus, having declared that the Kingdom exists "whenever and wherever man so accepts God" (p. 129), and hence is "really timeless" (p. 128), he goes on to speak of the parables of growth as indicating that Jesus thought of the Kingdom as having "already started to grow" (p. 131); of Jesus' reply to the Baptizer as suggesting "somewhat less ambiguously the arrival of the Kingdom" (p. 132); and of the successful exorcisms as proof to Jesus' mind that "God's kingdom had already come upon men" (p. 61). Repeatedly one reads that the Kingdom was present in Jesus' Person and Work, though at least once this is qualified to read, "in a specially real and powerful way" (p. 129). But that which has just "arrived," or which has suddenly "come upon men," or which had "started to grow," would appear to be a different conception from that of an obedience to God's will which had existed from the time of Abraham, wherever and whenever, in fact, men have obeyed God's will. Formally Cadoux accepts the latter view, and denies that the apocalyptic aspects of Jesus' thought were the primary ones. Repeatedly, however, he is drawn to the opposite view, that Jesus conceived of the Kingdom as having in some sense come or arrived in his work, a view which is essentially apocalyptic. The reviewer would venture to guess that the difficulty lies in the effort to combine a belief in the Messianic consciousness of Jesus, to which the author adheres, with an interpretation of Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God along rabbinic lines. Is not a messianic consciousness essentially

out of harmony—though not, be it admitted, logically incompatible—with the rabbinic conception of the reign of God?

HARVIE BRANSCOMB
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Religion and the State in America. By EVARTS B. GREENE. New York: New York University Press, 1941. 172 pp. $2.75.

This publication on the Stokes Foundation traces the story of the American interpretation of the relation between church and state from its roots in the western medieval Christian tradition to the Hughes decision in the Louisiana textbook case and the latest constitution of New York state. It is among the best, brief, popular yet scholarly discussions of the American way of life.

The inherited European tradition was co-operation between church and state, with all major Christian groups when entrusted with government leaning heavily upon the support of the state. And these European ideas were actually transplanted to the Americas by both Catholics and Protestants. "Liberalizing factors in colonial America" included the experiments in Rhode Island, Maryland, and Pennsylvania but also the Scotch-Irish immigration, the great variety of denominations in the middle colonies, the Great Awakening and English Deism. The disintegration of religious establishments resulted from such trends as opposition to Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism and the Quebec Act, and especially the vigorous dissent in Virginia. It is clearly recognized that the religious clause of Amendment I applied only to the national and not to state governments. The survey of the American religious situation after 1791 directs attention to the gradual abandonment of religious tests for office, the disqualification of clergymen from important public offices, the inauguration of office of chaplain, the exemption of the churches from taxation, prosecution for blasphemy, the problem of Protestant-Catholic friction, the schisms provoked by negro slavery, the breakdown of the ecclesiastical view of marriage, and so on.

In the sixth and final chapter, "The American Tradition Tested," the inquiry is particularly concerned with religion and public education and the criticism of the absolutist theory of the state. This is the most pertinent material in the study, and the issues and facts are in general clearly and impartially stated.

There are those who insist upon a return to religion in public edu-

cation because "religion is the integrating principle in education," and those who "emphasize the business of the state under a democratic government to maintain a system of schools open to all children, supported by public taxation, and limiting itself to *purely secular instruction.*" A middle group stands between these contenders "without clearly defined convictions." "Purely secular instruction" deserves the following clarification:

What Catholics and Protestants mean by *religion* and by *church* cannot possibly be harmonized. When the Pope says, "first of all education belongs pre-eminently to the Church," he means not Christendom but the Roman Catholic Church, and when he uses the word "religion," not the various religions of the world or Protestantism but only Roman Catholicism. The popes have never and cannot approve the Protestant interpretation of Christianity or the Church. There is only one Church.

The parochial school has been a dismal failure among Protestants and a disappointment for Catholics. The Presbyterian parochial school experiment of the 1840's was in disintegration within seven years. At the present time a Protestant constituency of over 31 millions can muster only a paltry 275,643 for all its parochial schools, while over 21 million pupils attend public schools. Fifty-seven percent of American Catholic youth do not attend parochial schools.

Religion has never been separated from public education in the United States. Only sectarianism and formal training in the Bible have. The indirect cultivation of religion and ethics in public education at the present time is probably doing much more for the development of the religious attitude among us than the emotionalism in many of the more than 250 American religious bodies. During the last century formal and institutional Christian emphases have been surrendering to less direct but far more potent applications of inherent religious values. There is no such thing as "purely secular instruction." The American way of life grew out of the Judeo-Christian tradition as well as the Greco-Roman civilization. Hence, religious instruction must be present even in "secular" American history!

The reader who desires a more extensive evaluation of the pacifist contention and its refutation than could be given in Professor Greene's concise but illuminating analysis is referred to the chapter on "Re-examining Pacifism" by John Knox in *Religion and the Present Crisis.*

Conrad Henry Moehlman

The Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

The Story of American Catholicism. By THEODORE MAYNARD. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941. xv + 694 pp. $3.50.

Half a century has passed since the distinguished Catholic scholar, John Gilmary Shea, published the last volume of his standard history of the Catholic Church in this country, to be followed only a few years later by O'Gorman's comparatively brief survey in the *American Church History Series.* During this period the whole position of the Church in American society has been radically changed. Its membership has been immensely increased, mainly, though not wholly, through immigration. Furthermore, there is, in spite of intermittent outbreaks of anti-Catholic feeling, an increasing readiness on the part of non-Catholic citizens to acknowledge fairly and sympathetically the special contribution of the Roman communion to our common American inheritance. In frank recognition of what the Church has suffered through the intolerance of earlier generations, few have gone farther than some of our younger Protestant scholars.

In bringing the story of American Catholicism up to date, a present-day student has at hand a substantial body of fresh material, both primary and secondary. Most of this has naturally come from Catholic sources; in the production of substantial, if sometimes difficult, monographic literature, the faculty and students of the Catholic University in Washington have been especially active. The present writer has aimed to take advantage of such spade work in preparing a "badly needed . . . handy popular history of the Catholic Church in the United States" (p. xiv). The result is a book which may be read with interest and profit by Protestant, as well as Catholic, students of American religious history, with due regard, however, to the special standpoint of the writer and his special approach to the subject.

Unlike many denominational historians, Mr. Maynard has undertaken, with some success, to relate his *Story of American Catholicism* to the general course of American history. "Too often," he thinks, "ecclesiastical historians have presented the life of the Church almost as though it existed in a vacuum." Here he has sought "to exhibit it as part of the epic of America, of an America not to be properly understood without it" (p. xii). In the colonial era, however, his perspective would have been improved by more thorough use of the material presented by the institutional historians of that period, notably by the late Herbert L. Osgood. In later periods, the author is aware of recent re-

vision of traditional views; but in some cases, his *dicta* will provoke dissent. In the field of Western history, for instance, Turner's frontier theory is now generally believed to require some qualification. It is going rather far, however, to dismiss it as "little more than a fanciful notion that appeals to the immature imagination . . . the small boy peeping out of the pedant" (p. 255). So in dealing with slavery and secession, the author would have substantial support from competent scholars in his critical treatment of abolitionism, but again one wonders about the fairness of such a sweeping judgment as this on the abolitionist agitation: "It was bigoted and deliberately mendacious, and therefore almost wholly mischievous" (p. 339). Much may reasonably be said for the compromisers of 1860 and the cautious position of the Catholic hierarchy on the slavery issue. It is doubtful, however, whether many serious students of the period would agree with the author's opinion that the Emancipation Proclamation was "a monstrous injustice, . . . the one blot upon Lincoln's record" (p. 359).

An important qualification for the ecclesiastical historian who aims at a just appraisal of his own church, in its relation to other social factors, is his ability to deal understandingly, and in some measure sympathetically, with mental attitudes other than his own, even though complete objectivity can hardly be expected in this imperfect world. It must be said frankly that Mr. Maynard's book leaves something to be desired in this respect. A convert to Catholicism in his youth, he has reacted sharply against the Protestantism of his early associations, and this experience obviously colors his narrative. In the colonial period, Lord Baltimore's toleration policy entitles him to due credit for enlightened statesmanship under trying circumstances. On the other hand, Roger Williams, in spite of his strenuous controversialism, in which he was in no respect peculiar among his contemporaries, deserves something better than the contemptuous treatment which the author has given him. A careful reading of Williams's writings, including his famous letter to the town of Providence, and the record of Rhode Island practice during his lifetime, should make it quite impossible to say, as the author does, that "the tolerance of Roger Williams" is "largely a myth." It was quite proper to point out and to emphasize the intolerance of the New England Puritans; but in view of the Rhode Island experiment, it is misleading to say that "nowhere in New England was any freedom given to dissent" (pp. 87 ff.). Generally speaking, enforced

conformity, whether in Catholic or Protestant colonies, was, of course, quite normal in seventeenth-century practice, though gradually weakened, especially in the English proprietary provinces by economic as well as idealistic considerations. The author's treatment of this subject may suggest to an uncritical reader that bigotry was a peculiarly Protestant vice.

The chapter on Catholic evangelism in the West during the early nineteenth century introduces such attractive personalities as Simon Bruté, the pioneer French bishop of Vincennes. The picture of religion in the trans-Alleghany country is, however, unduly simplified to the disadvantage of non-Catholic missions. As against the "severely intellectual religion" of the Catholic clergy, our author appears to find among the Protestants nothing but "orgiastic camp-meetings" conducted by itinerants of the "rabble-rouser" variety (pp. 261-62), quite ignoring the home missionaries whose active interest in education was the starting point of so many Western academies and colleges. In general, we have here a gloomy picture of non-Catholic Christianity in this country. "Except for isolated 'fundamentalists' . . . Catholicism could cut through Protestantism as through so much butter" (p. 613).

For the general reader the most useful sections of the book are probably those dealing with ecclesiastical developments during the past hundred years and with the position of the church on current social problems. Without going into the details of diocesan history, Mr. Maynard has found space to characterize effectively such outstanding leaders of the American hierarchy as Bishop McQuaid, Archbishops Hughes and Ireland, and Cardinal Gibbons. Two of the most interesting chapters deal with the period of Gibbons's cardinalate. Few will quarrel with the sympathetic portrait here drawn of one who was not only a distinguished prelate but an admirable citizen. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Gibbons's Protestant biographer and notes the Cardinal's irenic attitude toward his "Protestant brethren." Among the notable services which he rendered, to his country as well as to his church, were his firm resistance to German-American "Cahenslyism," which threatened the unity of the American church by its emphasis on differences of national origin, and his statesmanlike attitude toward the American labor movement.

The author belongs to the group of Catholic intellectuals who, encouraged by the encyclicals of Leo XIII and his more recent successors,

are sharply critical of modern capitalism. "The truth is," he writes, "that a healthy Catholic life is hardly possible under capitalism." He deplores, therefore, the position taken "almost universally by the wealthier Catholic laymen," as well as by some of the hierarchy, "that the Church should throw its weight into supporting the capitalist system as a positive good" (pp. 429, 433). Other chapters provide clear and readable explanations of church policy in relation to education, marriage, divorce, birth control, "Americanism," and church-state relations.

While naturally deferring to authoritative ecclesiastical pronouncements, Mr. Maynard is not unaware of human failings among the Catholic laity and hierarchy. He condemns, for instance, as "a ghastly error (p. 448)," however well-meant and excusable at the time, Archbishop Hughes's policy which favored the direction of Irish-Catholic immigration to the cities. So also, in his chapter on "The Cultural Contribution," Mr. Maynard is a frank, though sympathetic, critic of his fellow-churchmen, making only moderate claims for their achievements in literature and the arts. He finds Catholic novel-writing disappointing and not sufficiently frank in dealing with sex problems; "Catholic squeamishness has perils of its own" (p. 566). "As for Catholic criticism, it can hardly be said to exist in this country" (p. 568). With some exceptions, he considers that in Catholic Church architecture, "the standard is still low"; "so far the most 'Catholic' of American architects has been Ralph Adams Cram, who has for a long time been tottering on the brink of the Church without quite falling in" (p. 572). Notwithstanding the remarkable advance of Catholic educational institutions during the past half century, Maynard deplores the lack of adequate support among wealthy Catholics for educational endowments.

EVARTS B. GREENE

Columbia University

The Andover Liberals: A Study in American Theology. By DANIEL DAY WILLIAMS. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. x + 203 pp. $2.00.

The upheaval caused by present world events inevitably has its repercussions in the field of theology. One of these is a felt need that American theology should be written more in the light of its own history than has been true in the past. This is said, apropos of Dr. Williams' book, not in a spirit of theological "isolationism," but in the belief that

a better knowledge of the history of American theology would increase its contribution to theology as a whole.

Dr. Williams' book makes an important contribution to the history of American theological thought. Its scope is wider than its title indicates. The main source for his study is the nineteen volumes of *The Andover Review,* which was published monthly (except for the last year) from 1884 to 1893, inclusive. Of this magazine it has been said that "it was *The New Republic* of its day," that is, it was "a journal of liberal opinion." This estimate is borne out by the fact that it numbered among its contributors such writers as Washington Gladden, Vida Scudder, Richard T. Ely, John Dewey, as well as William J. Tucker, of the Andover Faculty. Five members of the Faculty were its editors, and most of their important writing during the life of the *Review* appeared in its pages. This material, together with a good many collateral sources, has enabled the author to present a valuable account of American liberal theology toward the close of the nineteenth century.

Throughout his study the author emphasizes the influence upon theology of the general sociological environment. At the outset he sketches "the warfare of old and new faiths which developed on a prosperous industrial seacoast allied to a frontier, agricultural hinterland" (p. 1). Andover Seminary was founded in the hope that it would be a "sacred West Point" for Calvinism, but by the time that the *Review* was founded its faculty was standing for what it termed "progressive orthodoxy," which developed into an evangelical liberalism. This transition did not come to pass without a struggle. Heresy trials were instituted against the faculty, and the consequent litigation lasted for six years; but none of the faculty was removed.

Dr. Williams defines liberalism as follows: "Liberalism is not primarily a system of doctrine, but rather an attitude toward doctine. It is the position that truth can be attained only through a never-ending process of criticism and experiment" (p. 64). He finds that there were three major issues which confronted theology at the time of the founding of the *Review*. The first issue sprang from "the ideas of the changing world and relativity of moral standards which centered in the conceptions of evolution and progress." The second issue arose from "the criticism which applied the principle of development to the origin and history of Christian doctrine itself." The third was "involved in viewing personality as conditioned by social factors and involved in social conflicts" (p. 31).

With respect to the first issue, the author shows that the Andover liberals, while freely accepting the general evolutionary account of man's origin, made an effective critique of the evolutionary naturalism of the day, that of Herbert Spencer. This they did by upholding human freedom, as against Spencer's universal mechanism, through contributing at an early date a doctrine of emergent evolution. The acceptance of evolution, even though it be understood as emergent evolution, made necessary a revision of the conception of the relation between God and the world. Concerning the position taken by the liberals the author says: "God remains the center of the universe; but the Supreme Lord, transcendent Creator of the world who demands that man turn to him in an instantaneous and miraculous repentance in order to be saved for a blessed life in heaven has now become a creative, intelligent spirit, immanent in the forces of nature, and working for the gradual improvement of the entire creation" (p. 44). But as for the grounds of theism, Dr. Williams finds that the liberals wavered between basing the doctrine on faith alone and finding it supported by reason and experience. On his own part, he does not find the theistic position intellectually tenable.

When the idea of evolution was applied in the field of ethics two questions arose: are moral standards to find their basis in nature? and what is the effect of evolutionary thought upon the conception of man's salvation? On the whole the liberals refused to find the basis of moral standards in the natural process and sought such a basis in a transcendent spiritual reality; though the author himself takes the naturalistic position in this matter. But, to the liberals, salvation became a matter of the moral transformation of the individual and of social progress on this earth, as well as entrance into a blessed state in heaven. At the same time, the liberals rejected the idea of the inevitability of progress and insisted that divine agency is necessary for salvation, whether of the individual or of society. "It is too simple," writes the author, "to say that the liberal theology resulted from an optimistic faith in progress" (p. 160).

With regard to the issue arising from the historical criticism of Christian doctrine, Dr. Williams says that the idea of development "is basic in liberal theology," and he finds that the Andover liberals were willing to reinterpret Christian doctrines in harmony with that idea. At the same time, they were concerned to uphold the evangelical posi-

tion that Christianity contained an adequate and final revelation of God. The crux of the matter was the doctrine of the person of Christ. Here too there was reinterpretation, but what was deemed essential to the evangelical position was that the character of God was revealed in Jesus Christ. The question, in the author's judgment, becomes one of the theory of knowledge. "Andover moved toward the position that the evidence for Christianity is in the experience of the Christian as interpreted by reason" (p. 113). But he finds that these theologians shifted back and forth between reason, experience, faith, and mysticism in a vague and inconsistent way.

Apropos of the third issue mentioned above, Dr. Williams writes: "Because Andover believed that moral character is partially conditioned by environment, a conception of social improvement was necessarily an organic part of the doctrine of salvation. God must reconstruct society even to save individuals. But social change, for the liberal theology, is more than a means to individual salvation. The good society itself becomes a worthy object of human desire, and one of the central goals of God's creative purpose" (p. 165). It was chiefly under the leadership of Professor William J. Tucker, afterwards president of Dartmouth College, that Andover developed its teachings concerning "social christianity." These teachings were given concrete expression in social action when Dr. Tucker founded "Andover House," in the south end of Boston (later, "South End House"), which was one of the pioneer social settlements in the United States.

It was not a mere superficial optimism which inspired the development of the social gospel. "The basic achievement of the liberal social gospel," says the author, "was its separation of the Christian way of life from a complacent acceptance of the social order in which Christians live. It was the liberal theologians who brought the whole of nineteenth century culture under the criticism of Christian ethics. To be sure, the criticism was not as thorough or as comprehensive as it should have been; but it did imply that all social relationships fall short when judged by the standards of Christian ethics. It is a curious but undeniable paradox that theologies with extreme stress on man's sin have usually accepted the given social order as ordained by God" (p. 170).

It is in respect to social ethics, however, that some of the author's most searching criticisms are made,—as when he writes: "Never at any time did Andover consider that existing standards of justice and

morality might be definitely related to special class interests" (p. 139).

Dr. Williams' basic criticism of the liberals, running all through his study, has to do with their epistemology, which he finds to be vague and confused. He writes from the standpoint of "an experimental epistemology," with which he couples a humanistic naturalism in metaphysics. To the present reviewer, the use of the term, scientific method, to denote the only process by which valid knowledge can be obtained is both vague and restrictive—vague, in that it blurs the distinction between knowledge in the fields of physics, of history, and of value; and restrictive, in that it debars intuition and speculative reason from the task of philosophical synthesis. A realist epistemology enables us to have a more adequate conception of moral personality than the apparently behavioristic one of the author, and can deliver us from his complete relativism in the realm of values. Nor does a realist epistemology close the door to theism and to metaphysical meanings for religious experience by the positivist doctrine that all reality must be a part of "nature,"—which term the naturalists seem never to define.

But apart from any differences of point of view, the reader of this book will have much reason to be grateful for its thorough scholarship, its fairmindedness, and its challenge to critical thought.

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The Lambeth Conferences: The Solution for Pan-Anglican Organization. By WILLIAM REDMOND CURTIS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. 355 pp. $4.00.

Dr. Curtis' valuable study approaches the history of the Lambeth Conferences from two points of view. Undertaken in search of parallels to the organization of the British Commonwealth of Nations in general and the Imperial Conferences in particular, it has necessarily been worked out in detail as a study in church history for its own sake. The parallels between the Anglican Communion and the British Empire are both clear and interesting. Ecclesiastical autonomy was gained in the Dominions at about the same time as political home rule. It is interesting to note in this connection that the historical significance of Bishop Gray's effort to depose Bishop Colenso, of Natal, springs not so much from the theological questions involved as from the practical importance

it gave to the Privy Council dictum of 1863 that "The Church of England, in places where there is no church established by law, is in the same position with any other religious body,—in no better, but in no worse position" (p. 110).

The result was the organization of the Dominion churches on a voluntary basis, towards which the Anglicans of Canada and New Zealand had been moving since 1850. As the author observes, "The steps by which dioceses became disestablished in the colonies of the British Empire seem to prefigure the growth of political self-government, and their union into provinces suggests the development of dominion status through the union of contiguous colonies" (p. 284). The royal supremacy no longer served as a bond of union. In a typically English and Anglican manner, informal institutions were created to replace it—the Lambeth Conferences, which are not Synods, and the leadership, which is not jurisdiction, of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Lambeth Conferences are, indeed, a parallel to the League of Nations as well as to the British Commonwealth. They have, from the first, included the American Episcopal Church, and in recent years the increasingly self-conscious national churches of missionary foundation. On the whole, this informal gathering, which has never received or been felt to need any grant of power or written constitution, has been effective in preserving Anglican unity and organizing Anglican co-operation.

One may hope that general historians as well as students of Anglican affairs may be interested in further studies of some of the details of the interrelation between the Anglican Communion and world affairs. In a general way one knows that the Anglican Churches have been a valuable link between the English-speaking nations. Within the Empire their influence has generally been in support of the British connection, but with variations. To mention examples, the Church of England in Australia has so valued its English "legal nexus" that, alone among major Anglican Churches, it has not embarked on a revision of the Prayer Book of 1662—the Church of the Province of South Africa has stood (in contrast to the Dutch Reformed Church and in opposition to some elements at home) for a liberal approach to the race question—and the Church of Ireland, though it still prays for the King, has come to terms not unsuccessfully with the Government of Eire, as well as with that of Northern Ireland. In recent years Anglicanism has become increasingly international in its interests. The 1920 and 1930 Conferences displayed

an intelligent interest in social and international affairs, and an active concern with reunion in its international as well as its Anglo-American aspects. The position of the present Archbishop of Canterbury as chairman of the World Council of Churches is a tribute both to Dr. Temple's personal leadership and to the status which his office has acquired through the development of which the Lambeth Conferences have been the center. These topics lie outside Dr. Curtis' subject; his study leads into them, and they are mentioned here as an indication of possible future inquiries.

Dr. Curtis begins with a survey of the organization of the Anglican Churches in 1867, and describes in detail the events which led to the calling of the first Lambeth Conference, and the proceedings of the first two conferences of 1867 and 1878. In a concluding chapter he summarizes the further development as reflected in the Conferences of 1888-1930. It is useful as indicating the increasing extent of the subject-matter of the Conferences; but since this section consists mainly of extracts from the official reports it might well have been shorter. This limitation probably accounts for Curtis' observation that Tait dominated the Conference of 1878 to an extent unapproached by any of his successors (p. 292). Archbishop Davidson had much more influence in the Conferences of 1910 and 1920 than appears in the reports, and, if Curtis had continued his full narrative into the later period, he would doubtless have realized the fact. As the heir of Tait's tradition of ecclesiastical diplomacy, Davidson was praised by his admirers for his skill in bringing out the *communis sensus* of the various bodies over which he presided (G. K. A. Bell, *Randall Davidson,* p. 1161). To others this meant that under the Archbishop's leadership disputes were always compromised and clear decisions avoided; much as all parties liked him personally, there was considerable foundation for the feeling typified by the saying ascribed to Bishop Gore: "When I go up the stairs at Lambeth, I say, *Charles, you be very careful.* When I come down the stairs, I say, *Charles, you know that you never meant to agree to that*" (*Ibid.,* p. 1160). There has been, since 1868, a continuity of attitude and method at Lambeth, enforced by personal and family connections between successive Archbishops. The policy of solving immediate problems separately and avoiding ultimate issues has at times been aggravating, although probably in the long run useful under the conditions of the last two generations. The present times call for a more adventurous

leadership than recent primates have given the Anglican Communion. Under Dr. Temple it is likely to get it.

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The Passing of the Saint: A Study of a Cultural Type. By John M. Mecklin. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941. ix + 206 pp. $2.00.

There is no clearer proof of the gradual broadening of the social sciences than the present, extensive use of the terms "culture" and "cultural." First widely used by anthropologists, the terms are now a regular part of sociological, psychological, and even psychiatric, discussions of man. It is difficult to hark back to a time when "culture" indicated the niceties of life as made up of manners, appreciations, and of quotations from Shelley. Today, we are increasingly aware that the material possessions, actions, thoughts and even feelings of men depend in large part upon their social and psychic environment. That this environment must remain at the present so impossible of definition does not lessen the working value of the "cultural" concept. Yet to date it has been mainly applied to relatively simple situations, to the so-called primitives and to semi-rural, small town communities.

In *The Passing of the Saint* Professor Mecklin has dared to apply the cultural concept to our own rich, highly complex past. From his *Introduction* to his *Epilogue,* he passes from Moses and the Ten Commandments to Hitler and the New Deal. He is making, as his sub-title indicates, the study of a cultural type. Actually, however, he has done two things in passing over the gamut of our historical background: (1) he has isolated a number of saintly types such as the ascetic, the medieval saint, the Calvinistic and Quaker saints, and the eighteenth century saints; and (2) he has insisted that all of these belong to a single type characteristic of the Christian era. His chapter titles ("The Saint in Folklore," "The Saint as a Citizen of Two Worlds," "The Saint and Society," "Augustine and the Cosmos of the Saint," "Bernard of Clairvaux," "St. Francis and Lady Poverty," "The Saint and the Middle Class," and "The Saint and the Democratic Myth") show pretty clearly that Mecklin is primarily interested in the latter of these. Although all of the periods he mentions cry out for cultural analysis as discreet units—

think of the difference between the surrounding world of Augustine and that of Calvin!—he treats them rather as facets of a whole, a single "culture" spread over two continents and two thousand years.

There is a great deal to be said for the existence of such a culture as Mecklin posits. Certainly it must be regarded in only the broadest terms. It is, therefore, indulging in carping criticism to point out that he is often guilty of loose writing and loose thinking; many of his generalizations are not only controversial but questionable; and he seems to be but half aware of his own implications. Mecklin is a sociologist dealing with the published materials of the Christian era, and these are preponderantly religious and historical: until fifty years ago the social sciences were composed of theology and history. He has been obviously influenced by such men as Troeltsch and Delehaye, the latter of whom he graciously acknowledges (p. 8), and by the modern trend toward a history of ideas. His book, then, gives a picture primarily religious and historical, with a sociological outlook. It is especially to be noted that the materials go through the eighteenth century, including Voltaire and Diderot, Franklin and Jefferson among the saints. Mecklin finds that the saints were so much a part of their own times that they also foreshadowed the days which were to come after them. They were men of thought and action whose vision illuminated their world and whose lives illustrated their vision. "All the great saints were the apostles of socialized reason" (p. 183). This is a definition of sanctity in terms of social setting and as such its breadth does justice to the stage in which Mecklin has set his figures.

Nevertheless, both his concept of culture and his description of sanctity are too narrow. If we are to have breadth of concept, and if we are to apply the social sciences to our cultural past, we must do so with the benefit of all that social science has to offer. The fields of religion, history, sociology, psychology, and anthropology constantly overlap. But each of these has different methods, different techniques if you will, which must be utilized. Monasticism may have had an ethic of superlatives, as Mecklin says, and it may have been in conflict with the established church. But what of the economic structure and the wealth of the monasteries? To consider the conflict without reference to these seems something less than adequate. Even the methods of sociology are only partially adopted here and those of psychology and anthropology not at all.

Granting that Mecklin is mainly interested in sainthood, not monasticism or any of the other subjects which fall short of full treatment, and granting the overwhelming social significance of the saints, why should sanctity stop short at 1800? Mecklin's answer is clear: "The august Christian tradition has degenerated into hundreds of impotent middle-class cults that bear a strange family resemblance to the futile cults of the late Roman Empire. These, thanks to their diversity and impotence, have been forced to come to terms with a secularized society and to provide the religious sanctions for wealth and respectability" (p. 199).

Here again, there is a great deal to be said for his analysis. It is certainly that most widely accepted: the Industrial Revolution saw an increased materialism in all branches of life, and the influence of the Church gradually declined. This is, however, essentially an historical analysis. Looking at the facts in the light of the other social sciences, can we limit religion in this fashion to an existence bolstered by institution? Mecklin has said himself, in compelling phrase, "Mankind once more is on the march" (p. 200). I should suspect that a discussion of religion, or of saints, which falters on the threshold of a period when mankind "is on the march" misses the full implications of its cultural approach.

This criticism of the scope of *The Passing of the Saint* is much less a criticism of John M. Mecklin than of his predecessors. We are about to see exciting and revolutionary changes in the interpretations of the realms of human endeavor, and a man who is among the pioneers cannot be blamed for not having said the final word.

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Philosophical Foundations of Faith: A Contribution Toward a Philosophy of Religion. By MARION JOHN BRADSHAW. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. x + 254 pp.

More accurately, this book might be entitled "The Faith of Seventeenth Century Philosophers." That men like Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz had a faith worthy of their philosophy may startle those who know only the familiar mode of disparaging religion in all philosophical discussion. The personal faith of these men has the flavor, bears the limitations of their age. But the extensive consideration of

religion, particularly of Christianity, within their philosophical systems, is impressive and intellectually stimulating.

Were the seventeenth century "founders of modern philosophy"—the four above plus Pascal and Spinoza—concerned in any profound sense with religion? Or was Descartes "naïve," did Hobbes scorn religion and thus bring about the eternal rejection of his system by churchmen, was Locke's empiricism a rejection of historic religion, was Spinoza's God irrelevant for religion, was Leibnitz' presumed interest in theology insincere? To the first of these questions, Yes; to all the others, No! Professor Bradshaw's brief exposition represents a thorough, perhaps not exhaustive, search through the works of these men for their interpretations of religion. "Christianity was a dominant factor in the environment of each of them, and to ignore it would have been to alienate their thought from reality" (p. 12). The treatment of Descartes is more extensive and convincing than any of the others. Descartes, famous for his exacting demand for certitude and refusal to accept only what could be proven true, was immersed (as shown here by numerous references to the *Discourse on Method* and the *Meditations*) in thoughts of God. His existence was the basic truth upon which all certitude depends. "All other propositions . . . such as that . . . the earth exists, and the stars, are in fact less certain." Thus, scientific truth rested upon religious truth; i.e., the humanitarian ends of science could not be derived from science itself, which has no teleology, but from the hidden, mysterious ways of God which religion in part reveals. Science was not co-extensive with nature, nor did it comprehend the whole of knowledge. Theology constituted knowledge, but Descartes did not feel competent to enter that field. The Cartesian dualism did not, therefore, give science a free hand in the quest for knowledge. That dualism itself rested upon the certainty of an underlying divine purpose which gave meaning to all existence itself.

He finds in Hobbes one of the few men of that age who deal profoundly with the problem of conscience in the relation of religion to the State. His answer to that question in favor of the authority of the State proved to be on the wrong side of historical trends, as were most of his opinions. It is indeed amazing to note the extensive consideration Hobbes gave to religion in his system and to see here a materialist who was also a Christian. Locke, the "great empiricist," was saturated with the spirit of the New Testament Gospels. His theory of toleration re-

quired a thorough-going analysis of the relation of religion to civil and ecclesiastical authority; he put obedience to God as first before obedience to law. The author finds Pascal as meriting a place among the great philosophers, because he confronted death without ceasing to *think,* and thus reached the "frigid frontiers of knowledge." Contemporary revival of interest in Spinoza has established his position as one of the great religious thinkers. Bradshaw documents this well from the *Ethics* and in *A Theologico-Political Treatise.* In the case of Leibnitz, the book goes far to restore him to a place of respect and significance in the history of religious thought. "The essence of his philosophy is the harmony between reason and religion."

The author in passing reveals something of the individual faith and religious outlook of these men, though his purpose is more to show religion as basic in their philosophic systems. Numerous quotations make possible a constant interplay between the works of these men and the author's treatment. There are 20 references to Spinoza's *Ethics,* 25 to Pascal's *Pensees,* almost 80 to Leibnitz' works; over 500 footnotes in a text of 232 pages. It is a worthwhile and illuminating effort.

Most of the book's limitations are those recognized by the author. It should be read with a more complete and systematic treatment of the entire works of these writers at hand. The last chapter might well have been given to a more comparative study of these men: Hobbes and Locke, Leibnitz and Descartes. To have referred to each one as "the great" is inappropriate and unnecessary. More should have been said of the fact that this was the century of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton. These are minor points. The book definitely contributes to the restoration of a working relation between philosophy and religion, even theology, and may initiate for Protestantism what the Neo-Thomists have done for Catholicism.

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Experience and the Christian Faith. By HOWARD B. JEFFERSON. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. 230 pp. $2.00.

This book wrestles intelligently with a real problem, and points to a solution which may prove satisfactory to many when more fully stated. The problem is posed by the conflict between experimentalism as developed mainly by John Dewey and found throughout thinking

America, and the traditional Christian faith which is still held by the majority of American Christians (thinking or unthinking). The solution is to accept the operational method to determine what can be called knowledge of both facts and instrumental values, to overlay it with "faith" in realism concerning facts and in God as the supreme value, and to appeal to the revelation found in the Christian tradition as the body of faith about the nature of God.

At first sight, there appears an unreconcilable opposition between experimentalism and traditional Christianity. The former leads logically to humanism and finds its basis in a view of the universe and man which has been refuted by events of the present century. Modernism has sold out to the experimentalists, and therefore is "not essential to Christianity" (p. 22). Any appeal to Christian tradition, however, must include the findings of modern religion; and, if we are willing to admit that the modernist has prejudices, we must also recognize that no other age can be absolutized, even though it produce an Aquinas or the Reformers.

The second chapter is the heart of the argument, and the rest of the book is an elaboration of it. The author uses the term, knowledge, to apply only to what can be empirically verified, and he limits empiricism to what can be determined by Bridgman's operational procedure. Even the realist's inferential knowledge "—that is, arguing from observed phenomena back to an antecedent reality which gave rise to the phenomena—we shall not be able to call knowledge at all" (p. 31). At the same time, "it is reasonable to postulate by an act of faith the existence of an inclusive matrix out of which our various experiences and categories come and to which they refer" (p. 32). Thus the advantages both of experimentalism and of realism are retained by the appeal to faith; but it is not knowledge when the act of faith is made. The examination of nature and values, when backed by various acts of faith, shows that "while faith in God is legitimate, human processes of knowing can give us little assurance as to what God is" (p. 57).

The concept of God gets its content by the appeal to revelation as found in the historic Christian community. This revelation, which moves in the realm of faith, must be consistent with knowledge, but cannot be discovered by the processes of knowledge. The events before Christ, especially in the development of Greek philosophy and the insights of the Jewish scriptures, were a preparation for the supreme reve-

lation in Christ, and "Christ is the symbol of God's mercy in identifying himself completely with the human at a particular point in the historic process, thus bridging the gap between the eternal and the temporal. In addition to following Jesus as our ideal, Christian salvation in its deepest form means identifying ourselves with the God-Man so that we become one with God" (pp. 88-89). Revelation is also continuous and is found in the Christian community. There is no fundamental opposition between this faith in revelation and experimentalism.

The liberalism which aligned itself too closely with contemporary culture, realistic epistemology, and religious experience is evaluated and found wanting. Humanism and naturalism are discounted. Then the method of the combination of experimentalism and faith is turned on nature, evil, and values. The author shows how nature is capable of many interpretations. Experimentalism tells us about some of God's activities within nature, but it takes faith to point to "a God who is really God" (p. 149). Dr. Jefferson does not answer the problem of evil, but turns his criticisms on some inadequate solutions and then writes that "religious faith has three postulates: the reality of evil; a good God who is not responsible for evil; a dependable God who controls nature and can be trusted ultimately to overcome evil" (p. 160). The only values which can be called objective are instrumental values, and they are relative. There is no way to supreme value prior to faith in God.

A final chapter illustrates this approach in terms of the relation of theology to the social problem. Pragmatism, faith in a transcendent God, and faith in the revelation of the Christian tradition are shown to be relevant to the social situation. He concludes with three interpretations of the kingdom of God, and says these three views must be taken together to avoid one-sidedness.

We may be grateful for this book because it states a fundamental problem which modern theologians must face. Especially in America, theologians must come to terms with John Dewey's humanistic pragmatism, which has permeated both secular and religious education. It is not conclusively shown by Dr. Jefferson, however, that acceptance of an out-and-out operational theory of knowledge is the answer. By doing this, he puts the theologian at a disadvantage by making him rely on a special kind of faith. In the end, it requires a specifically religious faith to come to the rescue at the religious level. This makes all theology, including the bare fact (if it can be called a fact) of the existence of God,

part of a system of overbeliefs whose only claim to objective status is that they are somehow consistent with knowledge.

It is never quite clear what this "faith" is. It is an act of trust; it is like Santayana's "animal faith"; it is a willingness to believe. It is checked by not being allowed to contradict empirically verified facts (which are merely operational tools, anyhow, and therefore subject to constant change). It is nearer to speculation or guess-work (at best like Abailard's *existematio*), backed by good will towards the findings of the Christian tradition. In fairness to the argument, it is to be admitted that all theories of knowledge have a faith that concepts check with facts, but there is no need to bring in a special type of faith which is open to a highly subjective interpretation.

The heart of the difficulty is, of course, Dr. Jefferson's rejection of realism as a theory of knowledge. He writes that "the validity of a realistic theory of knowledge is dubious even when applied to objects of scientific knowledge" (p. 111). If this is so (and I am not persuaded by the arguments), then Dr. Jefferson has no right to bring it in again as an act of faith.

The value-theory espoused in the book follows consistently from the rejection of realism, but even the making of instrumental values part of the operational technique makes specific "goods" (either as means or as ends) just as objective as facts, and this provides a basis for an objective theory of ultimate values as well. There is no need to resort to a special appeal to faith as a kind of certainty which is not to be called knowledge.

Even on operational grounds, it is not quite so easy as the author believes to get rid of religious experience as a source for knowledge of God. He uses Professor Macintosh's statement that the "right religious adjustment" is always dependable, and shows that this is not so. Yet, there would not be any religious faith at all if there were no possibility of a right religious adjustment, for religious faith is born in the relations between God and man. It is entirely possible that the so-called "data of religious experience" must include also the experience of *frustration* as essential to an understanding of the nature of God.

But this would be an ungracious review if it were not pointed out that Dr. Jefferson has performed a significant task, both in stating the problem so clearly and in suggesting an important solution. One of the most important things about the book is its evidence that a liberal can

adapt himself to a new situation and provide a reconstructed theology which eliminates the errors of previous liberal thought without sacrificing the liberal spirit. Another value of the book is the illustration of how operational theory can be aligned with the problem of religious knowledge, indicating its limitations and the possibilities of its use when supplemented by faith; one is grateful for his careful distinctions between what is known and what comes from faith. There are many incidental criticisms of other widely held positions which occur throughout these chapters, and which will make many a reader stop and think. Even where the reader does not agree, the interpretations of nature and value illuminate the problem which the theologian must face. He points out the danger to the empiricist of getting caught in a vicious circle (p. 107). Finally, there are some important insights into the relevance of theology to the social order, which the theologian can ignore only at his peril.

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Is Modern Culture Doomed? By ANDREW J. KRZESINSKI. Foreword by Msgr. G. BARRY O'TOOLE. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1942. xvi + 158 pp. $2.00.

This is a difficult book to review adequately, for, as with so many other diagnoses of the modern world, the fundamental attitude of the author, despite his apparent clarity, is anything but clear to the reader. Father Krzesinski is a devout and learned priest of the Roman Catholic Church, and he sees the solution of the world's difficulties in a return to the Church and to real traditional Christian culture.

This is all to the good. There can be no doubt that the last centuries have witnessed a decrease in the influence of religion which has now, in many parts of the globe, been driven into the catacombs by the forces of militant paganism, atheism, and materialism. The interests of the human race are centered on this world, and God has been definitely brushed aside, neglected, and denied. The result is the present situation. So far we must all agree with Father Krzesinski.

Yet, in the midst of his indictment of modern materialistic culture, we suddenly begin to feel doubts. Of course, if every man and woman did his duty as a Christian, the present deplorable situation would not

arise. Yet why is it that militant atheism has scored its greatest victories in those countries which were the most backward materially? Why is it that Nazism and racism have triumphed in Germany, where material progress was highest? It is too simple an explanation that we are offered here in this book.

Is it possible that traditional Christian culture failed to appreciate the new forces that were bestowed upon man in the rediscovery of classical culture and in the advance of physical science? That it contented itself with a position of opposition instead of mastery of the world in the name of heaven? That it bound itself to a temporary code in the idea that it was the goal of mankind? That the Christian leaders of the later Middle Ages did not have the human wisdom and learning of those men who had shaped Christian ideals and culture for the first thousand years?

It requires little knowledge of the past to realize that our present problems, gigantic as they are when time and space have been almost abolished, when radio circles the world in less than a moment of time, when food and supplies are brought speedily and normally from all portions of the earth to a given spot, when the world is interdependent, were (at least in inchoate form) present when a town, a province, or a nation was separated from its neighbors by fifty miles or a good day's journey. The medieval world, with its traditional Christian culture, did not solve those problems. It remains to be seen whether the modern world can do better.

On the moral side there is the same confusion. The dances of today are no more bitterly attacked (p. 86) than were those of a century ago or of five centuries ago, when the nature of their pagan content was still unrealized. Parallels to the sports and the abuses can always be found. The problem of a Christian culture is not yet solved.

There remains alone religion and the decline of the power of the Church. There remains the loss of faith in God. This must be restored if Christian culture is to proceed upon its course. There are indications, as Father Krzesinski points out, that many of the leaders of world thought are realizing this sincerely. There are possibilities, yes, probabilities that the power of irreligion will be broken and that the Christian religion will be able to master the forces of irreligion and of other religions, for Nazism and Communism are new atheistic religions.

To bring about this result, mere attack is not enough. The conscience

of mankind must be again awakened, but for its part Christianity must differentiate sharply and more clearly than in the past between a literal following of an ancient code and the essence that the code sought to fulfil. It will be a long and serious struggle, and the resulting world will have little likeness to that from which it moved.

Father Krzesinski presents a formidable indictment of modern culture and its weaknesses. Yet his history and analysis of materialistic culture does not answer the needs of the present. He is right when he demands a restoration of the Christian ideal, but he gives us very little information as to how that ideal can be worked out in the modern world. The spirit is the main thing; the Christian Faith is the main thing, and his broad denials of the modern world will not assist appreciably in bringing about that recovery.

The book belongs to that ever-growing series of indictment literature. There is no need to question the correctness of details. There is no need to defend realism in literature, modern humanitarianism, and many other objects attacked. The book will appeal to a certain type of Roman Catholic mind and to those who have a wistful longing for the past. It will serve little purpose as a guide to the future, except in so far as it is another voice demanding that the Christian religion be given its proper place in life.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Prayer. By GEORGE ARTHUR BUTTRICK. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. 333 pp. $2.75.

There are along our seacoast three kinds of lighthouses: the fixed, the sector, and the flashing light. The first is the classical light; the second might be called a specialized light; the third is "inspirational." One might say that books can be thus classified. There are serene books standing in their own right; there are books of research restricted to some narrow angle of truth; and there are flashing books which light up a whole horizon by their revolving ray of mobile insight.

Dr. Buttrick's book is of this last class. It is a book written by a man who is happy in the high calling of the preaching ministry, and who bends his whole strength to the dignifying of that ministry. This is, primarily, a book by a preacher for preachers. They will gain most from it, because they are privately aware of the problems involved and publicly concerned with decent solutions to those problems. Beyond

this first circle of readers the book should reach the wider circle of thoughtful laity, as found, for example, in the congregation of the Madison Avenue Church, to whom it is very fittingly dedicated. All readers will feel that they have been generously invited to share with a distinguished preacher in his own personal meditations and devotions, as in the formulation of his professional skills.

Prayer is commonly described as being adoration and praise, confession, petition, intercession, and thanksgiving. These five or six types of prayer may again be re-classified as being either mystical or prophetical. In general, prayers of praise and adoration are mystical in their mood and content. They are technically described as "orison," a reflective consent to a divine reality. They bring the affairs of time to the footstool of eternity and lay them there. "Our hearts are restless until they find rest in thee." Prayers of petition and intercession are, however, of the prophetic type. They are concerned with affairs in time and, what is more, they hope to make a change in the course of those affairs; they attempt to make or to direct history, whether as the experience of a single individual or as the collective life of a society.

Prayers of praise, adoration, and thanksgiving present no serious intellectual difficulties, provided one is a believer in God. Prayers of confession, if properly worded and phrased, ought to present no grave moral problems. What we call the "problem of prayer" attends petition for ourselves in the first instance, and is even more acutely stated in the terms of our intercessions for others. Of the subjective value of prayer there are no serious doubts. Psychology concedes that fact in advance. As to the objective efficacy of prayer there must always be genuine perplexity. And there is always the moral danger that prophetic prayer may lapse back into the slough of magic, from which mystical prayer is forever attempting to rescue it.

Now Dr. Buttrick is an unashamed and unequivocal Protestant who stands in the prophetic tradition. Trusting his own instinct and experience, therefore, he devotes the most serious pages in his book to the problem attending prayers of petition and intercession. The field is a familiar one; the considerations used in argument pro and con are equally familiar. Yet the problem is never wholly solved, and the perennial debate always takes on new interest when dealt with in candor and honesty by a religiously mature and disciplined mind. In many ways Dr. Buttrick's chapters on these subjects are the best in the book.

In later pages we find him as pastor rather than preacher, dealing with his theme as it touches the newer sciences of the mind. He knows that a pastor is not a secular psychiatrist, but he also knows that anything which the new psychology may tell us about the inner life of men and women, and the processes going on there, deserves the sober consideration of the minister of religion. Books which represent ventures back and forth across the fluctuating boundary between the ministries of religion and medicine are now very many. Dr. Buttrick has not duplicated studies previously made of this thoroughly contemporary concern, and has done a good deal to suggest ways and means of praying with and for the mentally and emotionally unstable, of whom, alas, there is, in these troubled days, an increasing number.

One could wish that Dr. Buttrick had explored at greater length the "problem" of appropriate contemporary forms for our traditional general confessions of sin, which might command the instant consent of the modern conscience. This matter needs careful elaboration. Furthermore, being prophetically Protestant, our author has not proffered, for the correction of conventionally one-sided Protestant prayer as petition and intercession, an equally discursive consideration of the place which mystical prayer, as meditative orison, might take in public worship. We should find ourselves in Protestantism less cumbered by worshipers perplexed about the problematical aspects of prayer if we gave more attention to its non-problematical expression as adoration, praise, and thanksgiving. As one reads the Catholic missal with its note of adoration, and the Jewish prayer book with its thanksgivings, one is aware of the actual possibility of such correction or re-emphasis. However, we thank Dr. Buttrick for what he has done so honestly and vigorously; it is ungenerous to comment upon what he has left undone.

W. L. Sperry
Harvard University

The Religious Function of Imagination. By Richard Kroner. (Published for Kenyon College) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. x + 70 pp. $1.00.

This little book publishes the Bedell Lectures, delivered by Professor Kroner at Kenyon College in November, 1940. A month later in that year Professor Kroner asked for my views on the subject of the religious function of imagination, in the course of commenting publicly on a

paper I had read before the Philosophical Association. Since Professor Kroner's lectures had not been published at that time, I welcome this opportunity to continue the discussion of their important theme.

Professor Kroner's thesis in his first lecture, on "Thought and Imagination," is that "it is religious imagination and not philosophic thought that gives the most satisfactory and the most profound answers to the deepest questions. Religious imagination is, as it were, more akin to the ultimate essence of life and reality than are thought and speculation" (p. 3). The second lecture, on "Imagination and Revelation," declares that

> the superiority of Biblical religion is based on the presumption that the divine mystery reveals itself in it, or that *man's* imagination is at the same time the word of *God*. Religious imagination thus turns into Divine Revelation from the side of God and into Inspiration from the side of Man. Religious imagination in the sense of Biblical religion is *inspired imagination* (p. 37).

Elsewhere Professor Kroner characterizes religious imagination as *productive, inspired,* and *responsible* (all italics his).

Perhaps we can take as an uncontroversial point of departure a statement which Professor Kroner makes toward the end of the lectures, to the effect that "we have to spend the whole energy of all our mental powers to discover the right way in life and in belief as well. The totality of our existence is at stake, and thus the totality of our personality must participate in the search" (p. 63). But "totality" is such a vaguely comprehensive term that theory always seems fated to depart from it in the direction of giving it some more specific characterization. No doubt my own views illustrate this fact in their way just as truly as Professor Kroner's do in his. He says "religion is a product of imagination" (p. 1) rendering totality imaginatively. I prefer to say religion is a kind of activity, a consecrating activity; the adjective includes the connotation of involving an integration of self, fellow-beings, and world. The imagination, when it functions religiously, is responsible to this kind of activity.

Some of Professor Kroner's key statements read as follows:

> Imagination unifies the opposite poles of our mind, the pole of sensation and that of reason (p. 15). Actual *responsible imagination* is centered in the image of the whole, of the real, of the ultimate meaning of the world (p. 13). This whole is a mystery, and can be grasped or experienced only as a mystery, and that means only by religious imagination (p. 18). The mystical unity of God and

the prophet has certain limits. It is not an identity between God and man but an imaginative kinship between them (p. 52). The trend of his imagination indicates the nature of a person, the height of his moral standards, the very worth of his character, the level of his spirit (p. 8). The whole existence of Jesus the Christ is formed and constituted by his imagination (p. 61).

Just putting these statements together in this way makes a strong case for Kroner's view, I think, and one hesitates, in a culture so greatly in need as ours of finer religious imagination, to say anything against such an emphasis. Yet, just as Santayana's way of appreciating the role of imagination in religion can tend to render it impotent, so Professor Kroner's way of exalting it threatens to sink us into confusion. Both may obstruct the advance of religious truth.

In the case of Professor Kroner's first chapter, on "Thought and Imagination," my difficulties lie in the traces there of a compartmentalism worse than Kant's. No doubt Professor Kroner does not mean it so, for he says, "the imagination unifies the opposite poles of our mind." But note that the unification is attributed to imagination, and not to collaboration of all the mental powers. Professor Kroner criticizes Kant's failure to recognize an imaginative intuition corresponding to the ideal of totality. But when Professor Kroner places this imaginative intuition beyond the discipline of thought, one might criticize him, in turn, for delivering us over to irresponsible imagination, just as the doctrine of reason's self-sufficiency can land us in uninspired intellectualism.

My difficulties with the second chapter, on "Imagination and Revelation," lie in its apparent oscillation between bibliolatry and an extremely vague mysticism. Revelation seems to mean, on the one hand, disclosure of life's mystery and, on the other, the biblical word of God. Professor Kroner, of course, regards the two as the same. He contrasts biblical miracle with the imaginative fiction and esthetic fantasy of the Greek myths, because, in the former, "God as a personal agent enters the world of historical and daily events, and these definite events are consistently referred to His agency" (p. 44). But later, he admits that "according to the Greeks, the god works in poetic creation; it is, in fact, Apollo who creates poetry in the soul of the genius" (p. 55). And now the superiority of the biblical view is maintained on the ground that "only the prophetic afflatus, i.e., that which directly has to do with the reality of our moral life and with our moral weal and woe, is divine inspiration" (p. 55).

The basic question is in what sense the religious imagination is to be regarded as responsible. Professor Kroner bares this difficulty in a footnote on page 64. Here it is rather suddenly said that "the objectivity of religious truth is due to moral reason and to philosophical thought." But since "life is always individual and concrete," religious truth also has a subjective relation to "the divine mystery." Religious imagination somehow, in a way Professor Kroner "supposes inexplicable," satisfies this double responsibility to its objective and subjective grounds. If religion, however, be regarded not merely as "a product of imagination," but, more completely, as an activity of a consecrating kind, there will be room to include recognition of both objective and subjective factors and also of imagination's functions in linking both. But it will not be necessary to claim that the religious image (cf. Hegel's *Vorstellung*) is the final synthesis in religion. The responsibility of the imagination in religion lies in what it does to further the actual linking of persons and groups and world in a consecrating, or one might also say a justifying, way. It is true that where there is no vision the people may perish, but where there is visionary mystification and fanaticism they may perish too. The Bible is indeed sublimely imaginative, but it also forbids idolatry.

HORACE L. FRIESS

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BOOK NOTES

The Bhagavad-Gītā and Modern Scholarship. By S. C. Roy. London: Luzac & Co., 1941. xviii + 270 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*

This book leads back to the heyday of controversy on the origin, composition, and meaning of the Bhagavad-Gītā, in dwelling extensively on the theories and interpretations of Garbe, Holzmann, Hopkins, Dahlmann, Bhandarkar, and various Hindu scholars. Its first part, in fact, was written twenty-five years ago; the present volume, moreover, is only meant to be an introduction to the study of the Gītā to be followed by two more volumes to be named *The Bhagavad-Gītā and Its Background,* and *Interpretation of the Gītā in the Light of Modern Thought.* Unfortunately, some more recent explanations of the Song Celestial have escaped the author's attention, notably Franklin Edgerton's and Rudolf Otto's remarkable attempts to solve the problems which will haunt every critical reader of the immortal document. Still this extensive research of so many earlier interpretations of Western and Indian scholars, though at times it makes rather dull reading, is justified by the intrinsic complexity of its subject-matter, and should prove a useful survey of the painstaking labor devoted to the Hindu gospel since the beginnings of Indic studies.

Roy denies the assumed clash between pantheistic and theistic views in the Gītā, and refutes the claim that the Gita should be taken as a sectarian text of the Bhāgavatas. Emphasizing the Upanishadic origin of the teaching of the Gītā, he criticizes the orthodox Hindu view of the sectarian origin of the Māhabhārata and the Gītā as well. In this respect the chapters on the relation of the Gītā to the Nārāyaṇa cult, based on a comparative analysis of the Gītā and the Nārāyaṇīya section in *Mokṣadharma,* and on its relation to later Kṛṣṇa-cult and bhakti as well, are of special interest.

Henry R. Zimmer

Eight American Praxapostoloi. By Kenneth W. Clark. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941. 204 pp. $2.00.

This monograph is gracefully and most fitly dedicated "to the memory of F. H. A. Scrivener, indefatigable collator and devoted scholar." It is nearly a century since Dr. Scrivener, then a young Cambridge graduate and curate, began his great task of research into the manuscripts of the New Testament. The textual materials to which he called attention have been widely enlarged during recent years, and specially in this country. Dr. Clark pays just honor to the pioneering efforts of the distinguished English churchman in this field of linguistic study, in editing these collations of medieval texts which are to be found in American collections.

Scrivener himself had bewailed the lack of attention paid to the text of Greek Church lectionaries from Acts and the Epistles. Such collating had hitherto been hasty and partial, owing to the state of the texts. He himself achieved some

results, but this admirable monograph puts within reach of scholars fresh data of a singularly important character, including not merely independent work by Dr. Clark but a fresh revision of Codex 876 by Professor Sanders, and Professor Riddell's collation of Codex 2412, "the most significant of American Praxapostoloi." Even when the importance is secondary, it is relevant to an appreciation of the major texts at many points.

Eight handsome plates adorn the volume. But textual students of the New Testament will be primarily grateful for the minute, exact scholarship which enables them to supplement work already done on the Praxapostoloi by Gregory, von Dobschütz, and others. The present reviewer has not been able to work over more than the Acts and First Corinthians data, but even this partial survey is enough to show our large indebtedness to Dr. Clark for this sequel to his *Descriptive Catalogue of Greek New Testament Manuscripts in America. Inter arma silent leges,* perhaps, but happily not *voces doctorum in scripturis.*

JAMES MOFFATT

The Literary Lineage of the King James Bible, 1340-1611. By CHARLES C. BUTTERWORTH. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941. xi + 394 pp. $4.00.

The First Authorized English Bible and the Cranmer Preface. By HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. 55 pp. and facsimiles. $1.00.

In *The Literary Lineage of the King James Bible,* Dr. Butterworth has given us a new history of the English Bible up to and including the Authorized Version of 1611. His treatment of the "external" history of the Bible (that is, his account of the translators, revisers, and printers) is, in most respects, fuller than any previous one-volume treatment of the subject; but, as his title suggests, he has put the chief emphasis on "internal" history, or the development of the text itself and of the English biblical style.

It will be no surprise to many of Dr. Butterworth's readers to discover, from the table on page 231, that only about 39% of the phraseology of the King James Bible was original with the revisers of 1611; but the other figures in this table are highly instructive. From a rather extensive sampling of the text, Dr. Butterworth estimates that approximately 19% of the King James phraseology first appeared in the work of the Geneva revisers of 1557-1560, 18% in Tyndale, 13% in Coverdale, and the remainder in the other earlier versions. In the course of his book he devotes much more attention than his predecessors to the minor translators whose work contributed to the King James text, and especially to George Joye, whose translations of Jeremiah, Isaiah, and the Psalter appeared in 1531-1534. and who was probably also the translator of the hitherto neglected edition of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes published by George Godfray about 1535. He makes clear the dependence of the King James Bible on the earlier

translations and revisions, and their dependence on each other, by means of illustrative parallels, which are scattered plentifully throughout the book. I count no less than fifty-two sets of parallel passages, some of them quite short, but all of them significant for the history of the biblical text. For example, to show the place of the Rouen Primer of 1536 in the tradition, Psalm 19:1-5 is quoted in parallel texts from the "Argentine" Psalter of 1530, Joye's Psalter of 1534, Coverdale's Bible of 1535, the Rouen Primer, and the King James Bible itself; similarly, to illustrate Coverdale's technique of "blending" his own translation of 1535 with the Matthew Bible of 1537 to produce the Great Bible, parallel texts of II Samuel 1:23-26 are used. Bishop Westcott, in his *General View of the History of the English Bible*, gave extensive collations from most of the versions, but Dr. Butterworth's arrangement of the materials is much easier for the student and general reader to follow. Further application of this method is made in Appendix I, where ten selected passages from all parts of the Bible (including one from the Apocrypha) are presented in parallel texts from the King James Bible and the relevant earlier versions, in each case with underlining of the first occurrence of the King James phraseology. Luke 1:46-55 (the Magnificat) is here printed from no less than nineteen versions, and Psalm 23 from fifteen. Appendix II is an analysis of the six sections of the King James Bible assigned to the six companies of revisers, showing the literary lineage of each of these parts. Clearly, little more could be desired in a single volume, and Dr. Butterworth's book will be welcomed with gratitude by all students of English biblical history.

The title of Dr. Willoughby's monograph reminds the reader that there were other Bibles before the King James version of 1611 which were "appointed to be read in churches"—to wit, the Great Bible of 1539 and the Bishops' Bible of 1568. Dr. Willoughby's subject is the Great Bible, and the "seven successive and very magnificent folio editions" of it which appeared during the years 1539 to 1541. In the four chapters of his book, he discusses (1) the typography of the Great Bible, for which François Regnault, the Parisian printer, was largely responsible; (2) the title-page woodcut, which has generally been assigned to Hans Holbein the Younger but which, according to Dr. Willoughby, is not Holbein's work; (3) the six-page preface by Thomas Cranmer, which first appeared in the edition of April, 1540; and (4) Coverdale's text of the Great Bible and the successive revisions of it. At the end of the book are facsimile reproductions of the title-page and the Cranmer preface (both taken from the edition of April, 1540), together with a "somewhat modernized" version of the preface in letterpress. All in all, this monograph is a useful contribution to our knowledge of the Great Bible; it is by specialized investigations of this sort that the many gaps in our knowledge of the English Bible versions may eventually be filled.

ELLIOTT V. K. DOBBIE

Rashi Anniversary Volume I: Text and Studies. New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1941. 248 pp.

Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac, known under the name of Rashi, the great Jewish commentator, was born in 1040, and the 900th anniversary of his birth was commemorated by the Jewish Academy for Jewish Research by the publication of this volume. It contains general articles by A. Marx and I. Elbogen on his life and work and general meaning for our time, as well as articles dealing with various aspects of his work. Rashi's popular commentary on the Bible is one of the widest read books in Jewish literature, and A. Freimann's contribution, "Manuscript Supercommentaries on Rashi's Commentary on the Pentateuch," comprises 134 books written in twelve different countries. "Rashi and the Community of Troys" is discussed by S. W. Baron. A study of Rashi's lexical contributions to the Hebrew language is offered by B. Cohen, while other literary and historical aspects are dealt with by V. Aptowitzer, M. Higger, and B. D. Weinryb.

ABRAHAM HESCHEL

The Ethics of Tolerance. By IRA EISENSTEIN. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. ix + 87 pp. $1.50.

Tolerance has been regarded as a virtue by those showing it and as an indignity by those subjected to it. For to be tolerant is to appear to oneself broad-minded toward those whom one might otherwise contemn; and to be tolerated is to appear to oneself endured by those whom one suspects of contempt. In a society of equals, in other words, tolerance itself would disappear, to be replaced by that active respect and cultivation of different personalities and groups which would be the mark of a genuinely democratic society.

In keeping with that spirit of modern inquiry which transforms the object with which it begins, Mr. Eisenstein makes a significant contribution in his brief but searching volume. He has seen clearly into the well-meaning but misguided efforts of those who think and talk in terms of tolerance. And though his inquiry bears the term in its title, he has skilfully analyzed the matter into its basic elements and reconstructed them in a more dynamic and democratic way.

Putting to excellent use the principle of polarity, Eisenstein centers his inquiry on the question of a fruitful relationship between individual and group. He limits the use of the term "tolerance" to "that condition of social equilibrium which exists when there is no conscious striving for equilibrium." When there is an awareness of relations, however, and conscious efforts are made to establish or maintain this equilibrium, the principle involved becomes that of equity. It is this principle of equity with which he is primarily concerned, and which offers the dynamic method with which he approaches the social scene.

The application of the principle is restricted in this volume to relationships among various religious groups, in which are included secular faiths, and es-

pecially nationalism. He is distrustful of the bases of the inter-faith movements which have occupied the scene in recent years and is, properly, much more hopeful of such efforts as are exemplified by the Common Council for American Unity.

It seems to the reviewer that Eisenstein's basic principle is equivalent to that emphasis upon the active cultivation of differences made by Felix Adler and the Ethical Culture Movement he founded. They are not mentioned in this inquiry, but this and other groups have been attempting to put to pragmatic test the things of which the author writes. That they have met with only limited success up to the present time is no reflection upon Eisenstein's principle of equity; it poses a problem, rather, and issues a challenge for more widespread utilization of the method.

JEROME NATHANSON

Philosophy and Order. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1941. Vol. XVII. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America, 1942. 204 pp. $2.00.

The volume is dedicated to the discussion of problems of both "the order that man makes and does not find and the order that he finds and does not make" (p. 4). Worth mentioning among the divers contributions are, above all, the exposition of the new hypothesis "that there exists a one-to-one isomorphism between an n-valued logic and the algebra of remainder-class ring modulo n" (p. 17); the reference to the fact that mere accumulation of data, for instance in the social sciences, does not of itself lead to the discovery of any order: "one selected bibliography lists one hundred and fifty pre-1929 publications dealing with business-forecasting, and yet all this and like information on forecasting did not enable us to foresee the crash of 1929 six months before it occurred" (p. 36); the criticism of Communist doctrines as distortions and caricatures of Christian truths (p. 63 f.); the description of the religious background of the Constitution of the United States (p. 131) in contradistinction to the disorder prevailing in contemporary philosophy of law. Finally it is pointed out that one of the major characteristics of Thomism is its "universalism" (p. 151): "it may be called a system if one understands by this an organism, not a mechanism . . . it is a synthesis which transcends its components . . . is always inventive, essentially progressive and with a fundamentally inherent need . . . to renew itself."

HENRY DEKU

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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